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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 6, 1983, a bomb exploded in an Israeli bus traveling
through Jerusalem, killing six passengers and injuring some fifty others. Three
years later, an Israeli military court found two Palestinian residents of the
West Bank' guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Their homes
were then demolished pursuant to an order issued by the Military Com-
mander.2 The confessions upon which the convictions were based implicated
a third person, Nader Jaber, who had fled to Jordan. At the time of the bomb
explosion, he had been living with his wife in a room on the roof of his
parents' house in the West Bank town of Ramallah. Fearing that his home
would be demolished, Nader's father, Ramzi Jaber, petitioned the Israeli
Supreme Court for an injunction against a potential demolition order.' His
fears were confirmed when the Military Commander requested approval for
the exercise of his authority under Article 119 of the 1945 Defense (Emer-
gency) Regulations (1945 DERs).4 Article 119 authorizes the confiscation and
destruction of houses in which either an action violating a security-related law
was committed or a person who committed such an action resides.5 The
Military Commander sought to destroy the room on the roof of the Jaber
family's house and to seal up the second floor.6
Jaber pursued three arguments. First, he argued that the order should not
be issued before a criminal court established his son's guilt. The Court,
1. This Article generally refers to the Israeli-occupied regions by the names that are most commonly
used in the international debate: "West Bank," "Gaza Strip," or "the Occupied Territories." The biblical
terms "Judea" and "Samaria" - as the West Bank is officially called in Israel - are used as they appear
in quoted texts or in formal titles. This Article also uses the terms "occupied territories," "military
government," "occupying power," and "occupant" as they are normally used in international law.
2. The Military Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region issued
the Order. According to international custom, occupied territories are governed by army officers appointed
by the occupying army. These military commanders normally establish military governments and execute
their policies through them. The Military Commanders of the two regions are hereinafter referred to as
Military Commanders. Israel has also established a Civil Administration, which is responsible for the civil
and economic facets of its rule.
3. Before August 1989, homes were demolished without giving their residents prior notice. See infra
text accompanying notes 157 to 160.
4. 1442 Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1055, 1089 (Sept. 27, 1945) [hereinafter 1442 Palestine
Gazette], as amended by 1600 Palestine Gazette Extraordinary, Supp. No. 2, at 1159 (July 31, 1947)
[hereinafter 1600 Palestine Gazette].
5. For a discussion of Article 119, see infra part II.D.
6. The Military Commander explained that he had originally intended to demolish the entire three
story structure, but because "Nader had not been living there since 1984 ... and ... due to technical
reasons it would have been impossible to destroy the second floor without ruining the other floors.., and
since two other families lived in the building ... [he decided] ex gratia ... to settle for the demolition
of the room on the roof and the sealing of the secondfloor." Brief for the Military Commander at 4, Jaber
v. Commander of Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522 (1987) (HCJ 897/86) (This and all other quotations
in this Article have been translated by the author.). According to the Military Commander's brief, the
ground floor was used for storage, Nader's parents and siblings lived on the first floor, one of his brothers
lived on the second floor with his wife and son, and Nader and his wife resided in the room on the roof.
Id.
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referring to the language of Article 119, responded that "the Military
Commander does not need a judicial conviction, neither does he constitute a
court himself. He need only determine whether a reasonable person would
have found the information before him to be sufficient evidence. No doubt,
this standard was met in the case before us."7 Second, Jaber claimed that his
son should not be considered an "inhabitant" of the family's house, since he
had been living outside the country for almost two years when the demolition
order was issued. The Court dismissed this claim by ruling that Article 119
does not require continuous residency!s
Finally, Jaber argued that the demolition practice is fundamentally
inconsistent with the international law of belligerent occupation. In so doing,
he set out to overturn a dozen of the Court's previous decisions. Jaber argued
that demolitions violate the Regulations Annexed to the 1907 Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague
Regulations),' and two articles of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention). 10 An
opinion of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported
Jaber's petition, asserting that Article 53 of the Geneva Convention prohibited
the demolition of private property, as performed by the Military Govern-
ment."
Most of the Court's three-page decision focused not on these legal
challenges, but rather on the importance of demolitions as a means of
deterring future offenses. The Court addressed the international law claims
only cursorily: "With all due respect to the [ICRC] legal opinion, the question
before us does not concern the interpretation of Article 53 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention." It stated that international law instructs occupying
powers to preserve local law that precedes an occupation and concluded
simply, "Article 119 constitutes part of the law that was in force in the Judea
and Samaria Region ... and we have not been presented with any legal
reasons why it should now be deemed invalid."' 2 The Court thus rejected the
international law claims without explaining why local law should take
precedence over substantive international law, without discussing Article 53
7. The Court stated that it relied on the "very detailed account of his convicted accomplices depicting
Nader's involvement" in the act. Jaber v. Commander of Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522, 524 (1987)
(English excerpt in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 252 (1988)).
8. Id. at 525.
9. Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, T.I.A.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. Jaber cited
Articles 46, 23(g), and 50. Brief for Appellant at 2, 41(2) P.D. 522 (1987) (HCJ 397/58).
10. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. Jaber cited Article 53
(destruction of property) and Article 33 (collective and non-individual punishment).
11. Interpretation by the ICRC of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949
(Nov. 25, 1981) (appended to Brief for Appellant, 41(2) P.D. 522 (1987) (HCJ 397/58)) [hereinafter ICRC
Interpretation]. For an excerpt from the letter, see infra note 366.
12. Jaber, 41(2) P.D. at 525-26; see also infra note 240.
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of the Geneva Convention, and without mentioning the five other provisions
cited by the petitioner. Even so, the Jaber decision is one of the few
demolition cases in which the Court made any reference to international law.
The Court has decided ninety-four home demolition cases since it began
to adjudicate the practice in 1979.13 The Court has addressed this issue more
than any other legal question concerning the Occupied Territories. The
Court's record displays almost uniform support of the practice. It has upheld
demolition orders in ninety-one cases, effectively authorizing the destruction
of eighty-seven homes and the sealing of another fifty-eight. 14 The Court has
overruled only three demolition orders. 5 In all of these cases, only two
dissenting opinions have been written. 6
This Article examines the legality of the Israeli Military Government's
home demolition practice in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and evaluates the
jurisprudence that endorses it. 17 1 intend to show that the practice is prohibited
by the international law of belligerent occupation and by Israeli law. This
endeavor is crucial. The demolition of a home is a harsh measure that inflicts
hardship upon people who are not suspected of any wrongdoing. Rather, they
are punished merely because they live in, or own, a home in which someone
who committed a security offense resided. The ramifications of the practice,
however, transcend the realm of legal rights and financial loss: the practice
has frustrated and humiliated Palestinians and exacerbated their antagonism
toward Israel. It has also demeaned the image of Palestinians in the Israeli
psyche and threatened the Israeli commitment to their well-being. It has thus
eroded mutual respect and diminished the prospects for reconciliation. The
practice has also affected the Israeli legal system adversely. The Supreme
Court's approval of demolitions in the face of legal and moral challenges has
corrupted Israeli law and has undermined the legitimacy of the Court itself.
I do not question that the Military Government has had great difficulties
in maintaining peace and order in the Occupied Territories. Nor do I deny that
13. This Article systematically surveys the cases delivered until June 1991. To the best of my
knowledge, 115 petitions concerning home demolitions had reached the Supreme Court until that date, 24
of which were settled without judgment. See infra text accompanying note 161. The Article also discusses
three additional cases delivered since then that are of particular significance. These figures do not include
petitions that were withdrawn by the petitioners after the Military Government announced that it had no
intention to demolish the homes in question or that it had rescinded the demolition orders prior to the court
session.
14. Some cases involve more than one house. A total of 145 houses were ordered destroyed or sealed
in the cases reviewed by the Court.
15. Turkeman v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 5510/92 (1993) (unpublished); Nimer v. Military
Commander of West Bank Region, HCJ 299/90 (1991) (unpublished); Nassman v. Military Commander
of Gaza Region, 44(2) P.D. 601 (1990). The Court also restricted an order in another case, Jabarin v.
Minister of Defense, HCJ 443186, 515186 (1987) (unpublished).
16. AI-Amrin v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, 46(3) P.D. 693 (1992) (Heshin, J.,
dissenting); Khizran v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 46(2) P.D. 150 (1992)
(Heshin, J., dissenting).
17. This Article uses the term "demolition" to refer to the practice in general; it uses the terms
"sealing" and 'destruction" whenever the distinction is relevant.
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other available law enforcement measures have been insufficient to contain
Palestinian violence. This analysis, however, focuses on the legality of the
demolition practice and the character of the case law that has justified it.
This Article is going to press just four months after the signing of the
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). 8 This watershed event has propelled the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict into a new era marked by a radical transformation of
policies, including the virtual suspension of the home demolition practice. One
may doubt today whether the analysis of demolitions is still relevant: whether
it is not stranded in the barren land between present-day actualities and
history. I believe that it is very relevant.
First, even if the Declaration of Principles is fully implemented, we may
have not yet seen the end of the practice. Israeli rule over the West Bank and
Gaza Strip has not ended. Indeed, according to the Declaration, Israel will
remain responsible for most of the region's overall security even after the
Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho,
and their redeployment in the West Bank. 9 Furthermore, the 1945 DERs
will most likely remain in force.2" It is, therefore, possible that, faced with
demanding circumstances, the IDF might continue resorting to the demolition
practice, as it did on November 17, 1993 in response to the murder of an
Israeli soldier.2 ' It is also already apparent that the forthcoming Palestinian
entity will be faced with fierce opposition. Armed with the 1945 DERs, this
entity might be tempted to rely on harsh security measures in response to
those who challenge its rule. Even though it will be based on a form of self
rule - the antithesis of belligerent occupation - the Palestinian entity might
well benefit from the experience of its predecessor. If it resorts to the home
demolition practice, it will be subject to the same kinds of legal and moral
criticisms as the Israeli Military Government. The Palestinian entity will be
bound in such matters by international human rights law' and by general
principles of law.'
18. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangement, Aug. 31, 1993, reprinted
in N.Y. TIES, Sept. 1, 1993, at A8.
19. Id. art. VII.
20. Id. art. IX.
21. The house of the murder suspect's family was sealed, and the eight family members were left
with one unsealed room in which to live. David Regev & Arieh Kizel, The Chief of Staff. Individual
Soldiers Deternine Their Reaction and the Consequences in a Split Second, YEDIOT AIRONOT, Nov. 19,
1993 at 2 (Hebrew).
22. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Civil and Political
Covenant] (right to "fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established
by law'); id. art. 17 (protection from "interference with... privacy, family, home'); id. art. 23 ('The
family... is entitled to protection by society and the State.'); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
art. 17, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration] ("No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property."); id. arts. 10, 11 & 12.
23. Some of the due process guarantees that are relevant to the demolition practice have apparently
attained the status of universally recognized principles of law and are thus binding on all states in
accordance with Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See THEODOR MERON.
1994]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Second, understanding the dynamics underlying the demolition policy and
comprehending its ramifications serve as an important legal and historical
lesson. They illuminate the political and legal realities of belligerent
occupations, the use of force and its limits, the law of occupation, and the
role of courts in enforcing this law. They also provide a close evaluation of
the actions of Israeli Military Commanders, the decisions of the Israeli
Supreme Court, and the legacy of its judges. Judges forge the way in which
future law will be decided: they determine jurisprudential methodologies,
prescribe power allocations, and endorse modes of resolution and styles of
reasoning; they also impress upon us values, standards of morality, and
notions of integrity. Their enduring legacy must be presented, comprehended,
and evaluated. It is, therefore, contemporary legal understanding, and not
merely the integrity of history, that requires that the work of the critic persist.
Part II of this Article provides the historic and legal background of the
home demolition practice, and describes the way in which it is administered.
Part III delineates the legal system in the Occupied Territories, which is
characterized by the partial application of belligerent occupation law, the
incorporation of principles from Israeli constitutional and administrative law,
and the exercise of judicial review by the Israeli Supreme Court. Part IV
examines the Israeli Supreme Court's rulings on the practice. It explores the
development of the Court's demolition doctrine, the jurisprudence employed
to formulate it, and its influence on government policy. I show that the deci-
sions - cursorily debated and disconnected from their consequences - have
been overly protective of the Military Government's position and have avoided
a meaningful examination of the practice, despite the substantial legal and
moral questions it raises. I also criticize the ways in which the Court has
justified its decisions and examine how the Court's decisions have reflected
upon the Court itself. I conclude that the demolition jurisprudence has
damaged the Court's stature. Part V evaluates the compatibility of the practice
with international law. It first examines a crucial aspect of the Court's
doctrine, the supremacy of local law over substantive international law, and
argues that the Court's conclusion defies international law. It then explores the
effects of the practice on offenders' relatives and landlords and argues that
demolitions violate the prohibition against non-individual punishment. Finally,
it briefly discusses three doctrines of substantive international law that have
been circumvented by the Court's preference for local law: the prohibitions
against confiscation of property, destruction of property, and punishment
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 49-50 (1989).
On the convergence of human rights norms and humanitarian norms, see Eyal Benvenisti, The
Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to the Occupied Territories, 26 ISR. L. REV. 24,
27-30 (1992); Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 72 (1990). See generally THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RiGos IN INTERNATIONAL
STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1987). But see Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts: International Humanitarian Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 345, 350-52
(Theodor Meron ed., 1985).
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without due process. The Article ends with two general observations that arise
from a discussion of the demolition issue. First, the practice demonstrates that
the balance an occupying power strives to maintain between its own interests
and those of a local population is unstable and ultimately unsustainable.
Second, I question whether it is desirable to rely on municipal courts to
adjudicate claims of human rights violations when the political branches
invoke claims of national emergency. The demolition discussion, I conclude,
does not provide a solid answer to this perennial dilemma.
II. THE DEMOLITION PRACTICE
A. Definition
This Article examines the Israeli Military Government's practice of
destroying or sealing Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories in which
security offenses were allegedly committed or in which suspected offenders
resided.24 The Military Government carries out destructions either by blowing
up the home with explosives or by razing it with bulldozers.' When the
offending act is less serious or when destructions appear infeasible for
technical reasons, the Military Government typically seals homes, blocking
their doors and windows with cemented bricks or metal plates. Sealings are
considered a less severe sanction, because they are reversible and cause little
permanent damage to the premises.
In both destruction and sealing cases, families are forbidden from
rebuilding their homes or using their land in any way. The properties are
legally forfeited to the government, although, as a matter of policy, the
Military Government does not make use of them. The families must find
alternative residences themselves. Those who are unsuccessful move into
meager tents provided by the ICRC or U.N. relief agencies. Traditionally,
families have received financial compensation for the replacement of their
homes from various Palestinian organizations, including the PLO.
The practice of home demolition has been employed since the beginning
of the Israeli occupation in 1967. It reached its peak after the beginning of the
Intifada in December 1987,26 but has declined since mid-1989.27 Between
24. The home demolition practice pursuant to Article 119 should be distinguished from the less
frequent destruction of properties during pursuit of wanted persons. See B'TSELEM, HOUSE DEMOLITION
DURING OPERATIONS AGAINST WANTED PERSONS (1993).
25. Bulldozers are used when the explosion is likely to cause damage to neighboring buildings.
Nevertheless, between December 1987 and July 1989, for example, explosions damaged 34 neighboring
homes. The Military Government normally compensates owners for unintended damages. See B'TSELEM,
DEMOLITIONS AND SEALINGS OF HOUSES 25 (1989) (English version) [hereinafter B'TSELEM, 1989
DEMOLITION REPORT].
26. In the first year of the Intifada, 125 houses were demolished and 41 were sealed; in the second
year, 158 houses were demolished and 80 were sealed; in the third year, 88 houses were demolished and
96 were sealed; and in the fourth year, 47 houses were demolished and 48 were sealed. In the fifth year
(beginning December 1991) 8 houses were demolished and 22 were sealed. B'TSELEM. VIOLATIONS OF
19941
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December 1987 and June 1992, 426 homes were destroyed and 287 were
sealed. Since the Labor Party ascended to power in June 1992, only two
homes have been destroyed and thirty-three sealed.2"
B. Historic Roots
The roots of Israel's home demolition policy date back to British orders
promulgated during the South African Boer War. In June 1900, Lord Roberts,
the general in command of British forces in South Africa, issued two
proclamations in response to repetitive Afrikaner commando attacks on
railroad and telegraph lines. His orders permitted the destruction of homes
closest to the sites of such attacks.29 Initially, the British exercised demoli-
tions sparingly,3" but as the war continued the practice was expanded." The
British Army introduced the policy in Palestine during the Great Arab
Rebellion of 1936-39." Drawing legal authority from Article V(5) of the
Palestine (Defense) Order in Council 1931, the British used home demolitions
to respond to Arab acts of sabotage." The British, however, never demol-
HUMAN RIGHTs IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORms 1992/1993 (forthcoming 1994) [hereinafter B'TSELEM,
VIOLATIONS]. B'Tselem's figures are very close to those furnished by the IDF spokesman.
Precise statistics on demolitions prior to 1987 are unavailable. B'Tselem quotes various sources
indicating that, between 1979 and 1986, the number of homes demolished or sealed per year ranged from
2 to 49. B'TSELEM, 1989 DEMOLITION REPORT, supra note 25, at 11.
27. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
28. B'TsELEM, VIOLATIONS, supra note 26.
29. Proclamations of June 16, 1900 and June 19, 1900, cited in S.B. SPIES, METHODS OF
BBARISM? ROBERTS AND KITCHENER AND CIVILIANS IN THE BOER REPUBLICS, JANUARY 1900 - MAY
1902, at 102-03 (1977).
30. In March 1900, Lord Roberts issued a proclamation forbidding the destruction of private property
unless it was justified by the usages and customs of civilized warfare. G.B. BEAK, THE AFTERMATH OF
WAR 5 (1906). Beak, in defense of the British practice, mentions that on May 20, 1900, Roberts admitted
to having ordered the destruction ofjust two farmsteads, each flying a white flag, from which his troops
were fired upon. Id. at 4.
31. By September 1900, Roberts allowed his troops to carry out demolitions without inquiring
whether the inhabitants of the home in question were implicated in the attacks. SPIES, supra note 29, at
109. By October he ordered the destruction of all fhrms within a radius of ten miles from the site, id. at
110, and of whole villages, id. at 119. Subsequently, Roberts broadened the practice and began to destroy
homes for the mere reason that their owners were absent, even when no raids were committed in the
vicinity. Id. at 120. Following criticism of such demolitions, Roberts issued the following conciliatory
proclamation on November 18, 1900: "[The mere fact of a burgher being absent on commando is on no
account to be used as reason for burning the house." BYRON FARWELL, TiE GREAT BOER WAR 352-53
(1976); see also J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIoHTS ON LAND 353 (1911); SPIES, supra note 29, at 116-18.
32. See 1 ROBERT JOHN & SAMI HADAWI, THE PALESTINE DIARY 261 (1970); ANN M. LEscH,
ARAB POLITICS IN PALESTINE, 1917-1939, at 225 (1979); Y. PORATH, Tim PALESTINIAN ARAB NATIONAL
MOVEMENT 240 (1977).
33. Article V(5) of the Palestine (Defense) Order in Council 1931, the antecedent of the 1945 DERs'
Article 119, stated, "The High Commissioner ... may, if he thinks it necessary for the purposes of the
defense of Palestine, cause any buildings to be pulled down ... or to be destroyed." 3 THE LAWS OF
PALESTINE 2622 (Robert H. Drayton ed., 1934).
The legality of demolitions was contested on one occasion before the British Mandate's High Court
of Justice sitting in Jerusalem. The case involved an order to demolish scores of Palestinian homes in the
old city of Jaffa. The Court deferred to the government's security claim without hesitation and upheld the
demolitions. EI-Qasir v. Attorney General, HCJ 44/36 (1936), reprinted in 3 THE LAW REPORTS OF
PALESTINE 121 (1936).
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ished homes of Jews, not even in response to the fiercest attacks of Jewish
underground organizations, such as the hangings of British sergeants or the
blowing up of British headquarters at the King David hotel in Jerusalem. 4
Early Israeli demolition practice emulated the British example. Moshe
Dayan, the Defense Minister during the formative years of the Israeli
occupation and the architect of the demolition practice, simply applied what
he had learned personally during his service in the British army some thirty
years earlier.35 Dayan first applied the practice as early as 1939, in his
capacity as a commander in the Jewish underground, the Hagana. In this role,
he commanded an operation in retaliation for the death of a Jewish fighter
who had been shot during an Arab ambush. The assailants' trail led to the
village of Lid Al Awadin. Dayan's unit entered the village dressed in British
uniforms, smoking English cigarettes, and speaking English. Adhering to the
policy of those whom they were imitating, Dayan's men blew up the home of
the village's elder (the Mukhtar).36 This event represents the importation of
British colonial practice dating back to the Boer War to the current Israeli
occupation.
C. The Demolition Policy
As long as the Military Government is responsible for governing the
Occupied Territories, it must fulfill its moral and legal duty to minimize
violence and bloodshed. Its interest in deterring violent offenses, therefore,
is compelling. But its task of preventing offenses, detecting perpetrators, and
proving their criminal responsibility in court is hampered by popular
Palestinian sentiment. Since most Palestinians view security offenses as
legitimate - even heroic - acts of resistance, they adamantly refuse to
cooperate with the security authorities in their enforcement endeavors. The
Israeli government explains that the ordinary criminal system does not
adequately deter security offenses, particularly since it does not provide for
capital punishment.37 It asserts that the demolition policy is of "utmost
34. See AMos PERLMUrrER, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MENACHEM BEGIN 176 (1987).
35. During the 1936 Arab Rebellion, Dayan served as a reconnaissance scout (ghaffir) for the
Scottish regiment along the Iraq Petroleum Company Oil Pipeline. In later years, Dayan described how
the British had reacted to Arab acts of sabotage during the 1936-39 rebellion: a British officer would enter
the nearest Arab village with a cane under his arm and choose three houses at his whim; without uttering
a word he would then point the cane at the selected homes, thus ordering them to be destroyed. Amihai
Dagan, Here is the Stick, But Where is the Carrot?, HA'ARETZ, Oct. 21, 1988, at 12 (weekend
supplement).
36. SHABTAI TEVETH, MosHE DAYAN: A BIOGRAPHY 102 (Leah & David Zinder trans., 1972).
37. Dov Shefi, The Reports of the U.N. Special Conmitees on Israeli Practices in the Territories,
in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-80, at 285, 303 (Meir
Shamgar ed., 1982) [hereinafter MILITARY GOVERNMENT]. The Military Government has effectively
abolished capital punishment, Military Order No. 268 (1968), which existed under previous Jordanian law
and is in principle permitted by international law, Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 68. For an
interesting account of both moral and operational reasons for abolishing the death penalty, see SHLOMO
GAzrr, TiE STICK AND THE CARROT 297-99 (1985) (lebrew) [hereinafter GAZIT, STICK AND CARROT].
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deterrent importance."3" Proponents of the policy argue that, in this turbulent
state of affairs, lengthy legal proceedings wear away the impact of punish-
ment.39 Former Brigadier General Shlomo Gazit argues that "punishment
must be immediately visible" in order to achieve deterrence, and that
destroying the offender's home one day after the event produces "a 'pillar of
smoke' that everyone sees, hears and understands. "I
Notwithstanding the Military Government's genuine interest in enhancing
deterrence, I suggest that exhibition of might is the primary force driving the
home demolition practice. The formal legitimacy of belligerent occupations
does not emanate from principles of social contract or from the willful
acquiescence of subjects. Rather, it is derived, by definition, from sheer
force. Since international law recognizes that a belligerent occupation exists
only when a state's army holds physical control of a territory,4' a military
government that fails to maintain its authority over the population loses its
status as an occupying power.42 Control and domination are the foundations
of a military government's rule; disobedience, particularly forceful resistance,
undermines it.
The Israeli-Palestinian struggle, therefore, is played out in the realm of
force. As expressed by Itzhak Rabin, then Minister of Defense, in a 1989
interview: "The first priority [is] to prevent violence in whatever form that it
takes, and we'll do it with force. We will show who is running the Terri-
tories. "'4 Indeed there is more than winning and losing involved. Images of
triumph and defeat also drive the politics of the conflict. Successfully executed
offenses signal a slip in the government's control and encourage the occupied
38. Meir Shamgar, Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 276 (1971) [hereinafter Shamgar, Observance].
39. See Symposium on Human Rights, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 361, 376 (1971) [hereinafter
Symposium]; Shefi, supra note 37, at 303.
40. Shlomo Gazit, The Administered Territories - Policy and Actions, 204 MA'ARAHOT 25, 37
(1970) (Hebrew) [hereinafter Gazit, Administered Territories]. Former Brigadier General Shlomo Gazit
served as the Coordinator of Governmental Activities in the Administered Territories and worked closely
with Moshe Dayan in the first years of the occupation.
41. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations determines the status of occupation: "Territory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only
to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised." Hague Regulations, supra
note 9, art. 42. Article 43 conditions the status of belligerent occupation on the event that "[t]he authority
of the legitimate power has in fact passed into the hands of the occupant." Id. art. 43; see also EYAL
BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCuPATION 8 n.9 (1993); MoRRIs GPEENSPAN, THE
MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 213-19 (1959); Lassa Oppenheim, The Legal Relations Between an
Occupying Power and the Inhabitants, 33 L.Q. REV. 363, 366 (1917).
42. There is, of course, the possibility of winning over the population by exercising a benign and
accommodating administration. Initially, Israel's policy was allegedly directed at creating such a
framework. In 1971 Gazit stated, "We aim, in occupying the Territories, to do away with at least some
of the irrational elements of the conflict.... Israel wants to convince their residents that they have a very
keen interest of their own in the continuation of coexistence - economic, cultural and social - between
the two peoples." Shlomo Gazit, Policy in the Occupied Territories, 1 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 278, 281
(1971); see also MOSHE DAYAN, THE STORY OF MY LurE 399-403 (1976); GAzrr, STICK AND CARROT,
supra note 37, at 334-40 (discussing Gazit's retrospective disillusionment with demolition practice).
43. Videotape on Confronting Political and Social Evil: Complicity, Resistance, Human Rights, and
U.S. Foreign Policy (1990) (on file with EPIC, Tufts University).
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population to stage even more vigorous and conspicuous acts of defiance. The
more strongly the government responds to such acts and castigates offenders,
the firmer its rule appears to be.44 Hence the importance of spectacles of
power. 45
Few measures display governmental might as poignantly as blowing a
person's home into the sky. Every aspect of a demolition is played out in
theatrical fashion. A large military unit enters the neighborhood, usually in the
late hours of the night, and officers announce the demolition and instruct
families to evacuate their homes immediately. The anxious families are kept
at bay as the entire neighborhood awaits the explosion. Then, the thunderous
bang, the cloud of smoke, the trembling earth: the spectacle is overwhelming.
The government has demonstrated its might by destroying the most intimate
of a family's possessions. The army unit exits, leaving the family devastated,
angered, humiliated, and homeless. The penalty for challenging the govern-
ment is unmistakable. But the spectacle of power is not over. The remaining
heap of gravel, now a piece of government property, is deliberately left in
place as a monument to the Military Government's dominance. The debris,
however, is no less symbolic in Palestinian eyes. From their perspective, it
epitomizes the injustice of Israeli rule and reinforces their self-image as
virtuous victims. The conspicuous ruins also serve as testimony to the
personal sacrifice that Palestinians are willing to undertake in order to
promote their national goal.
On a more abstract level, the demolition policy undermines the Palestinian
national identity by destroying Palestinian links to the land. At its most basic,
the one-hundred-year Jewish-Palestinian rivalry amounts to a contest over
land. For both peoples, physical control and sovereignty over the land of
historic Palestine is the single most significant ingredient in their national
identity, the ultimate objective of their political vision. For the Jews, Eretz-
Israel is the land from which they were exiled two thousand years ago. The
settlement of the land and the building of a homeland in it mark the realization
of the Zionist dream. Their Palestinian counterparts have been living in most
of the same land for generations and now find themselves confined to only a
portion of it, placed under the control of a hostile occupier. Ownership,
44. Michel Foucault tells of medieval practices of excessively painful punishment intended to
manifest the invincibility of the Crown and the fragility of its subjects. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DIScIPLINE
AND PUNiSH (1977); see also S. GIORA SHOHAM & GAVIEL SHAVIT, CRIMEs AND PUNISHMENT: AN
INTRODUcTION TO PENOLOGY 148 (1990) (Hebrew).
45. A British commentator on the 1936-39 Arab Rebellion observed, "In troubled times justice, to
be an effective deterrent, which is its main function in such times, must be both swift and certain....
Unless apprehension and punishment follow hard on the commission of crime the apparent immunity of
the criminal will encourage crime.' JOHN MARLOWE, REBELLION IN PALESTiNE 168 (1946). Similarly,
Moshe Sneh, commander of the Hagana, described the goal of one of the organization's operations as
demonstrating the following to the British: "1. They tried to confiscate our weapons; we shall confiscate
theirs. 2. They tried to paralyze our national institutions; we shall paralyze theirs. 3. They tried to
demonstrate their superiority; we shall demonstrate our national will over theirs." PERLMUTrER, supra
note 34, at 176 (quoting Moshe Sneh).
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habitation, and cultivation of the land constitute the underpinnings of the
Palestinian identity. The demolition policy thus goes to the heart of the
national rivalry. Every confiscation and destruction severs a family's link to
its land, representing yet another defeat inflicted on the Palestinian cause by
its Zionist rival. 4
Another force that appears to motivate the demolition practice is
retribution. The Military Government strikes back at offenders ferociously and
immediately, without judicial proceedings. Retribution is never explicitly
stated as one of the practice's purposes. Gazit, however, describes two
incidents in which demolitions were motivated, in his words, by impulses of
"retaliation and vengeance."47 Retributive motives are closely linked to the
government's need to respond to the sentiments of segments of the Israeli
public - primarily the political right and victims of Arab terrorism -
typically following the murder of Israelis by Palestinians. Demolitions seem
to appease those who demand more severe responses to Palestinian vio-
lence.4"
Despite strong support for the practice among members of the military,
no consensus has been reached about whether or how well it actually serves
the interests of the Military Government. Officially, members of the Israeli
executive deem the policy effective and treat it as almost indispensable. The
policy constituted a key component of the "stick" side of the "stick and
carrot" scheme devised by Moshe Dayan in 1967."9 Support for the policy
reached its peak under Itzhak Rabin, Israel's Defense Minister during the
early stages of the Intifada.50 Various military officials have sworn by the
46. The deportation practice, by which Palestinians are forcefully removed from the region, has
similar effects. Deportations are based on Article 112 of the 1945 DERs. 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra
note 4, at 1085; see El-Affli v. Military Commander of the West Bank, 42(2) P.D. 4 (1988), translated
in 29 I.L.M 139.
47. On October 21, 1969, an Israeli army officer was killed, and two soldiers were injured in a
shoot-out with a Palestinian in the town of Khalkhoul. Moshe Dayan, then Defense Minister, visited the
site on the same morning; by early afternoon, he had ordered the demolition of eight homes. Four days
later he ordered the demolition of ten more homes. Gazit comments, "It is almost certain that unless the
minister had visited the scene while it was still smoking, unless he had seen the casualties at the site, he
would have rejected the request to demolish the 18 homes, had it been made to him through the regular
chain of command.* GAzrr, STICK AND CARROT, supra note 37, at 306. A week later, an Israeli merchant
was murdered in a furniture store in Gaza. Dayan rushed to the scene of the murder and was confronted
with the fresh puddle of blood. He immediately ordered the destruction of all eight houses along the alley
by the store. Gazit observes, "Once again Dayan diverged from his own policy. Here too, the 'Red in the
Eyes' took its toll.... There weren't many incidents of this kind, and for this reason, the uniqueness of
these cases was all the more conspicuous," Id.
48. The telephone conversation that took place between the Prime Minister and the wife of Natan
Azaryah, who was murdered on a Tel Aviv street, is a telling example of such a response. The recently
widowed woman protested, "Mister Prime Minister, if you do not blow up the terrorist's house, I will.'
Tamar Tarbels, 'Mr. Prime Minister, If You Do Not Blow Up the Terrorist's House, I Will,' YEDIOT
AHRONOT, May 3, 1993, at 1 (Hebrew); see also infra note 128 (discussing suggestions for application
of harsher measures).
49. See, GAzrr, STICK AND CARROT, supra note 37, at 300; Dagan, supra note 35.
50. Rabin stated, "The use of Molotov cocktails has recently declined as a result of our punitive




practice's effectiveness to the Israeli Supreme Court." Major General
Amram Mitsna, for example, testified that "the home demolition policy has
caused a significant decrease in the use of Molotov cocktails."52 Outside the
corridors of the executive branch, however, approval is less widespread.
Indeed, many of those who supported and applied the policy while in
office have since criticized it. Former Brigadier General Benyamin Ben-
Eliezer personally signed scores of demolition orders, including the order that
prompted the seminal Sakhawil case of 1979.' 3 Yet in a 1985 interview with
Israel Radio, he stated his "adamant objection" to the measure and condemned
the policy for portraying a negative image of Israel, creating an atmosphere
of Palestinian solidarity, and strengthening support for the PLO, which helps
finance alternative housing. Ben-Eliezer also referred to the moral aspect of
collective punishment: "[1]t is the offender who commits the act, not the
family. 1154
Former Brigadier General Aryeh Shalev was also responsible for issuing
numerous demolition orders. 5 Yet in his recent research on the Intifada,
Shalev suggests that demolitions have not contributed to curbing violence and
that, instead, they may have exacerbated it.56 He reports, quite surprisingly,
that in the early 1980s even the General Security Services acknowledged the
policy's detrimental effects and advised the Military Government to cease its
application. This retrospective criticism of the practice by its early
advocates has helped to intensify the nationwide debate over the merits of the
practice.
The demolition policy has been the subject of intense political controversy
on the Knesset floor. Abba Eban, Israel's former Foreign Minister, described
the policy as a "desecration of Israel's heritage and a blatant violation of the
legal and societal rules of the civilized world. "" The political unattractive-
51. AI-Raqeb v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, HCJ 878189 (1989) (unpublished); Shoukeri
v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 798/89 (1990) (unpublished).
52. Brief for the IDF, ACRI v. Commander of Central Command, 43(2) P.D. 529 (1989), quoted
in B'TsELEM, 1989 DEMOLITION REPORT, supra note 25, at 29. Mitsna's testimony attributed the decrease
of Molotov cocktail incidents to the "severe and instantaneous" execution of home demolitions.
53. Ben-Eliezer served as both the IDF's Military Commander in the West Bank and as Coordinator
of Government Activities in the Administered Territories. He is currently Housing Minister and a Member
of Knesset from the Labor Party.
54. Interview with Benyamin Ben-Eliezer, Former Brigadier General (Israel Radio Broadcast, July
30, 1985).
55. Shalev, who served as the IDF's Military Commander in the West Bank in 1974-76, is currently
a researcher at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.
56. Shalev examined the correlation between the measures imposed by the Military Government and
the rate of security offenses committed in the subsequent months. He found an increase in violent incidents
following a high incidence of demolitions. Shalev admits that his examination does not allow for the
influence of other factors and is, therefore, not conclusive. Still, he maintains that his findings indicate
an actual phenomenon. ARYEH SHALEV, THE INTIFADA: CAUSES AND EmFEcTS 113-14 (1991). Shalev's
general conclusion accords with an analysis of the effectiveness of British demolition practice in the Boer
War. See SPIEs, supra note 29, at 114.
57. SHALEV, supra note 56, at 114.
58. lan Kfir, Abba Eben:Blowing Up Homes -A Desecration of Israel's Heritage, MA'ARIV, Nov.
22, 1981, at 6 (Hebrew).
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ness of the practice was highlighted in 1981 in a bizarre exchange in the
Knesset between then Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Shimon Peres, the
Defense Minister of the preceding government. Each bitterly condemned the
other's administration for having demolished more Palestinian homes,
although both governments had officially endorsed the policy.59 In the same
debate, Member of Knesset Amnon Rubinstein criticized the measure, inter
alia, for being ineffective: "You can blow up one more home, you can blow
up ten more homes - it just won't do any good."6" As noted in Part IV of
this Article, however, this controversy has barely reverberated in the halls of
the Israeli Supreme Court.
The demolition policy may do more to inflame Palestinian defiance than
to deter it. Palestinians perceive it as a gross injustice; it precipitates anger
and humiliation rather than respect for the rule of law. Instead of providing
a healthy basis for maintaining peace and order, the policy tends to reaffirm
people's belief that they will not receive justice from an alien government.
This perception fans, rather than douses, the rebellious quest for liberation.
Indeed, Palestinians include the demolition policy among those practices to
which they must respond with "heroic tenacious struggle."61 Historically,
policies that are perceived by the population as oppressive and unjust have
strengthened the national spirit. The American Revolution,6 2 the Boer
War,63 World War I,' and the Jewish struggle against British rule in
Palestine65 all offer this lesson. This historic pattern was apparently also on
59. DVREI HAKNESSET [KNESSET PROTOCOLS] 563 (Nov. 25, 1981) (Hebrew); see also YosefHarif,
Begin: Overl,OOHousesDemolishedin Territories UnderLabor Government, MA'ARIV, Nov. 23, 1981,
at 3 (Hebrew).
60. DivREI HAKNESSET [KNEssET PROTOCOLS] 567 (Nov. 25, 1981) (Hebrew).
61. POLITICAL COMMUNIQUt (Palestine National Council Nov. 15, 1988), translated in 18 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 216, 218 (1989).
62. The American Declaration of Independence centers around the King's "history of repeated
Injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these
states. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776). After listing 27 such injuries, the drafters went on to pronounce the colonies "free
and independent states." Id. para. 32.
63. Lord Roberts was averse to the farm-burning policy, a practice that he had observed previously
in India's Northwest Frontier, warning that it would result in "a rich harvest of hatred and revenge."
FARWELL, supra note 31, at 352. The Times History, commenting on the British practices in the Boer
War, stated, "The policy fitfully adopted after the beginning of June (1900) of burning down farmhouses
and destroying crops as a measure of intimidation had nothing to recommend it, and no other measure
aroused such deep and lasting feelings of resentment." 4 THE TIMES HIsTORY OF THE WAR IN SOUTH
AFRICA 494 (Basil Williams ed., 1906).
64. On the excessive use of collective punishments, Garner commented, "[UInstead of subserving the
real military necessity, they only tend to drive the population to desperation, to arouse an undying hatred
against the occupying belligerent, to intensify the spirit of revenge, and finally to make it more difficult
to overcome effectively the resistance of the people who are made the victims of such severities." James
W. Garner, Community Fines and CollectiveResponsibiliy, 11 AM. J. INT'L. L. 511, 537 (1917); see also
Oppenheim, supra note 41, at 370 ("iThere is neither a need nor a right of the occupant to set up a reign
of terror and frightfulness. Moreover, such a reign is apt to defeat its own ends because it will sooner or
later drive the unfortunate population into desperation so that they rise in arms.").
65. On emergency measures applied by the British, one commentator noted, "Even when applied
judiciously, they were excessive and smacked of a 'police state.' Consequently, while they strengthened
the hand of government to respond to unrest, they simultaneously undermined its legitimacy." DAVID A.
Home Demolitions
the minds of the authors of the Geneva Convention's Commentary.66 Both
history and politics, then, cast doubt on the wisdom of the practice.
D. Legal Justifications
The legal foundation of the home demolition practice is Article 119 of the
1945 DERs,67 which modified and enhanced the previous Emergency
Regulations of 1931 and 1936. The 1945 DERs, which the British Mandatory
Government promulgated to combat the Jewish insurgency, originally applied
to the entire territory of Palestine.6" They remain in force to this day in the
state of Israel and, as the official Israeli view maintains, within the Occupied
Territories. 69 Article 119 states, in part:
(1) A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture to the Government of
Palestine of any house, structure or land from which he has reason to suspect that any
firearm has been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or incendiary
article illegally thrown, detonated, exploded or otherwise discharged, or any house,
structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street the inhabitants or some
of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have committed, or attempted to commit, or
abetted the commission of, or been accessories after the fact to the commission of, any
offense against these Regulations involving violence or intimidation or any Military Court
offense; and when any house, structure or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the Military
Commander may destroy the house or the structure or anything in or on the house, the
structure or the land.
The provision's breadth affords tremendous discretion to the Military
Government on a number of levels. First, Article 119 allows the Military
Government to issue demolition orders as an exercise of administrative
CHARTERS, THE BRITISH ARMY AND JEWISH INSURGENCY IN PALESTINE, 1945-47, at 87 (1989).
66. See COMMENTARY ON IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 226 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter THE COMMENTARY] ("Far from
achieving the desired effect, however, such practices, by reason of their excessive severity and cruelty,
kept alive and strengthened the spirit of resistance.'). For the Convention's strong position against
collective punishment, see infra part V.B.1.
67. 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 4, at 1089; 1600 Palestine Gazette, supra note 4, at 1159.
68. The 1945 DERs vest highly intrusive powers in the hands of the executive branch, exercisable
at its discretion without need for judicial approval. The regulations permit the government, inter alia, to
detain people for periods of up to one year, 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 4, at 1083 (Article 111);
to deport people out of Palestine, id. at 1085 (Article 112); to take indefinite possession without
compensation of private land, id. (Article 114), vehicles, animals, or boats, id. at 1087 (Article 115); to
order people to accommodate and feed police personnel free of charge, id. at 1089 (Article 121); to
determine the time and venue of burials without consulting the families of the deceased, id. at 1093
(Article 133); to order people to remove glass, nails, or other obstacles from roads, id. at 1090 (Article
123); and, as a means to ensure the successful exercise of the above powers, to prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquor to the members of His Majesty's forces, id. at 1094 (Article 135).
69. See Shefi, supra note 37, at 294-99. Opposing views maintain that the Defense Regulations were
revoked before the end of the British Mandate by the Palestine (Revocation) Order in Council 1948 or,
alternatively, abolished by the Jordanian Government on May 14, 1948, when the Jordanian Defense
Regulations (1935) came into effect. For extensive analyses of the validity of the 1945 DERs in the
Territories, see ESTHER B. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERurroRIEs 1967-1982,
at 94-96 (1985); EMMA PLAYFAIR, DEMOLITION AND SEALING OF HOUSES AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE IN
THE ISRAELI-OccUPIED WEST BANK 10 (1987); Usama R. Halabi, Demolition and Sealing of Houses in
the Israeli Occupied Territories: A Critical Legal Analysis, 5 TEMPLE INT'L & Comp. L.J. 251, 261-64
(1991).
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authority,7' without recourse to judicial proceedings.71 It requires only that
the Military Commander "ha[ve] reason to suspect" and "[be] satisfied" that
an offense was committed. Since the ACRI case of August 1989,72 however,
most orders have undergone judicial review by the Israeli Supreme Court. The
Court routinely issues interim orders preventing execution of demolition
orders until it completes its proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court's oversight
does not amount to a criminal appeal. The Court does not canvass evidence
or determine guilt: it merely decides whether demolition orders meet the
relatively lenient standards for review of administrative actions. Furthermore,
demolitions do not replace criminal proceedings or regular criminal punish-
ment. Whether or not their homes were demolished, the offenders invariably
are prosecuted in military courts for the very same offenses, and generally are
sentenced to substantial terms of imprisonment. The procedure, therefore, is
quite disconnected from the judicial process.
Second, Article 119 gives the Military Government broad legal authority
in determining the scope of the practice. Each of the two parts of the Article
(separated by the words "or any house") establishes different sets of criteria
for applying the measure. The first part pertains only to homes that were used
directly in the commission of an offense. The second part authorizes the
demolition of houses where the offenders reside - houses that have no
connection to the commission of an offense. Initially, the Military Government
limited the measure to properties from which offenses had actually been
committed;73 it later extended the measure to apply to homes where offend-
ers resided. Indeed, most home demolitions have been carried out on the latter
ground. The Military Government has also broadened the scope of the policy
to include rented homes, homes in which offenders lived infrequently, and
multi-apartment structures. It has even demolished homes of those killed in
the course of committing an offense.74
Article 119's language goes further. It authorizes the destruction of "any
house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street"
whose inhabitants have committed an offense. Its scope seems virtually
70. As a matter of internal procedure, the Military Commanders consult the General Security
Services (GSS) and their legal advisors before issuing the orders.
71. Out of the 94 cases that the Supreme Court has adjudicated, eight demolition orders were issued
following judicial convictions, 31 orders were issued during criminal proceedings in military courts, and
33 orders were based solely on confessions obtained in interrogations.
72. ACRI v. Commander of Central Command, 43(2) P.D. 529 (1989).
73. See, e.g., SHABTAITEVETH,KLALATHABRACHA [THE CtSEDBLSSIN] 183, 211,258, 261,
263, 266, 274 (1970) (Hebrew).
74. Six such cases have been reported. See B'TSELEM, 1989 DEMOLITION REPORT, supra note 25,
at 17. The Supreme Court has not yet adjudicated a case involving the demolition of a slain offender's
house. One such petition was submitted, but the Military Government withdrew the demolition order
before the Court could adjudicate it, presumably out of fear that the Court would enjoin it. Calbineh v.
Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 681/89 (1989) (unpublished). In another case,
the Military Commander commuted an order to demolish the entire house into one to seal one room after
the slain offender's family indicated to the Military Government that it intended to petition the Supreme
Court. See Israelis Drop Order to Raze Home of a Slain Palestinian, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1991, at 5.
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limitless.75 In practice, however, the Military Government does not apply its
power to the full extent permitted by law. It has not demolished homes that
have had nothing to do with an offense or offender. Although it is unlikely
that the Military Government would engage in arbitrary demolitions of this
kind, or that such a policy, if attempted, would be upheld by the Court,76 the
mere existence of such unbridled authority is nonetheless troubling.
Article 119 makes no reference to the question of ownership. Homes,
therefore, may be demolished even when their owners have no connection to
an offense. In the ninety-four cases adjudicated, the Court mentions only
seven homes that the offenders themselves owned. Of the remaining 138
homes,' at least sixty-nine were owned by offenders' parents, sixteen by
their siblings, and nine by other relatives. Six homes belonged to third parties
and were rented out to offenders' families.7" In principle the IDF seals, but
does not destroy, rented homes.
Finally, the law's breadth does not limit demolitions by type or severity
of offense, although the Military Government normally employs the measure
only in serious cases. In thirty-two of the ninety-four cases studied, the
sanction was triggered by life-taking offenses (eight involved Jewish victims
and twenty-four involved Palestinian victims). Demolitions are also often
exercised in response to assaults on, or harassment of, fellow Palestinians,"
and are routinely applied in response to offenses involving Molotov cocktails,
the elimination of which has been one of the Military Government's major
goals.8" At one point the Military Government began to seal homes in
response to stonethrowing, a widespread offense not generally considered to
be grave. The Court upheld the orders in the only two such cases that it
reviewed.8' Article 119 thus gives the Military Government almost limitless
75. At one stage during the Boer War, the British demolished all homes that were within a radius
of ten miles from the site of the attack. SPins, supra note 29, at 110.
76. See AI-Amrin v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, 46(3) P.D. 693, 705 (1992) (Heshin, J.,
dissenting).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 13 to 14.
78. The ownership of the remaining 38 homes cannot be accounted for from the information
contained in the rulings. Where the identity of the homeowner is not stated specifically, I have assumed
that the person who petitioned the court is the owner. In reality, however, the situation is more complex
because many homes are co-owned, often by siblings and cousins. See, e.g., Zubah v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 152/91 (1991) (unpublished). According to B'Tselem,
about 60% of the homes were owned by the offenders' parents, 6% by their siblings, and about 18% by
the offenders themselves. See B'TSELEM, 1989 DEMOLITION REPORT, supra note 25, at 16.
79. At least 37 demolitions followed assaults on fellow Palestinians. The major reason for these
assaults is suspicion of collaboration with the security -forces. In some cases, however, Palestinians were
assaulted because of "immoral conduct," i.e., drug-dealing or prostitution. See, e.g., Obeida v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 295/90 (1990) (unpublished).
80. See Al Fasfus v. Minister of Defense, 43(1) P.D. 576 (1989); Tamas v. Minister of Defense,
43(2) P.D. 559 (1989). When the cocktails cause no damage, the government generally settles for sealing.
81. In Abu Al'an v. Minister of Defense, 37(2) P.D. 169 (1983), the Court upheld an order to seal
the homes of four Palestinians suspected of throwing the stones that killed an Israeli soldier driving
through the town of Khalkhoul. In Mansur v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 3740/90
(1991) (unpublished), the Court upheld an order to seal a repeat offender's room, without mentioning
whether any damage was caused by the stones.
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authority in determining the circumstances under which it can order home
demolitions in the Occupied Territories.
In 1971, then Attorney General Meir Shamgar82 presented the govern-
ment's seminal, and almost sole, legal justification of the demolition practice.
Shamgar defended the policy along two alternative lines. First, he asserted
that Article 119 was valid "local law" and therefore superior to substantive
international law:
The Demolitions are based on Regulation 119 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations,
1945, which are part and parcel of the penal law in the West Bank and Gaza.... Article
64 of the [Geneva] Convention leaves the penal provisions of the local law intact insofar as
the local law includes rules permitting demolition.'
Second, Shamgar claimed that Article 119 was consistent with substantive
international law. He asserted that the practice falls within the legal bound-
aries of Article 53 of the Geneva Convention, which makes an exception to
the prohibition on destruction of private property under circumstances of
absolute military necessity:
It is necessary to create effective military reaction. The measure under discussion is of
utmost deterrent importance, especially in a country where capital punishment is not used
against terrorists killing women and children.... In conclusion, it appears that even if
Regulation 119 . . .is regarded as suspended, demolition can be based, in appropriate
circumstances, on Article 53 of the Convention."
Shamgar further explained that a "house from which hand grenades are
thrown is a military base, not different from a bunker in other parts of the
world. "" He described the measure as "personal," insisting that this
"punitive measure... is directed personally only against the person who has
been culpable of the commission of a certain offense. "'
III. THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Before examining the Court's treatment of the legal justifications for the
demolition policy, I will briefly survey the legal system in the Occupied
Territories so as to place the demolition jurisprudence in a legal framework.
A. International Law
Since June 1967, the IDF has ruled over the Occupied Territories within
the framework of belligerent occupation law. The IDF legislates, adjudicates,
82. Shamgar served as the IDF's Military Advocate General from 1961 to 1968, and as Attorney
General of Israel from 1968 to 1975. Shamgar has served on Israel's Supreme Court since 1975 and is
currently the President of the Court.
83. Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at 275-76; see also infra part V.A.
84. Id. at 276; see also infra part V.C.I.
85. Id. at 275-76.
86. Symposium, supra note 39, at 380.
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exercises police powers, collects taxes, and otherwise administers the regions
as this law prescribes.8 7 Considering the systematic disregard by victorious
belligerents of this body of law throughout modern history, the Israeli
acknowledgment of its relevance is commendable. 8
Belligerent occupation law, which is a segment of the international law
on land warfare, becomes operative after active warfare ceases and one army
takes control of its enemy's territory. This field of law neither condones nor
outlaws occupations; it treats them as a reality and simply tries to make them
more decent.89 It is embodied primarily in the Fourth Geneva Convention of
194990 and the Regulations Annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907. 9' The remainder is found in military manuals, opinio juris, and the
writings of prominent international legal scholars.92 Generally speaking,
belligerent occupation law is designed to balance an occupying power's
interest in governing a region effectively and securely, with its obligation to
protect the interests of the civilian population. The law aims ultimately to
regulate and mediate the tension between military necessity and human
rights. 93
Israel, it should be noted, does not fully apply the law of belligerent
occupation. Both the Israeli government and Supreme Court restrict the extent
of its application, although they do so on different grounds. Since 1967, the
Israeli government has argued that its rule over the West Bank and Gaza is
not one of belligerent occupation; it therefore contests the formal applicability
of belligerent occupation law to this occupation. Israel does not dispute that
it is a party to the Geneva Conventions94 or that the Hague Regulations have
attained the status of customary international law, binding on all states. The
government argues, however, that the law of belligerent occupation applies
only when the territory in question was previously under the sovereignty of
87. Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at 267-68 (citing proclamations of Military Commander).
88. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 63. In a recent book, Eyal Benvenisti thoughtfully examines an
array of occupations and shows that this body of law is habitually circumvented by occupying powers.
BENVENISTI, supra note 41, at 149-90.
89. See THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at
518 (James B. Scott ed., 1920) (Address of Delegate Martens) [hereinafter CONFERENCE OF 1899
PROCEEDINGS].
90. Geneva Convention, supra note 10.
91. Hague Regulations, supra note 9.
92. Prominent texts by international legal scholars include the following: GREENSPAN, supra note
41; 2 L. OPPENHEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th
ed. 1952); 2 GEORG ScHwARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1968);
GEmIARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY (1957). For an account of medieval
codes of warfare, see Theodor Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1992). For a contemporary critical analysis, see generally BENVENISTI, supra note 41.
93. Belligerent occupation law also seeks to prevent disruptive changes in the occupied territory,
preserve military discipline among occupying forces, reduce risk of renewed conflict, and enhance
prospects for an eventual peace agreement. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 46; see also infra note 252 and
accompanying text (discussing Preamble to Hague Convention).
94. Israel ratified the four Geneva Conventions on July 6, 1951. 1 KITVEI AMANAH [TREATY SERIES]
559 (Hebrew).
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a "High Contracting Party.""5 It argues that since neither Jordan nor Egypt
held good title to the West Bank and Gaza, the Occupied Territories were not
under the sovereignty of a "High Contracting Party." Fearing that acknowl-
edgment of a state of belligerent occupation might imply recognition of the
former administrators' titles, the government argues that the legal status of the
Occupied Territories precludes application of the law of belligerent occupa-
tion.96 It has, nonetheless, undertaken to abide by the Conventions' "humani-
tarian provisions" on a de facto basis.97
In contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court treats the state's rule over the
Occupied Territories as a belligerent occupation.98 The Court thus treats the
Hague Regulations, which are broadly recognized as customary international
law, as fully enforceable. The Geneva Convention, on the other hand, is
treated as non-justiciable by the Court. In the Israeli legal system, treaty law
binds only state parties among themselves and cannot be invoked before an
Israeli court unless it has become part of domestic law by legislation. So far,
the Knesset has refrained from making the Geneva Convention the law of the
land. 99
Although not formally enforced, the Geneva Convention has not been
ignored. The Court has repeatedly discussed and referred to it to justify the
Military Government's actions.1° In some cases, where the Convention
95. UNITED NATIONS, THE QUESTION OF THE OBSERVANCE OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
OF 1949 IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967,
at 4 (1979).
96. Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at 263-66. For a defense of this position, see JULWUS
STONE, No PEACE - No WAR iN THE MIDDLE EAST 39 (1969) [hereinafter SToNE, No PEACE]; Yehudi
Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279,
301 (1968); Stephen M. Schwebel, Wat Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 344, 344-45 (1970);
cf. Julius Stone, Behind the Cease-Fire Lines: Israel's Administration in Gaza and the West Bank, in OF
LAW AND MAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HAiM H. COHN 79 (Shlomo Shoham ed., 1971). For critical views,
see BENVENISTI, supra note 41, at 110; YoRAM DINSTEIN, DINE! MiLHAMA [LAWS OF WAR] 212 (1983)
(Hebrew); Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria (the West
Bank) and to the Gaza Strip, 24 ISR. L. REV. 485, 485-94 (1990); Stephen M. Boyd, The Applicability
of International Law to the Occupied Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 258, 259-60 (1971); Yoram
Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
104, 107 (1978); Richard A. Falk & Bums H. Weston, The Relevance ofInternational Law to Palestinian
Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 129, 138-44
(1991); Theodor Meron, West Bank and Gaza: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the Period of
Transition, 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 106, 109 n.6 (1980); Roberts, supra note 23, at 62-66; Amnon
Rubinstein, The Changing Status of the 'Territories," 1988 TEL Aviv U. ST. L. 59, 64-67. The Israeli
position has also been criticized by the U.N. General Assembly and the ICRC. G.A. Res. 43/58, U.N.
Doc. A/43/904, part B (1988); see also UNrrED NATIONS, supra note 95, at 3-14 (1979); ICRC, ANNUAL
REPORT 83 (1987).
97. Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at 266.
98. The Court affirmed its treatment of Israel's rule as a belligerent occupation in Dweikat v. Israel,
34(1) P.D. 1, 13 (1979) (English excerpt in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 345 (1980)) (invalidating confiscation
of private land near Nablus intended for establishment of Jewish settlement).
99. See BENVENISTI, supra note 41, at 118-19; Bar-Yaacov, supra note 96, at 485.
100. See, e.g., Arjub v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 42(1) P.D. 353 (1988)
(English excerpt in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 255 (1988)) (upholding government's refusal to establish
military court of appeals); El Affu v. Military Commander of the West Bank, 42(2) P.D. 4 (1988),
translated in 29 I.L.M. 139 (upholding deportation of Palestinians from Occupied Territories); Sajadiyeh
v. Minister of Defense, 42(3) P.D. 801 (1988) (upholding detention of administrative detainees inside
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appeared to work against the Military Government, the Court has referred to
it and wrestled with it, instead of dismissing it as non-justiciable.'0 ' Over
time, the distinction between the two types of international law has almost
eroded. It would thus be very difficult for the Court to uphold a policy that
it explicitly found violated the Convention. '02
This ambiguity regarding the justiciability of the Geneva Convention,
however, bears but an indirect influence on the demolition practice itself,
since the Court's justification of demolitions has not been based on the
inapplicability of the Hague and Geneva instruments, nor on the non-justicia-
bility of the latter. The Court has defended the practice, for the most part,
within the terms of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention: its
central international law argument - that local law supersedes substantive
provisions of international law - follows from an interpretation of the
instruments. Demolitions, it is argued, are consistent with international
law. 1 03
B. Principles of Israeli Law
Israel decided in 1971 to apply to the Occupied Territories some of the
guarantees of personal rights found in Israeli domestic administrative and
constitutional law. Meir Shamgar presented the legal policy as a commitment
to "basic principles of natural justice as derived from the system of law
existing in Israel." 14 The legal ideals set out to be realized included "justice
and fairness," "respect for law," and "prevention of discrimination. '
Since this policy originated from the recognition that belligerent occupation
law does not provide adequate protection for civilian populations, these norms
Israel); Abu-Aita v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 37(2) P.D. 197 (1983), translated
in 7 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 1983-1987, at 1 [hereinafter SELECTED
JUDOEMENTS] (upholding extension of Israeli value-added taxation system to Occupied Territories); Ayoub
v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113 (1979) (English excerpt in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 337 (1979))
(upholding requisition of private land for establishment of military bases and Jewish civilian settlements);
El Tin v. Minister of Defense, 27(1) P.D. 481 (1973) (English excerpt in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 376
(1975)) (upholding government policy of rescinding residency rights of persons who stayed outside
Occupied Territories for longer than specified period).
101. For two notable cases, see El Affu, 42(2) P.D. at 4, and Sajadiyeh, 42(3) P.D. at 801. For
criticism of the El Affu decision, see sources cited infra note 267.
102. See Yoram Dinstein, The Supreme Court and the Law of Belligerent Occupation: Reunification
of Families, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 173, 176 (1988); Ruth Lapidoth, he Expulsion of Civilians from
Areas Which Came Under Israeli Control in 1967: Some Legal Issues, 2 EuR. J. INT'L. L. 97, 101 (1990).
103. See infra part V.A.
104. Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at 266-67. The concept of "natural justice" is used in
Israeli administrative law in a way comparable to that of procedural due process in American law.
Shamgar later described these precepts of natural justice as "reflecting similar principles developed in
Western democracies." Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government -
The Initial Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 37, at 13, 49 [hereinafter Shamgar, Legal
Concepts]. For a favorable account of the legal policies designed by Shamgar, see MOSHE NEOBI, JUSTICE
UNDER OCCUPATION - THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (1981) (Hebrew).
105. Shamgar, Legal Concepts, supra note 104, at 48.
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were "to a large extent beyond any demands of International Law."106 The
key aspect of this policy was that it granted Palestinians access to Israeli
courts, in particular to the High Court of Justice, thus providing them with
immediate and affordable access to judicial review of almost all actions of the
Military Government. The Court adjudicates these matters by reference to
customary international law, i.e., the Hague Regulations and other customs
recognized by various legal scholars, as well as concepts borrowed from
domestic Israeli law."07
C. The Israeli Supreme Court
In its capacity as the High Court of Justice, the Israeli Supreme Court
adjudicates petitions to grant relief against the state or any of its administrative
authorities, including the IDF.'0 ' It has original jurisdiction over virtually
every power exercised by the branches of government, and is competent to
order them to perform or refrain from performing any action.'" Every act
of the Military Government thus falls under the Court's purview." 0 The
Court has been receptive to affording Palestinians the opportunity to challenge
the Military Government's actions. This unprecedented phenomenon of
allowing the civilian population access to the occupying power's national
courts and subjecting the Military Government's conduct to domestic judicial
review has added a unique element to this occupation."' The immediate
effect has been the legalization - or what Lon Fuller called the "judicializa-
tion"I" - of the conduct of the government. The rich body of case law thus
generated has shaped and modified policies of the Military Government." 3
The Israeli Supreme Court is widely recognized as a competent,
non-partisan, and principled institution. It is a responsive and active court," 4
106. Id.
107. See Abu-Aita v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 37(2) P.D. 197, 230-32
(1983), translated in 7 SELECTED JUDGEMENTS, supra note 100, at 1; see also Cooperative Society v.
Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 37(4) P.D. 785, 810 (1983) (English excerpt in 14
ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 301 (1984)) (Barak, J.) ('Every Israeli soldier carries in his backpack the customary
norms of public international law of land warfare, as well as the basic rules of Israeli administrative law.')
(upholding expropriation of private land for construction of highway in West Bank).
108. In its other capacity, the Supreme Court hears appeals from the district courts.
109. The Israeli legal system absorbed these powers of review from the English prerogative writs
of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The High Court of Justice also has supervisory
jurisdiction over tribunals or people who exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. See Basic Law: The
Adjudication, 1110 Sefer Ha'Khukim 78 (Feb. 28, 1984), as amended by 1383 Sefer Ha'Khukim 72 (Feb.
4, 1992).
110. See Abu-Aita, 37(2) P.D. at 197; Cooperative Society, 37(4) P.D. at 785. See generally Eli
Nathan, The Power of Supervision of the High Court of Justice over Military Government, in MELrrARY
GOVERNMENT, supra note 37, at 114.
111. See BENVENISTI, supra note 41, at 119.
112. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 111-12 (1968).
113. See Ronen Shamir, 'Landmark Cases'and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case ofIsrael's
High Court of Justice, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 781, 798 (1990); see also infra part IV.
114. The Court periodically overrules Israeli administrative actions and secondary legislation on
grounds of fairness, reasonableness, equality, and personal freedoms. In addition, it has virtually
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and, in the absence of a bill of rights, it has been instrumental in authoring
and implementing Israel's much needed code of civil liberties.1 ' Although
the Court could have easily declined requests to adjudicate petitions con-
cerning the Occupied Territories - citing lack of territorial jurisdiction or the
"political question" doctrine - it chose instead to undertake the complex and
ungratifying task. The Court deserves credit for its willingness to review cases
from the Occupied Territories, especially in light of its heavy workload.
116
The Court insists that it reviews the actions of security authorities
comprehensively and with demanding scrutiny, and has explicitly undertaken
to do so in cases involving the Military Government in the Occupied Terri-
tories." 7 It has repeatedly emphasized its adherence to the fundamental
principle of belligerent occupation law: that of striking a balance between
military necessities on the one hand, and the rights and well-being of the
neutralized, by means of strict interpretation, some acts of primary legislation, which are, for the most
part, immune from judicial review. A good example was the 1927 Theater Censorship Ordinance, which
was extensively constricted in Laor v. Theater Review Board, 41(1) P.D. 421 (1987). The Knesset
repealed the Ordinance shortly after the judgment.
115. The seminal case was Kol Ha'am, which recognized free speech as a fundamental right which
may be restricted only for probable danger. Kol Ha'am v. Minister of Interior, 7(2) P.D. 871 (1953); see
Pnina Lahav, Foundations of Rights Jurisprudence in Israel: Chief Justice Agranat's Legacy, 24 ISR. L.
REV. 211, 251-58 (1990); Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel's Jurisprudence of Free Speech, 9
HASTINGs CoNs'r. L.Q. 21 (1981); see also Jeffrey M. Albert, Constitutional Adjudication Without a
Constitution: The Case of Israel, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1245 (1969); Baruch Bracha, The Protection of
Human Rights in Israel, 12 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 110 (1982); Amos Shapira, The Status of Fundamental
Individual Rights in the Absence of a Written Constitution, 9 ISR. L. REV. 497 (1974); Itzhak Zamir,
Human Rights and National Security, 23 IsR. L. REV. 375, 392-405 (1989); Dana Briskman, National
Security Versus Human Rights: An Analysis of the Approach of the Israeli Supreme Court to the Conflict
Between National Security and Civil Liberties (1989) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law School).
116. Unlike the discretionary jurisdiction held by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Israeli Supreme Court
has mandatory jurisdiction; it adjudicates every case submitted to it. While the Court cannot technically
bar the submission of petitions, it can easily hinder the submission of particular types of petitions. One
way would be to impose litigation costs, as it does in most fields of law, on petitioners who fail to show
exceptional factual bases or produce convincing arguments. According to the Ministry of Justice, 765
petitions were submitted to the High Court of Justice in 1989, of which 277 concerned security matters.
Tova Tzimuld, Beinish: Increase in HCJ Petitions, DAVAR, Jan. 16, 1990, at 3 (Hebrew).
117. Justice Barak has ruled that
the judgments of the Supreme Court stated more than once that the security considerations of
the army, both inside Israel as well as in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, are subject to judicial
review, and that this judicial review is not limited to questions of jurisdiction or the presence
of security considerations in the case at hand. It extends to the whole gamut of grounds for
review, including the question of reasonableness of the security consideration.
Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 42(2) P.D. 441, 486 (1988). Barak has also asserted that "extensive
powers are concentrated in the hands of a Military Government, and for the sake of the rule of law we
should apply judicial review according to the normal standards." Cooperative Society v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 37(4) P.D. 785, 810 (1983).
For a comprehensive survey of the Court's increasing intervention in the actions of the security
authorities, see Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts,
28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 (1991). Bracha's account pertains primarily to the Court's review of government
actions inside Israel. Id. at 45. Nonetheless, he expresses his concern about treating the two jurisdictions
as distinct and separate entities. Bracha reminds us that many of the emergency powers exercised today
in the Occupied Territories are available also inside Israel. Id. at 95-96. He also dispels the notion that
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence towards the Military Government can be isolated from the
jurisprudence it applies in reviewing other branches of government. Id. at 45.
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population on the other."' Moreover, the Court underscores that the
Military Government has undertaken to comply with "substantive" aspects of
the rule of law and to abide by progressive standards. The Court purports to
hold the Military Government to these standards.1 9 In reality, however, the
Court has sided with the Military Government in most cases, including those
involving an array of restrictions on personal liberties. ° The Court has thus
played a crucial role in legitimating Israeli rule over the Occupied Territories,
particularly in the eyes of the majority of the Israeli polity and certain
segments of the international community. It has also reinforced the self-image
of the Military Government.' 2 '
118. See, e.g., Abu-Aita v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 37(2) P.D. 197
(1983), translated in 7 SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 100, at 310.
119. Justice Shamgar has stated:
It appears from the evidence and arguments presented to us that the Israeli Military
Government did not exercise the above powers granted to it by international law to their fullest
and most severe degree, but rather sought to limit itself, as far as possible, to those steps
which were absolutely vital for the maintenance of safety and public order .... The exercise
of powers of the respondents [the Minister of Defense and the Military Commander of Judea
and Samaria Regions] will be reviewed by the same standards this Court applies when it
examines the action or omission of any other arm of the executive power, taking into
consideration the respondents' obligations that correspond to their duties.
Al Talya v. Minister of Defense, 33(3) P.D. 505, 511 (1979) (English excerpt in 10 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs.
333 (1980)); see also ACRI v. Commander of Central Command, 43(2) P.D. 529, 538 (1989).
120. The Court has upheld the Military Government's efforts to impose prolonged curfews, including
a night curfew that had been imposed every night on the entire Gaza strip for more than two years, Shawa
v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, 44(4) P.D. 590 (1990); requisition private land for the
establishment of military bases and Jewish civilian settlements, Ayoub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D.
113 (1979) (English excerpt in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 337 (1979)); restrict international telephone
communications from and to the Occupied Territories, Law in the Service of Man v. Military Commander
of Judea and Samaria Region, 42(3) P.D. 260 (1988); expropriate private land for construction of
highways, Cooperative Society v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 37(4) P.D. 785
(1985) (English excerpt in 14 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 301 (1984)); indefinitely suspend elections to local
councils, Amar v. Minister of Defense, 38(4) P.D. 645 (1984) (English excerpt in 15 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 274 (1985)); take temporary possession of private property for military purposes, Juha v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 43(2) P.D. 116 (1989); Abu Rian v. Military Commander of
Judea and Samaria Region, 42(2) P.D. 767 (1988); impose time and manner restrictions on funerals of
people killed in clashes with security forces, Baracat v. Commander of Central Command, HCJ 3393/92
(1992) (unpublished); Qillani v. Head of Civil Administration, HCJ 8/84 (1984) (unpublished); deport
individuals from the Occupied Territories on security grounds, El Affu v. Military Commander of West
Bank, 42(2) P.D. 4 (1988), translated in 29 I.L.M. 139; condition the right to travel abroad on receipt
of special and revocable permits, Awad v. Commander of Civil Administration, Ramallah District, 40(2)
P.D. 281, 284 (1986) (English excerpt in 17 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 305 (1987)); limit duration of stays
abroad and, upon default, indefinitely suspend the right to return, El-Tin v. Minister of Defense, 27(1)
P.D. 481 (1973) (English excerpt in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 376 (1975)); refuse to allow unification of
families where one of the spouses has no residency rights in the Occupied Territories, Al Saudi v. Head
of Civil Administration in Gaza, 41(3) P.D. 138 (1987) (English excerpt in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 246
(1988)); impose censorship on the press and all published materials, Al Talya v. Minister of Defense,
33(3) P.D. 505 (1979) (English excerpt in 10 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 333 (1980)); and close schools,
universities, trade unions, or social clubs for security reasons, Hamdan v. Military Commander of Judea
and Samaria Regions, 40(2) P.D. 614 (1986) (English excerpt in 17 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 316 (1987)).
Ronen Shamir has shown that only five of the 557 petitions that were submitted by Palestinians from
the Occupied Territories between 1967 and 1986 were decided in favor of the petitioners. At least
sixty-five cases were decided in favor of the Military Government during the same period. Most of the
petitions (492) were unaccounted for; it is unlikely that cases decided in favor of the petitioners went
unnoticed. Shamir, supra note 113, at 802; see also BENVENISTI, supra note 41, at 119-20.
121. See generally Shamir, supra note 113.
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Notwithstanding the criticism due to the Court for its performance on the
demolition issue, one ought not discount the difficulties that have constrained
the Court's task. The demolition policy had been exercised for twelve years
before it was first reviewed by the Court; 2 several hundred homes had
been demolished during this period.1"s A sudden judicial censure of this
practice would have delivered a blow to the Military Government, and to the
representatives of the state who had defended it over the years, thus
vindicating critics' reproaches of the state. 124
The demolition practice involves governmental claims of national security,
which present serious jurisprudential difficulties for courts in general."z
Ruling against the government is particularly difficult in countries like Israel,
where courts do not have formal constitutions on which to rely. 6 The
Military Government insists that the demolition practice is necessary to deter
Palestinians from committing acts of violence and to ensure the Military
Government's control. Indeed, the intensity and incidence of Palestinian
violence - including deadly assaults involving Molotov cocktails, stone-
throwing, firearms, stabbings, and kidnappings - put IDF soldiers, Israeli
citizens, and fellow Palestinians in grave jeopardy. The need for an effective
measure to combat security crimes resonates with the traditional assertion that
the Palestinian national movement poses a long-term threat to the state's very
survival. Judicial sensitivity to the state's security claims is therefore not
surprising. 2
7
122. See infra part IV.A.
123. The number of homes demolished during this period is not clear. According to the Ha'aretz
daily, 686 homes were demolished or sealed in the Occupied Territories between 1967 and 1979. Increase
in the Number of Home Demolitions by Security Forces in the Occupied Territories, HA'ARETz, May 18,
1981 at I (Hebrew); see also COHEN, supra note 69, at 98; cf. MERON BENVENiSTI ET. AL., TE WEST
BANK HANDBOOK - A POLiTICAL LEXICON 86 (1986).
124. See, e.g., PLAYFAIR, supra note 69, at 10-11; RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND
THE WEST BANK 41-49 (1985).
125. The U.S. Supreme Court is no exception; it has displayed ardent deference towards policies of
military agencies, even when they concern non-operational issues. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986) (upholding Air Force dress regulations barring Orthodox Jew from wearing
yarmulke); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding law which permitted exclusion of women
from draft registration). Former Justice William Brennan examines the Court's record with remorse and
embarrassment. He salutes the Israeli Court for striking the correct balance between civil rights and
security interests and suggests that it be emulated by all states. Brennan describes Barak's ruling in Kahane
v. Minister of Defense, 35(2) P.D. 253 (1981), as a "monumental" example of upholding free speech in
times of crisis. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in 77mes
of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 11 (1988). The Israeli Court's performance cannot be
evaluated in such a uniform fashion. It appears that Brennan overlooks, or may be unaware of, the
discrepancy between the Court's treatment of Israel proper and its treatment of the Occupied Territories.
While the role played by the Court in defense of Israeli civil liberties is beyond dispute, its concern for
rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories is less than remarkable, as the issue of home demolitions
demonstrates.
126. The basis for the Court's review powers is an easily revocable Knesset law. See Basic Law:
The Adjudication, 1110 Sefer Ha'Khuldm 78 (Feb. 28, 1984), as amended by 1383 Sefer Ha'Khukim 72
(Feb. 4, 1992).
127. Special consideration for notions of national security and preservation of the Jewish nation is
not foreign to Israeli jurisprudence. A good example of a broad construction of national security interests
can be found in Ayoub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113 (1979) (English excerpt in 9 IsR. Y.B.
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The charged character of the issues concerning the Occupied Territories
further complicates the Court's task. Many of the Military Government's
practices are the subject of intense controversy and are continuously criticized,
often vehemently, from both sides of the political spectrum. 2 1 Moreover,
the Court itself has been criticized by the Israeli executive branch for
obstructing its task of curbing unrest in the Occupied Territories. 2 9 The
Defense Ministry under Itzhak Rabin had apparently lobbied for Knesset
legislation to bar the Court from reviewing home demolition orders.130
Following the government's defeat in Dweikat v. Government of Israel,'
former Cabinet Minister Ariel Sharon urged a similar attempt to "immunize"
the Military Government from the Court's oversight." 2 Naturally, such a
climate inhibits the Court from overriding the security authorities.' The
HuM. RTS. 337 (1979)). For judicial reference to notions of Jewish self-preservation, see the debate on
the question of "who is a Jew" in Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16(3) P.D. 2428 (1962).
128. The Military Government's policies are frequently criticized as violating Palestinian human
rights by the Jewish and Arab political parties on the left of the political spectrum, as well as by various
non-governmental organizations includingB 'Tselem, Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, the ICRC,
UNRWA, and the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights.
Politicians from the right criticize the policies as being too lenient. For example, Geulla Cohen, as
Deputy Minister, maintained that the effectiveness of sealing off houses is "laughable," and called for the
deportation of terrorists and their families and for the deportation of all the inhabitants of a village that
fails to respond to three warnings. Dan Margalit, An Arab Village That Does Not Respond to Three
Warnings - All Its Inhabitants Will Be Deported, HA'ARErZ, July 10, 1985, at 3 (Hebrew). Numerous
Cabinet Ministers have called for harsher measures. Raphael Eitan suggested that Israel reinstate capital
punishment, Gideon Alon, Ze'evi: You Can't Cure Cancer with Aspirin; Only Sealing the Territories Will
Curb the Murder Wave, HA'AP=rz, Mar. 25, 1991, at 2 (Hebrew), and impose collective fines on the
town of Qalqilya for damages caused to the property of the neighboring kibbutz Nir Eliyahu, Ehud
Rabinovitz, Raful: To Punish Qalqilya - Beat Them Once or 7ice and It Will Be All Over, MA'ARiV,
June 14, 1990, at 8 (Hebrew). Rehavam Ze'evi called for, among other measures, the deportation of
Palestinian "murderers and instigators" and their families, as well as the closure of all "instigating press."
Alon, supra. Ariel Sharon called for the immediate deportation of hundreds of leaders of the Intifada and
"other instigators." Id. He also suggested ordering soldiers to "shoot to kill" Molotov cocktail throwers,
Roni Shaked, Sharon: We Should KillAnyone Who Throws a Molotov Cocktail, YEDIoT AHRONOT, June
13, 1988, at 3 (Hebrew), and outlawing the Palestinian press and organizations that criticize Israel.
"Outlaw Press and PLO Groups Which Criticize Us," HA'ARETZ, Jan. 27, 1988 (Hebrew). Avner Shaki
called for deporting entire families, Alon, supra, reinstating capital punishment for Palestinian terrorists,
and outlawing meetings between Palestinian residents of Israel and Palestinians from the Occupied
Territories, describing such meetings as "spreading cancer," Collective Punishment in Judea and Samaria
Will Reduce the Rioting, MA'ARIv, May 12, 1989, at 3 (Hebrew).
129. Itzhak Rabin expressed such criticism in his former capacity as Defense Minister. Akiva Eldar,
Rabin: Laws Enacted Under Begin Hinder the Intifada Battle, HA'AR=rz, July 18, 1988, at 2 (Hebrew);
Kenneth Kaplan, The Military Has Exhausted Its Ideas, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 25, 1989.
130. The Justice Ministry reportedly blocked the request. Baruch Meiri, Justice Ministry Officials:
Won't Agree to Increasing Severity of Punishment, MA'ARIV, June 23, 1989, at 2 (Hebrew).
131. 34(1) P.D. 1 (1979).
132. See NEoBI, supra note 104, at 71.
133. In the politically charged Dweikat decision, Justice Landau explained:
There is still a great fear that the court will appear as though it has abandoned its appropriate
place and stooped down into the arena of public debate, and that its decision will be received
by part of the public with applause and by the other part with emotional and total rejection.
In this sense, I see myself here, as one upon whom has been imposed this duty, to rule on the
basis of law in every matter properly brought before the court, for I know in advance that the
general public will not look to the legal reasoning but rather only to the final conclusion, and
the rightful place of the court as an institution may be harmed, beyond the debates upon which
the public is divided. Yet what can we do? This is our role and this our duty as judges.
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Court's demolition jurisprudence should therefore be understood against a
background of an ongoing military struggle and a legal environment in which
formal recognition of international law and principles of "natural justice" is
strongly contested.
IV. THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT ON HOME DEMOLITIONS
This part of the Article describes the rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court
on the demolition practice. It examines the doctrine produced by the Court,
the jurisprudence employed by the Court, and the influence of the Court's
decisions on the Military Government's policy. The evolution of the case law
can be broken down into three periods. Before 1979, demolitions were not
reviewed by the Court. Between 1979 and July 1989, the demolition
jurisprudence, based on the seminal cases of Sakhawil3 4 and Khamri,3
consistently allowed the practice to flourish. In the third and current phase,
judicial uniformity has ruptured. Some judges have begun to find faults in
specific demolition orders, and one newly appointed judge delivers fierce
dissents. This mixed jurisprudence has resulted in the curtailment of the
demolition practice.
A. Demolitions in the Absence of Judicial Review
Before 1979, no demolition order reached adjudication. The Military
Government simply avoided the Court's scrutiny by executing demolitions
overnight without any warning. The unprepared families were awakened by
the army and given between thirty minutes and two hours to evacuate their
homes and to recover whatever they could of their personal belongings. The
demolition followed immediately. As a result, Palestinian homeowners had no
way of learning about their impending fate and were thus unable to take their
cases to the Court in time. Anticipating possible demolitions, families of
apprehended offenders began to forestall demolition by submitting "preemp-
tive" petitions for injunctions against such possible orders, without knowing
whether they had actually been issued. In most cases, the Military Govern-
ment responded that it did not intend to demolish the petitioners' homes.,
The Military Government was apparently concerned that the Court might
disapprove of the practice. 137
Dweikat v. Government of Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1, 4 (1979), quoted in AHARoN BARAK, JUDICIAL
DiscRETIoN 228 (Y. Kaufman trans., 1989).
134. Sakhawil v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 34(1) P.D. 464 (1979) (English
excerpt in 10 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 345 (1980)).
135. Khamri v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 36(3) P.D. 439 (1982) (English
excerpt in 17 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 314 (1987)).
136. See, e.g., Danon v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 312/89 (1989)
(unpublished); Salameh v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 353/86 (1986) (unpublished).
137. See, e.g., PLAYFAiR, supra note 69, at 26 (citing opinion of Lea Tsemel).
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B. Establishment and Expansion of the Demolition Doctrine
The second phase began in 1979, with a two-page per curiam judgment
in Sakhawil v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region.' In this
tersely worded ruling, the Court stamped the practice with legal approval and
paved the way for hundreds of subsequent destructions and sealings. Sakhawil
concerned an order to seal a room in the petitioner's house, located in the
village of Abuyn near Ramallah. The room was allegedly used by the
petitioner's son for storing explosives and for harboring a person responsible
for a series of bomb attacks in Jerusalem. Three weeks before the Supreme
Court hearing, the son was convicted by a military court and sentenced to five
years' imprisonment.
The opinion introduced the central tenet of the demolition doctrine, that
"local law" overrides international law:
Neither can we accept Mrs. Tsemel's arguments relying on the Geneva Convention. We
have no need to rule on the question whether the respondent was obligated to act in
accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, for even if this had been the
case, there is no contradiction between the provisions of the Convention. . . and the
exercise of the authority vested in the respondent by statutory provisions that were in force
at the time when the Judea and Samaria Region was under Jordanian rule, and that have
remained in force in Judea and Samaria to this day. 39
In effect, this paragraph constitutes the Court's entire discussion of the legal
justification for the demolition practice.
Despite the terse explanation, the ruling's implication is obvious.
Although the Court did not explicate its decision, it is clear that it was
applying its understanding of Article 64 of the Geneva Convention, which
instructs the occupier to maintain local law. 40 Article 119 of the 1945
DERs, therefore, trumped the substantive provisions of the Hague and Geneva
instruments. The Court thus failed to mention a series of pertinent humanitari-
an doctrines: the opinion made no reference to prohibitions on the confiscation
or destruction of private property, to due process concerns arising from the
issuance of demolition orders, or to the apparent violation of the prohibition
on nonindividual punishment. While the decision gave cursory attention to the
Geneva Convention, it completely ignored the Hague Regulations, which the
Court had previously acknowledged as enforceable law. 4' Interestingly, the
Court failed to mention the second of the policy's traditional justifications,
138. 34(1) P.D. 464 (1979) (English excerpt in 10 lsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 345 (1980)).
139. Sakhawil, 34(1) P.D. at 464. The opinion appears to have been written by Shamgar. It is only
natural that Shamgar, an acclaimed expert on belligerent occupation law and a specialist on IDF legal
matters, would take the lead. The content of the decision is very similar to the themes that Shamgar
presented on behalf of the Israeli government in 1971. See Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at
275-76; Symposium, supra note 39, at 380. Moreover, the style in which the decision was written strongly
resembles that of Shamgar.
140. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 64.
141. See supra text accompanying note 99.
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presented by Shamgar in 1971 - that demolitions are justified because they
are administered out of military necessity.142
It is not surprising that the Military Government chose the Sakhawil case
to establish the legality of the practice, since the particular circumstances
rendered it a safe case to defend. This particular order had minimal effects:
just one room, which had been directly used in the commission of the offense,
was to be sealed, not destroyed. Furthermore, the petitioner's son had already
been convicted in the Ramallah military court of the offense. The Supreme
Court could thus have reasonably treated the Military Commander's decision
as one founded upon facts proven in a court of law.
In a string of subsequent cases, the Court broadened the demolition
doctrine. Hamed v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region 43
relaxed the standard of evidence required for issuing demolition orders. While
Sakhawil was decided after a military court convicted the offender, the order
to seal the rooms in Hamed was based solely on pre-trial confessions obtained
from the suspected offenders. The Court asserted that the Military Com-
mander can exercise his powers under Article 119 whenever he "is satisfied"
that the offense was committed. The Court was not concerned that the
Military Commander's information was obtained from the offender in the
course of his interrogation.
The Court dramatically expanded the doctrine in its fifth decision, Khamri
v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region.'44 Khamri dealt with
orders to destroy the homes of two Palestinians suspected of stabbing a Jewish
settler to death. The case marked the first time that the Military Government
defended destroying, as opposed to sealing, homes; 45 it was also the first
case in which the designated homes had not been implicated in the commission
of the offense in any way.
In the decision to uphold the demolition orders, Justice Barak neither
acknowledged that he was broadening the demolition doctrine nor articulated
the reasons for doing so. Instead, he accepted the broadened practice as
though it had always existed. The decision hinges on the principle that the
Court's review is limited to the lawfulness of administrative actions and does
not extend to their efficacy or wisdom. Barak recognized the conflicting
interests and enumerated the factors and considerations on both sides of the
142. One possible explanation for the omission is that the premise of this justification had ceased to
exist: in 1971, the army demolished only those homes that were directly involved in the commission of
offenses; by 1979, the practice was applied primarily to residences in which offenders lived. The claim
of military necessity is less convincing when applied to mere residency. See infra part V.C.1.
143. 35(3) P.D. 223 (1981) (English excerpt in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 365 (1981)). In this case,
the order was to seal one room in each of the homes of two people who admitted killing several
Palestinians suspected of collaborating with the Military Government.
144. 36(3) P.D. 439 (1982) (English excerpt in 17 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 314 (1987)); see also
Khamamra v. Minister of Defense, 36(2) P.D. 755 (1982).
145. While a considerable number of homes had previously been destroyed, no cases challenging
the practice reached the Court.
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dilemma, cautioning that the demolition of a home is "a harsh and severe
measure, and that it should be applied only following strict investigation and
consideration, and only in special circumstances." 1" Ultimately, however,
he left the decision to the autonomous discretion of the Military Government,
stating that due to the "extreme severity of the offenses... of more than one
hundred stabs in cold blood," it was permissible for a "reasonable Military
Commander to apply the drastic sanction of demolition."' 47 The Court's
actual ruling - upholding the orders - thus overshadowed its warning
regarding the harshness of the measure.
The Khamri opinion also ruled that the "inhabitant" requirement of Article
119 is not limited to permanent or continuous residents. The offenders'
parents had argued that their sons should not be considered "inhabitants,"
because they lived at home only during school vacations. In response, the
Court introduced a notion of constructive residency: the mere fact that the
sons are away from their parents' homes during the school year "does not
prevent them from staying in, or being considered 'inhabitants' of, the homes
of their parents during vacation periods." The decision emphasized that at the
time of the murder, the offenders were staying at their parents' homes.14
Similarly, the Court rejected an indirect attack on the collective character of
the punishment. The petitioners claimed that the language of Article 119
should bar its application when only one of the house's residents committed
the offense.14 9 The Court stated that this proposition comports with neither
the provision's language nor with its "underlying legislative policy. '
While the Court often endorses the practice's purpose (deterrence) it rarely
endorses the policy underlying Article 119 - the policy of the British
Mandatory Government. The reference to the British legislator is an exception
to one of the Court's usual jurisprudential mechanisms - that of decon-
textualizing Article 119 from the Israeli system and treating it as a command
made by a foreign legislature in a different era. This approach was later
criticized by Justice Heshin. 5
Before !Kamri, the practice of home demolitions had been restricted by
the existence of judicial review. At least in those cases where the families
reached the Court before the orders were carried out, the homes were likely
to be subjected only to sealing. In cases where the houses had not been used
directly to commit the offenses, the homeowners stood a fair chance of
avoiding the predicament altogether. The Khamri precedent thus "lies about
146. Khamri, 36(3) P.D. at 443. This warning was not revived until Turkeman v. Minister of
Defense, HCJ 5510/92 (1993) (unpublished).
147. Khamri, 36(3) P.D. at 444.
148. Id. at 441.
149. Article 119 uses the plural form. It refers to houses "the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants
of which ... have committed... any offense." See supra text accompanying notes 69 to 70.
150. Khamri, 36(3) P.D. at 442.




like a loaded weapon;"1 52 it vests in the hands of the Military Government
the power to destroy any building simply because an offender resided there.
No other judgment has affected the demolition practice so dramatically. Since
the Khamri ruling, most homes have been destroyed rather than sealed, and
almost every home destroyed has been an offender's residence, not the site of
a crime.
In subsequent cases the Court condoned the sealing of rented homes,
despite the absence of any evidence connecting the landlords with the offenses
committed by their tenants. The Court reasoned that because the purpose of
Article 119 is deterrence, the exemption of rented homes would provide a
loophole by enabling a person contemplating an offense to avoid the
demolition punishment by moving into a rented house. This loophole, the
Court explained, would defeat the objective of the policy. 153 The Court
made no mention of the harm caused to the homeowners.
The Court further expanded its interpretation of Article 119 to permit the
destruction of multi-apartment buildings. Typically, such structures house
several nuclear families belonging to one extended family. For example, in
Qarabsa v. Minister of Defense,54 the Court upheld the destruction of a
building comprising five living units, housing twenty-seven members of one
extended family. The petitioner asked the Court to restrict the destruction to
the particular unit in which the offender resided. In its one-sentence rejection
of this proposal, the Court introduced the test of inseparability of "units of
residence": "It has not been disputed that the [offender's] 'unit of residence'
constitutes an inseparable part of the petitioner's home, and therefore we
cannot accept the claim to limit the destruction."155
Throughout this second phase of jurisprudence, the Court's decisions,
almost without exception, projected neither criticism of the demolition practice
nor any intent to restrict it.56 This attitude allowed the practice to prolif-
erate. The Court's legitimization and institutionalization of the practice
transformed it into a routine, almost mundane exercise of legal power.
Following this judicial sponsorship, the Military Government gradually
stretched the policy until it became a tool that was at the same time harsh and
152. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
153. Justice Shamgar, the President of the Court, stated, "We conclude that Article 119 serves as
a deterring punitive measure, and if the sanction will be precluded whenever the [terrorist] uses a rented
apartment, the deterrent effect which is expected from the Article will be undermined." Al Gamal v.
Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 542/89 (1989) (unpublished); see also Al Sheikh
v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 1056/89 (1990) (unpublished); Lafrukh v. Military Commander of Judea and
Samaria Region, HCJ 869190 (1990) (unpublished).
154. HCJ 2665/90 (1990) (unpublished).
155. Id. at 3.
156. During this period, Jabarin was the only case in which the Court substantively overruled a
demolition order, albeit marginally. Hamdi Jabarin was convicted of committing "serious security offenses"
and was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. The Military Government decided to seal two rooms and
the kitchen of the house which Jabarin shared with 23 members of his extended family. Without
explanation, the Court authorized the sealing of the two rooms but held that sealing the kitchen was
indefensible. Jabarin v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 443/86 & 515/86 (1987) (unpublished).
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easily executed. As the Intifada continued and Israel appeared to lose control,
the Military Government relied more and more on demolitions. By the middle
of 1989, however, the policy had become too pervasive for the Court.
C. Mixed Jurisprudence and the Chilling Effect
The third jurisprudential phase began with the Military Government's
defeat in Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) v. Commander of
Central Command."s7 Petitioning on its own behalf, ACRI requested the
Court to obligate the Military Government to notify in advance homeowners
whose houses were to be demolished and to afford them the opportunity to
appeal demolition orders. Until then, most demolitions were still being
executed in the middle of the night, with no possibility for any sort of
appeal.' ACRI's argument rested primarily on the "right to be heard," a
principle firmly embedded in Israeli administrative law and similar to the
American procedural due process requirement. The Military Government
insisted that to achieve the desired deterrent effect, it was necessary to execute
demolition orders swiftly, without granting owners the right to appeal."19
In its decision, the Court reaffirmed the validity of Article 119, but
decided in favor of the petitioners on the procedural question. The Court
ordered that before demolishing homes, the Military Government must give
families notice and enable them to initiate an administrative proceeding before
the Military Commanders and seek the Supreme Court's review of demolition
orders. The ruling, however, permitted the sealing of homes without prior
notice in urgent cases. 6 ' The Court has reviewed almost all demolition
orders since this decision.
Slowing down the demolition process has opened a channel for communi-
cation between families and the Military Government and has facilitated
alternative resolutions. At least twenty-four cases have been settled out of
court, many through creative arrangements limiting the demolition to only part
of the house.' In some cases, the government has rescinded demolition
157. 43(2) P.D. 529 (1989). The Association for Civil Rights in Israel is a non-profit organization
devoted to the promotion of civil liberties and human rights in Israel and in the regions under Israeli rule.
For an excellent analysis of ACRI and the subsequent ACRI v. Commander of Southern Command, 44(4)
P.D. 626 (1990), see Bracha, supra note 117, at 75-81.
158. Such was the practice in the West Bank; traditionally, however, the Military Commander of
the Gaza region notified owners of demolition orders some days prior to their execution.
159. During oral argument Justice Shamgar, the President of the Court, suggested a compromise that
would have barred demolitions without prior notice, but permitted sealings without notice in extreme cases.
ACRI accepted the suggestion, but the government rejected it.
160. ACRI, 43(2) P.D. at 541.
161. E.g., Abu Sarkhan v. Military Commander, HCJ 3274/90 (1990) (unpublished) (limiting order
to only part of home); Al Aga v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, HCJ 141/90 (1990) (unpublished)
(discussing out of court settlement to seal rooms instead of destroying house); Awis v. Military
Commander, HCJ 3923/90 (1990) (unpublished); Hussein v. Legal Advisor in Judea and Samaria Region,
HCJ 3702/90 (1990) (unpublished) (allowing family to choose rooms to be sealed); Khalil v. Minister of
Defense, HC 431/90 (1990) (unpublished); Qafisheh v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 5053/90 (1990)
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orders altogether,162 and in others it has settled for sealing instead of
destruction. 63 The new procedure has mitigated somewhat the unfairness of
the families' predicament. Rather than demolition coming as a total surprise
in the middle of the night, families have had a chance to prepare themselves,
physically and emotionally, for the demolition. The procedural arrangement
has also diminished the possibility that the Military Government will demolish
the wrong house because of mistaken identification."4 Furthermore, it has
imposed a "cooling down" period that prevents Military Commanders from
making hasty decisions in the midst of turbulent and distressing events.' 65
Since the ACRI decision, the Court has split into three factions.' 66 A
majority of the Court has adhered to the previous decisions.' 67 Consequent-
ly, the lion's share of demolition orders have been upheld with little
resistance.
Three or four justices have adopted a second approach. These justices are
critical of the practice, but refrain from confronting the mainstream view
directly. They are obviously aware of the difficulties entailed in condemning
the practice outright, and are probably concerned about embarrassing the
Court's majority. Furthermore, a direct reproach would be inconsistent with
the opinions that these justices themselves have previously delivered. One
method chosen by this second group of justices has been to censure demolition
orders on the basis of their particular circumstances. They have overruled two
demolition orders with judgments that indirectly express judicial discontent
with the practice. In Nassman v. Military Commander of Gaza Region,6 '
the Court remanded the demolition order for reconsideration on the ground
that it contained factual errors. In Nimer v. Military Commander of Judea and
Samaria Region,169 the Court overruled the order after finding that the
(unpublished) (discussing out of court settlement to seal rooms instead of destroying house); Toama v.
Minister of Defense, HCJ 430/90 (1990) (unpublished) (discussing sealing only one apartment and
postponing execution until after holy month of Ramadan); Daher v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 863188
(1989) (unpublished); Mushtaha v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 665/89 (1989) (unpublished) (limiting sealing
to one-half of house, on condition that family help seal).
162. E.g., AI-Qadri v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 598/91 (1991) (unpub-
lished); Marabah v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 1505/91 (1991) (unpublished).
163. E.g., Al Sayis v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 3794/90 (1991)
(unpublished); Qaraja v. Military Commander of West Bank, HCJ 3921/90 (1990) (unpublished); Jit v.
Military Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 120/89 & 121/89 (1989) (unpublished).
164. Such a mistake occurred in the village of Beita in April of 1988. The Military Government
admitted the error and compensated the homeowner. Reuven Pedatzur, Beita Resident Whose House Was
Accidently Destroyed to Get 35,330 N.LS., HA'ARZ, June 5, 1988 (Hebrew). Gazit admits that
demolition is an "arbitrary act without a trial and without the possibilities of investigating thoroughly," and
that "we are not angels. Here and there a mistake is possible." COHEN, supra note 69, at 99.
165. See supra note 47.
166. The Israeli Supreme Court does not sit en banc; cases are normally adjudicated by only three
of the twelve judges. While the Court does adhere to the stare decisis principle, judicial outcomes are still
somewhat contingent on the personal opinions of the judges assigned to cases.
167. One exception is Justice Barak's recent decision in Turkeman v. Minister of Defense, HCJ
5510/92 (1993) (unpublished).
168. 44(2) P.D. 601 (1990).
169. HCJ 299/90 (1991) (unpublished).
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offender did not in fact reside in the house that was to be demolished. Both
judgments, written by Justice Or, with the Court's Deputy President,
Menachem Elon, concurring, are inconsistent with the prevailing doctrine.17
0
Another method chosen by these judges has been to criticize the practice
in obiter dicta. In Caracra v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria
Region,171 the Court upheld an order to seal a rented home, but used an
unfamiliar judicial tone. Justice Or raised serious doubts about the appropri-
ateness of applying Article 119 to rented homes."7 More important, Justice
Shlomo Levine suggested that the time may have come for the Court to take
a more critical approach toward the demolition policy. " True, the Court
had spoken of the need to limit the practice as early as Khamri,74 but it had
always left discretion in the hands of the Military Commanders. Caracra
marked the first time that the Court sent the Military Government a clear
message that it might take the initiative and begin to restrict the scope of the
practice.
The third judicial approach emerged with the appointment of Justice
Mishael Heshin in January 1991. Heshin has confronted the demolition
doctrine diametrically and forcefully, although he has fallen short of calling
for an outright ban on the practice. He revealed his antagonism toward the
practice in his very first demolition case, Khizran v. Military Commander of
Judea and Samaria Region." Ilizran dealt with an order to destroy the
homes of two Palestinians accused of murdering a seventy-six-year-old Jewish
gardener in a small town near Netanya. Heshin's principal argument was that
the demolition of an entire house is prohibited, because it inflicts punishment
on some members of the offender's family. He challenged the prevailing
doctrine, which permitted the demolition of an entire house as long as the
offender's room could be considered "inseparable" from the rest of the
170. In Nassman, the order was based on three facts. The Court denied the order because it found
that only two of the three facts were correct. However, under the prevailing doctrine, the remaining two
facts would have been sufficient to justify the destruction. Furthermore, the Court seemed almost too eager
to hear the case. It expedited the discussion by hearing the arguments "as if an order nisl was issued."
Nassman, 44(2) P.D. at 601.
In Nimer, the Military Commander ordered the destruction of the house of the offender's uncle in
the West Bank village of Betuniya. Although the offender had led his interrogators to his uncle's house
after his apprehension, and his personal belongings were found there, the Court ruled that the offender
should be considered an "inhabitant" of his father's home in the Kalandia refugee camp. Justice Or could
have easily adhered to the Court's previously expressed broad interpretation of the "inhabitant" provision.
His preference for a narrow interpretation is conspicuous. Nimer, slip op. at 5.
171. HCJ 2630/90 (1991) (unpublished).
172. Acknowledging the injustice inflicted on owners of rented homes, Justice Or wrote, "[Tihe
Order is expected to cause severe harm to the buildings' owners, occasionally with no fault on their part,
while the harm caused to those who committed the acts of terror - depending on their rights in the
property - could be marginal." Id. at 4.
173. Justice Shlomo Levine stated, "I am inclined to believe that in light of the severe effect of
applying Article 119 ... the Court ought to limit its use and interpret it narrowly." Id. at 3.
174. See supra text accompanying note 146.
175. 46(2) P.D. 151 (1992).
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house.'76 Heshin lashed out at the Court's formalistic adherence to this legal
construct:I"
What is the normative significance - or what should be the significance - of the fact that
[the house has] only one roof and that the bathroom is commonly shared? The term "unit
of residence" has not been forced upon us; it is the product of our deliberation - viewed
within the realm of a particular theory and designated for a particular purpose .... We
should not concern ourselves with architecture, civil-engineering or graphic design. . but
with establishing appropriate norms within the confines of law, regarding the question of
what should be destroyed and what should not be destroyed."n
Heshin concluded that the Military Government could not seal or destroy
entire houses. The Khizran dissent represents a turning point in the demolition
jurisprudence, marking the first time that a Supreme Court justice has
declared the practice, as applied, to be unlawful.
The Khizran dissent was soon followed by Turkeman v. Minister of
Defense,'79 which constitutes the most significant intervention in the
demolition policy thus far. This unanimous decision, written by Justice Barak,
dealt with an order to destroy the house of a Palestinian who had shot and
killed a Jewish settler in the West Bank town of Jenin. The offender lived
with his mother and eight siblings, as well as with the wife and child of one
of his brothers. Most of this short opinion follows the Court's usual
affirmation of the power to apply Article 119, but the tone changes in the last
two paragraphs. Barak revisited the conflict of interests he had presented in
Khtamri,8 ° but evaluated the interests quite differently. In Khamri, Barak
had found that the severity of the offense rendered the destruction orders
"reasonable," regardless of the measure's impact on the offender's relatives;
in Turkeman, however, the measure's effect on family members took
precedence.' Barak introduced a test of "proportionality": the Military
Commander must take into consideration not only the illicit action that is
being deterred, but also "the harm caused to those who sustain the deterrent
measure."' 2 Barak stated that destroying the entire house as a response to
Mohammed Turkeman's act of murder would inflict harm on the family of his
older brother, and thus would amount to "a disproportionate - and therefore
unreasonable - measure."183 The Court enjoined the destruction of the
entire house, but allowed the sealing of two rooms.
176. See, e.g., Qarabsa v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 2665/90 (1990) (unpublished).
177. In Khizran, the respondent conceded that each of the homes "served several families
independently," but insisted that because they each had a "common bathroom and kitchen, and are covered
by a single roof... the entire apartment should be regarded as a 'single unit of residence' worthy of
demolition." Khizran, 46(2) P.D. at 159.
178. Khizran, 46(2) P.D. at 160 (Heshin, J., dissenting).
179. HCJ 5510192 (1993) (unpublished).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 146 to 147.
181. It is common knowledge that many Palestinian homes in the Occupied Territories contain more
than one nuclear family. See infra text accompanying notes 273 to 274.
182. Turkeman, slip op. at 3.
183. Id. at 4.
19941
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Turkeman decision, more than any other case, has thrown the
demolition doctrine into disarray. In effect, it has virtually prohibited the
destruction of houses and has limited sealing to the rooms occupied by the
offenders and their nuclear families. The Turkeman decision is intriguing
because it represents a distinct departure from the ninety-three previous
cases - including twenty-four cases in which Barak participated - whose
factual bases were virtually identical. Just as Justice Barak did not acknowl-
edge or explain his deviation from precedents when he broadened the
demolition doctrine in Iamri,' he refrained from doing so when he
narrowed the doctrine. He leaves the reader ignorant as to why, given the
backdrop of a line of consistent precedents, Turkeman's home was spared
destruction.
The Turkeman decision is remarkable in that it has managed to disrupt the
demolition doctrine without directly challenging the Court's precedent or
openly criticizing the Military Government's conduct. This seems to be what
it was intended to do. Indeed, the decision's evasive character and the stealth
with which it was handed down have apparently facilitated its acceptance and
dampened the reaction of the political right and the security authorities.'" 5
Given the other justices' high esteem for Barak, and in light of past experi-
ence, one can expect that the rest of the Court will eventually accept this
opinion."8 6 Significantly, nowhere in the Klizran and Turkeman opinions did
Justices Heshin or Barak refer to international law. Heshin mentioned the
prohibition against collective punishment, but treated it as a general principle
of law, while Barak's analysis was based on principles of Israeli administra-
tive law.
Isolating and ascertaining the exact effect of a court's decisions on the
executive branch's behavior is difficult; nevertheless, it seems that the Israeli
Supreme Court's output during the third jurisprudential phase has inhibited the
demolition practice. The decline in the incidence of demolitions after ACRI is
striking."s Judicial review of all demolition orders has provided those
184. See supra text accompanying notes 144 to 152.
185. It is significant that the Turkeman case was argued just four days after ACRI v. Minister of
Defense, HCJ 5973/92 (1993) (unpublished), which upheld the bitterly contested expulsion orders of 415
alleged Hammas and Islamic Jihad activists to Lebanon. The Rabin government seemed to acknowledge
and appreciate the judiciary's support in upholding the deportation orders in the face of both internal and
international criticism. In the tumult that followed, the Turkeman ruling (handed down two weeks later)
was hardly noticed. For a criticism of the deportation decision, see Eyal Benvenisti, N'garesh V'nishnah
[First Deport Then Listen], 2 MISHPAT U'MIMsHAL [LAw AND GOVERNMENT] 44 (1993) (Hebrew).
186. Neither of the two justices who joined Barak's opinion, Justices Maltz and Matza, had
previously expressed any criticism of the practice. For fuirther discussion of the Khizran and Turkenan
decisions, see infra text accompanying notes 339 to 345.
187. In the three months preceding the ACRI decision, 63 homes were destroyed, whereas in the
three months following it, 17 homes were destroyed. This represents a decrease of 73%. Looking at the
longer term, in the 12 months preceding the ACRI decision, 191 homes were destroyed, whereas in the
36 months following it, 171 homes were destroyed. This represents an annual decrease of 69%. A
decrease in the number of sealings and a further decrease in the number of destructions followed Nassman
v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, 44(2) P.D. 601 (1990), and Nimer v. Military Commander of
Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 299/90 (1991) (unpublished). See B'TSELEM, VIOLATIONS, supra note
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justices who hold views critical of the practice ample opportunity to express
their disapproval. Although none of the recent opinions has gone so far as to
invalidate Article 119 altogether, the importance of these judgments should not
be underestimated. Their power lies primarily in the Military Government's
fear of being censured. The Military Government displays deep concern about
its image as a law-abiding branch of government - an image that relies
heavily on the Court's rulings. It values its legitimacy more than the
demolition of any one home, and perhaps even more than the entire policy.
With four unfavorably disposed justices on the bench, jeopardizing its
legitimacy through continued reliance on the demolition practice would simply
be unwise.
D. Demolition Jurisprudence Analyzed
The demolition jurisprudence of the Court is based on its conception of
the political arrangement underlying Israel's rule over the Occupied Territo-
ries. This conception views the Military Government as possessing broad
discretion within the spheres of power vested in it by local and international
law.18 Within these spheres, the rights of Palestinians are limited to those
explicitly guaranteed by law, and only to the extent that they are not perceived
by the Military Government as a 'security threat. Palestinians may possess
other rights, outside of the Military Government's explicit sphere of power.
The Military Government has less authority to interfere with these rights. As
a result, judicial resolutions are rarely a product of the weighing and
balancing of conflicting interests, but rather of positioning the dispute either
within or outside the spheres of governmental authority.
The Court views the home demolition practice as being squarely within
the Military Government's sphere of authority. The Court has therefore
interpreted Article 119 expansively, skirting various challenges to the practice
based on doctrines of international law. Two additional aspects of the
demolition case law are conspicuous: cursory discussions, which allow but
minimal attention to contesting claims, and attempts by the Court to palliate
the harshness of the measure. These three characteristics of the demolition
jurisprudence are discussed below.
1. Expansive Interpretation of Article 119
The Court's view of the Military Government's absolute powers in the
law enforcement sphere has led it to interpret Article 119 of the 1945 DERs
26 (containing monthly tabulations of destructions and sealings).
188. Duncan Kennedy describes a similar type of judicial consciousness that once dominated
American legal thought. See Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 3, 4-6
(1980).
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expansively. It has done so through formalistic arguments presented in a
conclusory rather than explanatory manner, arguments that have immunized
the practice from moral or legal scrutiny. It has also relied heavily on stare
decisis, thereby diminishing the possibility of transforming the doctrine.' 89
The case law on demolitions consists primarily of mechanical, repetitious, and
almost uniform decisions, yielding only two dissents to date, both by the same
author. 190 The Court's predominant operational mode is one of deference to
the Military Commanders. The deference is often buttressed by expressions
of appreciation and respect for the Military Government's interest in law
enforcement.191 The judicial inquiry begins and ends as soon as the Court
confirms that Article 119 confers the authority in question to the government.
Most decisions turn on a laconic statement that because of the severity of the
offenses, the Court finds no reason to interfere with the Military Com-
mander's decision. 92 The Court occasionally goes beyond its habitual
deference and takes an affirmative stand in support of the Military Govern-
ment.193
189. The approach the Court has taken in these cases can be described as that of "legalism," which
Judith Shklar defines as "the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and
moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules." JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW,
MORALS AND PoLmcAL TRIALS 1 (1986).
190. AI-Amrin v. Military Commander of Gaza Regions, 46(3) P.D. 693 (1992) (Heshin, J.,
dissenting); Khizran v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 46(2) P.D. 150 (1992)
(Heshin, J., dissenting).
191. In ACRI, for example, Justice Shamgar stated:
The commander of the area carries the responsibility for the maintenance of security and
public order in the region under his command. His duties include ensuring the safety of the
IDF forces and of the civil administration functionaries, and maintaining lines of transportation
(see Article 64 of Geneva Convention). He must ensure the proper and effective implementa-
tion of the criminal law, and prevent criminality and anarchy. In performing an act of violence
against the military forces, a person commits an offense and is thus liable to be tried in court
and to undergo the imposition of any sanction permitted by the local law or the security
legislation (see also Sir H. Lauterpacht, The Law of War on Land, Part III of the Manual of
Military Law (London 1958) 35-36).
ACRI v. Commander of Central Command, 43(2) P.D. 529, 539 (1989).
192. See, e.g., Calbani v. Commander of Central Command, HCJ 986/89, slip op. at 3 (1990)
(unpublished); Abu Al'an v. Minister of Defense, 37(2) P.D. 169, 172 (1983); Khamri v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 36(3) P.D. 439, 444 (1982) (Barak, J.); see also Batash v.
Military Governor of Gaza, HCJ 179/89, slip op. at 3 (1989) (unpublished). As David Kretzmer points
out, this approach is inconsistent with the Court's traditional jurisprudence. First, it defies the restrictive
interpretation normally applied to governmental actions that infringe on "fundamental rights." Second, the
judgments lack any attempt to present, weigh, and balance the Palestinians' competing interests. Such an
endeavor, Kretzmer explains, requires more than just examining the severity of the offenses. It would
entail paying due regard to whether the families were involved in the offense; the extent of harm inflicted
on the families; the proportionality between the demolitions and the government's objective; and the
availability of alternative means. David Kretzmer, Judicial Review ofthe Demolition and Sealing of Homes
in the Occupied Territories, in THE KLNGHOFFER BOOK ON PUBLIc LAW 305, 347-55 (1993) (Hebrew).
Kretzmer's compelling critique of the demolition policy is the first critical analysis of the demolition policy
to be published in Hebrew.
193. E.g., Wahadan v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 348/90 (1990) (unpublished); Smaana v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 824/88 (1988) (unpublished); see also Kretzmer, supra
note 192, at 345-47.
Home Demolitions
The Court treats Article 119 as a fundamental norm that trumps all others
and interprets it in a way that maximizes its effectiveness. The Court has
ruled that demolitions are not contingent on prior convictions, because Article
119 requires only that the Military Commander be "satisfied" that an offense
has been committed; 94 that homes are not exempted even when some of
their inhabitants are innocent;1 95 that homes may be demolished for actions
of children who do not live there on a regular basis,'96 and for actions of
those who have not yet been apprehended; 97 that rented properties are not
exempted;19' and that "multi-unit" buildings may be demolished as long as
the offender's "unit" is considered an "inseparable part" of the building.' 99
The Court's treatment of Article 119 is particularly noteworthy when
compared to the lack of respect that the 1945 DERs generally command. 2°
2. Cursory Discussions
As suggested above in the discussion of deferential formalism, the Court's
demolition jurisprudence has developed in cursory opinions lacking any
substantial reasoning. The Court heard the seminal Sakhawil case without
awarding an order nisi.20' The legal debate was thus based on limited
arguments and terse briefs: the petition was one page long, and the state
attorney's response consisted of a two-page statement, dated and presumably
submitted one day before the hearing. The Court wrote and delivered its
194. Jaber v. Commander of Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522, 524-25 (1987) (English excerpt
in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 252 (1988)); Khamri v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region,
36(3) P.D. 439, 442 (1982) (English excerpt in 17 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 314 (1987)); Hamed v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 35(3) P.D. 223, 224 (1981) (English excerpt in 11 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 365 (1981)).
195. Tamimi v. Military Commander of West Bank, HCJ 454/86 (1986) (Dov Levine, J.)
(unpublished).
196. Khamri, 36(3) P.D. at 442; see also supra text accompanying notes 148 to 150.
197. Shahin v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 970/89 (1989) (unpublished).
198. Lafrunkh v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 869/90 (1990)
(unpublished); Al Gamal v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 542/89 (1989)
(unpublished). Along the same lines, a military official justified the demolition of homes of offenders who
had not yet been apprehended to "prove that fleeing and hiding does not grant them immunity from home
demolition." B'TsELEM, 1989 DEMOLriON REPORT, supra note 25, at 27.
199. Qarabsa v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 2665190, slip op. at 3 (1990) (unpublished).
200. The Court has described one of the 1945 DERs as a "draconian [regulation] promulgated by
a colonial regime." Al Asad v. Minister of Interior, 34(1) P.D. 505, 513 (1980) (Landau, J.); see also
Zamir, supra note 115, at 385-92. Likewise, Draper shows little respect for the 1945 DERs; he protests
that "they might be good regulations to decant into the dust bin. They have very little merit. They are the
type of regulations that came from the Boer War, and probably from the Crimea War before that."
Symposium, supra note 39, at 368.
201. Sakhawil v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 34(1) P.D. 464 (1979) (English
excerpt in 10 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 345 (1980)). An order nisi is a court order similar to a "show cause
order." According to High Court of Justice procedure, all petitions are submitted to a single justice who
decides whether or not to issue the order nisi. The petition is then argued before a panel of three justices
(with or without the order nist). If the initial justice did not award an order nisi, the litigants need not
submit full briefs. The respondent is also not required to submit affidavits to the panel, although the state
often submits them nonetheless. In Sakhawil the state did not submit affidavits to the Court.
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two-page decision on the same day as the hearing. The opinion is extremely
short and its language ambiguous; the Court pronounced its conclusions
without attempting to justify them. Only the outcome was clear: the
demolition practice had been declared legal.' °2 Most opinions in home
demolition cases are exceptionally short. Some contain no more than one
paragraph,2' others are just two or three pages long. As in Sakhawil, the
Court writes and delivers many decisions on the same day as the hearing.
Most disturbing, the Court does not always discuss all of the arguments
presented by the petitioners. In Sakhawil, for example, it stated that it was
rejecting the "arguments relying on the Geneva Convention, 204 without
specifying the arguments made, and without mentioning the Hague Regula-
tions at all. Similarly, in Jaber,0 5 the Court referred to only one of the six
provisions of international law that the petitioner cited.' °6
This trend of not discussing all of the arguments submitted is especially
troubling in Israel, because litigants' briefs are not published and are generally
inaccessible. Moreover, not all of the Supreme Court's decisions are
published. The Piskei Din series is edited and issued by the publishing house
of the Israeli Bar Association. Only decisions that, in the opinion of the
association's editorial board, contain meaningful judicial discussions or yield
significant results are made public. Only twenty-three of the home demolition
cases have been published, and the others are very difficult to obtain.2" The
justices, therefore, have been not only the official narrators of the facts and
the editors of the litigants' arguments, but also, in effect, the guardians and
censors of their own work. The more terse the opinion and the less meaning-
202. The Court did not grant orders nisi in the eighteen cases that followed Sakhawil, so that by the
time it awarded the first order nisi in Zaid v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ
788/86 (1987) (unpublished), the Sakhawil precedent had become solid law. It is not surprising that in the
sixth case, for example, the petitioner's counsel conceded the authority to demolish homes in principle,
and limited his arguments to the particular circumstances of the case. Musslakh v. Minister of Defense,
36(4) P.D. 610, 612 (1982); see also Jabarin v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 443/86 & 515/86 (1987)
(unpublished).
203. E.g., Shawahin v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 619190 (1990) (unpublished); Dar Zeid v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 451/86, 47/87 (1987) (unpublished).
204. Sakhawil, 34 (1) P.D. at 464.
205. Jaber v. Commander of Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522 (1987) (English excerpt in 18 ISR.
Y.B. HUM. RTs. 252 (1988)).
206. See supra notes 9 to 12 and accompanying text. Likewise in Jabri, the petitioner claimed that
destroying his house would amount to punishing the innocent, since he had no knowledge of the actions
of his 22-year-old son and was not responsible for his adult son's behavior. The Court simply ignored the
argument, stating, "It is our opinion that under the circumstances and due to the severe actions of the
petitioner's son, the Military Commander's decision to issue the order of confiscation and destruction was
reasonable. It has already been decided that certain situations warrant the application of measures to deter
others from participating in hostile terrorist activities with the purpose of launching assaults of the kind
imputed to [the petitioner's son]." Jabri v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 1786/90 (1990) (unpublished).
207. At the request of ACRI, the Ministry of Justice agreed to make available its collection of
unpublished home demolition cases. However, a similar request concerning the estimated 40 unpublished
cases on the issue of family unification wa denied.
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ful the legal debate, the less likely it is that the decision has been pub-
lished.20
3. Palliating the Harshness of the Measure
The third characteristic of the demolition jurisprudence is the justices'
efforts to palliate the harshness of demolitions. Most decisions are written in
a disconnected manner. The justices refer to the demolition act with a dry,
dispassionate, and detached rhetoric. They occasionally incorporate apologetic
statements ,2 9 and on rare occasion express misgivings about the prac-
tice, 210 but these exert no real influence on the legal outcomes. In contrast,
the language used when addressing the IDF is resolutely attentive. 211 At
times the Court creates the impression that the government is almost
compelled to perform the demolitions.212 It refers repeatedly to the fact that
the 1945 DERs are creations of the British Mandate and remnants of
Jordanian rule.2" 3 It also emphasizes the Military Government's obligation
under international law to apply local laws. It is as if a foreign army, not the
IDF, is performing the demolitions.
The justices rarely display any qualms about the practice that they
legitimate or about the jurisprudence that they employ. Their opinions
evidence no hesitation or implied criticism, no trace of self-doubt. The rulings
do not reflect any of the controversy surrounding the use of the sanction; it
is as if the justices have heard nothing of the vigorous public debate. 214 Nor
do they disclose any concern about relying on pre-conviction factual
assertions, most of which are obtained by less-than-benign methods of
interrogation. 215 The justices do not appear to be troubled even in those
208. A computer database set up in 1991 will eventually allow access to all of the Court's decisions.
209. See, e.g., Bakhri v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 610189, slip op.
at 5 (1989) (unpublished) ("The suffering inflicted on the families is extremely disheartening."); see also
Sanuar v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, 43(2) P.D. 821, 824 (1989); Abu Al'an v. Minister of
Defense, 37(2) P.D. 169, 172 (1983).
210. Justice Bach, in a rare display of pathos in his majority opinion in Al Amrin v. Military
Commander of Gaza Region stated, "I am certain that exercising the [demolition] measure does not bring
pleasure to those who are vested with the authority to exercise it, and surely nobody would lament it if
the amelioration of the state's security situation ... will some day lead the legislature to deem this
measure unnecessary." Justice Bach, nonetheless, upheld the destruction of the entire house over the
dissent of Justice Heshin. 46(3) P.D. 693, 699 (1992).
211. See supra text accompanying note 191.
212. See, e.g., Ajrab v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 4616/91 (1991) (unpublished).
213. See, e.g., Hamed v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 35(3) P.D. 223, 224
(1981); Jaber v. Commander of Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522, 525-26 (1987).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 49 to 66.
215. One should view the practice ofbasing demolitions on admissions obtained through interrogation
in light of the force used during interrogation by the General Security Services (GSS). A commission
headed by former Supreme Court President Moshe Landau examined the GSS's methods of interrogation,
and found that the GSS had routinely resorted to physical force to extract information from suspects.
Despite its harsh condemnation of the GSS's practices, the Commission concluded that "non-violent
psychological pressure through a vigorous and extensive interrogation,' is justifiable, and "when [this
does] not attain [its] purpose, the exertion of a moderate measure of physical pressure cannot be avoided.'
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cases where the evidence on which the demolition orders are based is
concealed from the petitioners throughout the proceedings. 216
What is particularly striking, however, is how the justices ignore the
consequences of their decisions for the people involved. The opinions refer
to Palestinian homes as abstract objects devoid of any personal, economic,
cultural, or political significance. They treat demolitions as a neutral exercise
of legal powers bringing about no trauma, homelessness, or humiliation. We
see occasional attempts to pass the moral responsibility onto the offenders
themselves, with the Court emphasizing that their own actions bring hardship
onto their families.2 17 Disregarding the Palestinian predicament is made
easier - and seemingly morally justified - by the explicit description of the
offenses for which the demolition punishment is levied. The Court often
exposes the reader to graphic portrayals of repulsive crimes committed by
Palestinians with detailed accounts of stabbings,2"' beatings, 2 9 torture and
beheading,' 0 and strangulations.Y
On the other hand, the Court obscures the harm inflicted by the Military
Government. The opinions tell the reader nothing about those who are
rendered homeless - not their names, ages, or relationship to the offender.
We do not know whether they include elderly, chronically ill, or disabled
people, nor whether they have a place to go. It was not until Justice Heshin's
Khizran dissent that the Palestinian predicament was acknowledged by any
The English version of the report is excerpted in 23 IsR. L. REV. 146 (1989). For a powerfiul critique of
the use of force and a disquisition on the danger of extracting erroneous admissions, see Mordechai
Kremnitser, The Landau Commission Report - Was the Security Service Subordinated to the Law, or the
Law to the 'Needs' of the Security Service?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 216, 257 (1989).
The GSS has recently announced the introduction of more restrictive regulations on the application
of physical pressure. It stated that only specified means of force are permitted, and that their application
is limited to the investigation of serious crimes that are based on substantial evidence. It also stated that
physical pressure may not be used in order to "humiliate, hurt, or torture" suspects, and that deprivation
of food or drink, exposure to heat or cold, and deprivation of access to a lavatory are explicitly prohibited.
The procedure itself, however, remains confidential. Dalia Schori, GSS Head to HCI: New Interrogation
Policy Implemented, HA'AREMZ, April 27, 1993, at 4; Israel Rethinks Interrogation ofArabs, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1993, at 3. The GSS announcement, which was made in response to a petition to the Supreme
Court by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, comes in the wake of repeated complaints of
physical abuse during interrogation. See B'TSELEM, THE INTERROGATION OF PALESTINIANS DURING THE
INTIFADA: ILL-TREATMENT, "MODERATE PHYSICAL PRESSURE" OR TORTURE? (1991); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: TE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: DETENTION, INTERROGATION AND TRIAL PROCEDURES 45-73 (1991).
216. This occurs when the state refuses to disclose the evidence upon which the demolition decision
was made. In such cases the Minister of Defense issues a Certificate of Privileged Evidence. The
government employs this procedure when it fears that disclosure will expose the identity of informants or
the surveillance techniques used to obtain the evidence. See Caracra v. Military Commander of Judea and
Samaria Region, HCJ 2630190 (1991) (unpublished); Shaqir v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 532/89 (1989)
(unpublished). For a debate and criticism of this practice, see Zamir, supra note 115, at 397-401.
217. Shoukeri v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 798/89 (1989) (unpublished); see also Dajlis v. Military
Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 40(2) P.D. 42, 44 (1986) (English excerpt in 17 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 315 (1987)).
218. E.g., Abu Zeina v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 900190, slip. op. at 2 (1990) (unpublished).
219. E.g., Nassman v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, 44(2) P.D. 601 (1990).
220. E.g., Qarabsa v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 2665190 (1990) (unpublished).
221. E.g., Sanuar v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, 43(2) P.D. 821, 823 (1989).
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member of the Court.m Arguing that the houses involved should not be
destroyed completely because of the harm that would be inflicted on the
offenders' families, Heshin provided a portrait of real life at the receiving end
of the law. He noted that Khizran shared the "living room" with his mother
and sister; that his parents had been divorced for many years and his father
lived elsewhere; that his brother Ahmad Diab lived in one room with his wife
and newborn daughter; and that another brother, Fida Diab, shared a room
with his pregnant wife. The rectangular house contained one kitchen, a long
corridor, a living room, a bathroom, an "inner room," two bedrooms, and a
balcony. The second house in question consisted of two structures separated
by a courtyard. One contained a kitchen, a storage room, and a bathroom; in
the other, the second offender, Abu-Muhsein, shared two bedrooms with his
mother, father, brothers, and sisters. His grandmother lived in a separate
room where she kept a refrigerator and did her own cooking. Heshin's dissent
will be remembered for personalizing the tragedies of the grandmother,
pregnant sister-in-law, and baby niece.
The Court's insensitivity to the Palestinian predicament is reflected in the
way the Court handles the claim that demolitions punish offenders' families
and homeowners, and thus violate the prohibition in international law on non-
individual punishment. The Court has offered two curt responses to this
argument, both of which treat this acute doctrinal challenge as irrelevant.
First, the Court states that the families' predicament is merely an incidental
and unavoidable infliction of harm. The most common approach is that
presented by President Shamgar in Sanuar v. Military Commander of Gaza
Region:
Admittedly, the offender's family also suffers for his actions, but this is often the side effect
of every punishment (as with imprisonment or a fine) imposed on the accused; it hurts -
no less, and occasionally even more - those dependent on him. This alone cannot negate
the justification of a deterring punitive measure that the respondent deems necessary for
fulfilling his duties and responsibilities.
A second response that is occasionally offered states that the relatives ought
not be considered the subjects of punishment because the measure is not
intended to punish them. A typical example is Justice Barak's statement in
Abu AI'an:
We are aware that [the sealing of a house] is by no means light [punishment], and that it
causes suffering to offenders' relatives, who are not suspected of violating the Regulations.
However, the sanction stipulated in Article 119 is not intended to punish them, but to deter
those who disturb the peace, and whose behavior causes grave and deadly injuries to other
innocent people.'
222. Khizran v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 46(2) P.D. 150, 155 (1992)
(Heshin, J., dissenting).
223. Sanuar, 43(2) P.D. at 824.
224. Abu Al'an, 37(2) P.D. 169, 172-73 (1983); see also Shoukeri v. Minister of Defense, HCJ
798/89, slip. op. at 3 (1990) (unpublished) ("The authority vested in the Military Commander by Article
119 is not one of collective punishment. Its exercise is not intended to punish the petitioner's family. This
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These two propositions, that the punishment of families is "unavoidable" and
"unintended," will be examined below under both international and Israeli
law.?
E. Questions of Legitimacy
Reading through the demolition cases, one senses the fundamental
incongruence that permeates Israel's political and judicial treatment of the
Occupied Territories. How can a state that demolishes homes on one side of
the Green Line remain a legitimate democracy on its other side? 6 And how
does a court that affirms such policies manage to maintain its stature as a
legitimate institution? It is the latter question that I explore here, although it
is not easily separated from the first. As mentioned, the Court generally
affirms the legality of the powers asserted by the Military Government and
readily defers to its discretion. More than twenty years of judicial approval
and executive acquiescence have created an intricate legalistic framework in
which the legitimacy of the Military Government's practices is intimately
entangled with the legitimacy of the Court.
The Court, therefore, in order to maintain its own legitimacy, must either
enhance the acceptability of these practices or reduce its own legal and moral
responsibility for them. 7 We have already observed how the Court
promotes the practice's acceptability by palliating its harshness and by
disregarding prohibitory doctrines. I now discuss how the Court attempts to
escape the responsibility that its acceptance of the demolition practice would
normally carry.
First, the Court insists that application of the repugnant 1945 DERs is
mandated by international law as laid out in the local law doctrine of Article
43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Geneva Convention. The
application of the 1945 DERs is thus portrayed as submission to universal
principles, rather than deference to a policy of Israeli expediency. In the
following Part, I will challenge the Court's understanding of the local law
doctrine.
is an administrative authority which is intended to deter and thus maintain the public order."); Sheloun v.
Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, HCJ 97/89 (1989) (unpublished).
225. See infra part V.B.
226. I am taking as accepted the proposition that for a policy to be accepted as legitimate it must win
the approval of the judiciary. See generally MAX WEER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., Bedminster Press 1968); ROBERTo M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLIIcs 84 (1975).
227. Ronen Shamir offers a different explanation as to how the Court has maintained its legitimacy
while consistently supporting the government. He argues convincingly that the few cases that the Court
decides against the Military Government bolster its legitimacy. These typically controversial and well-
publicized "landmark" decisions have the symbolic effect of exhibiting the Court's independence and thus
reaffirm its legitimacy. See Shamir, supra note 113. The single demolition case that may be considered
a landmark case is ACRI v. Commander of Central Command, 43(2) P.D. 529 (1989), which required
notice and opportunity for judicial hearing prior to demolition.
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Second, the Court has attempted to relieve Israel of any responsibility for
using the 1945 DERs, simply because Israel did not promulgate them. The
Court views the 1945 DERs, which were introduced by a foreign regime prior
to Israeli statehood, as an alien legal artifact. This enables it to enforce the
1945 DERs from a moral distance."2s This positivist posture, based on the
distinction between legislation and application, allows the Court to apply the
laws "as it finds them." The demolition decisions imply also that the Court
has no alternative but to interpret Article 119 as it does - as if it were
"necessary" for the Court to authorize the initial sealings and then allow the
gradual broadening of the practice.
Third, the Court has seized upon the notion that the law applied in the
Occupied Territories is distinct from Israeli law. This jurisdictional distinction
is based on an envisioned geographic division between the Occupied
Territories and Israel proper - as if a wall had been erected between the two
regions, separating a thriving democracy from a war zone.' 9 What the
Court decides on one side of the Green Line, then, need not apply on the
other.
The last two arguments were attacked by Justice Heshin in his dissenting
opinion in Al-Amrin v. Military Commander of Gaza Region.2" The Court's
majority decided to allow the destruction of a two story building that housed
three nuclear families. Heshin proposed limiting the demolition to the unit in
which the offender actually resided. Writing for the majority, Justice Bach
stated that Heshin's narrow interpretation of Article 119 was inconsistent with
the provision's language as well as its "spirit."'"n The majority thus implicit-
ly followed the interpretive principle laid down in Khamri. 3' Heshin
responded by contrasting the Al-Amrin and Khamri opinions with Justice
Barak's celebrated opinion in Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor,33 which
represented a major victory of (Israeli) civil rights over claims of national
228. See Baruch Bracha, Restriction of Personal Freedom Without Due Process of Law According
to the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 296, 318-19 (1978).
229. This approach is in fact fundamentally inconsistent with the official position of the Israeli
government, which has always favored a blurring of the Green Line. Following a Cabinet decision of
November 12, 1967, the state of Israel ceased to draw the Green Line on any of its official maps. As a
practical matter, it is impossible to tell from any Israeli map where the democratic regime ends and where
the stringent laws of warfare begin. See AMNON RUBINSTEiN, THE CONsTrruTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE
OF ISRAEL 96 (1991) (Hebrew).
The situation is further complicated by the fact that homes in the Territories are demolished in
response to crimes committed inside Israel proper. This practice has been officially incorporated into
military law and has not been questioned by the Court. See Order Concerning Means of Punishment
(temporary order) (Gaza Region) (amendment No. 8) (No. 1041) (1991), incorporated into Article 5b of
Order Concerning Means of Punishment (Gaza Region) (No. 277) (1969). On judicial approval of this
practice, see, e.g., Al-Amrin v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, 46(3) P.D. 693, 696-97 (1992).
230. 46(3) P.D. at 693.
231. Id. at 699.
232. Khamri v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 36(3) P.D. 439 (1982).
233. 42(4) P.D. 617 (1988) (allowing publication of criticism regarding General Security Services
over government claims of national security).
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security. 4 Heshin argued that the "spirit" of Article 119 dictated a broad
application of that provision only if one adopted the spirit of the British
Mandatory judges in 1945. Heshin posed a distinction between the values of
the British Mandatory Government in Palestine and the values of the State of
Israel:
But that "spirit" disintegrated and vanished, and [was replaced by] a grander spirit in 1948
upon the founding of the state... since the values of the state of Israel - a Jewish, free
and democratic state - are fundamentally divergent from those of the possessor of the
mandate who ruled the land. Our fundamental principles are - at this time - those of law-
abiding democratic states that aspire to liberty and justice, and it is these principles that
should breathe the spirit of life into the interpretation of such laws. See and compare
Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor (by Justice Barak).'
Heshin thus demonstrated the peculiarity of resorting to the original intent
of a colonial predecessor to determine the legality of a current government's
actions. More importantly, he condemned the Court for separating the laws
that it interprets and applies from the existing political and legal culture: a
court ought to abide by the norms and values it stands for, not those of
anachronistic and alien regimes. In the concluding paragraph of the dissent,
Heshin faulted the Court's geographical distinction:
True, we are not dealing here with the application of the [1945 Defense] Emergency
Regulations inside the boundaries of the state of Israel but in the Gaza Region, which is
outside of Israel. But this distinction does not appear to me to be great nor significant. The
connection between Israel and the Gaza Region - and the same applies to the Judea and
Samaria Regions - is so close in everyday life that it would be artificial for us to talk about
the application of these powers in Gaza as if it were somewhere across the ocean.'
Heshin thus emphasizes the proximity and interconnectedness of the two
jurisdictions and exposes the fallacy of the imaginary dividing wall. He
reminds the reader, as well as his colleagues, that the questions at hand do not
concern a foreign army fighting a distant battle, but the Israeli Defense Forces
exercising the state's policies just miles away, in a region that has been
virtually incorporated into the state. One may take Heshin to be saying that
it is Israeli morality, jurisprudence, and administrative and constitutional law
at stake in the debate over the demolition practice.
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Local Law Doctrine
The central component of the legal reasoning upholding home demolitions
is that Article 119 - being "local law" - trumps substantive provisions of
international law. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the
234. See Bracha, supra note 117, at 48, 84, 85, 97-102.
235. 46(3) P.D. at 705.
236. Id. at 706.
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Geneva Convention set forth the local law doctrine. Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations states:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant,
the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in
the country.'
Article 64 of the Geneva Convention reads, in part:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they
may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a
threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.21
The demolition issue thus raises an apparent conflict within belligerent
occupation law. These provisions of the Hague and Geneva instruments call
for the preservation of pre-occupation local law, but the local law under which
demolitions are carried out conflicts in substance with other provisions of
these instruments. Can the Israeli Supreme Court uphold the Military
Government's exercise of power under Article 119 even if Article 119 is
incompatible with substantive provisions of international law?
The Court has replied affirmatively without fully addressing the issue. Its
opinions have simply announced the primacy of Article 119 without
acknowledging any competing interests. The Court first sidestepped the issue
in the seminal Sakhawil case, in which it dismissed the relevance of
substantive international law in a single ambiguous sentence.3 9 The justices
did not mention international law in the home demolition context again until
Jaber, decided eight years and a dozen cases later. There, too, the Court
refrained from examining the apparent conflict and stated its conclusion as if
it were obvious.2' The Court's attitude is thus doubly disappointing: not
only does it fail to examine the practice's lawfulness against a considerable
body of substantive international law, but it also neglects to state the grounds
for doing so.
In the context of home demolitions, unlike that of deportations, for
example, the Court's conclusion has nothing to do with the non-justiciability
237. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 43.
238. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 64.
239. See supra text accompanying note 139.
240. Justice Shamgar stated:
Article 119 constitutes part of the law that was in force in Judea and Samaria on the eve of
the establishment of the IDF rule. According to principles of public international law, which
were incorporated in the IDF's Law and Administration Proclamation 1967, the local law
remained in force ... (see Hague Regulations, art. 43, and Article 64 of the Geneva
Convention). Consequently, the authority under Article 119 is considered local law, which
existed in the region of Judea and Samaria, and was not canceled during the previous regime
or during the belligerent occupation, and we have not been presented with any legal reasons
why it should now be deemed invalid.
Jaber v. Commander of Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522, 525-26 (1987) (English excerpt in 18 IsR.
Y.B. HUM. RTs. 252 (1988)).
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of the Geneva Convention.24 In other words, the Court ignores the substan-
tive provisions of international law, not because it deems the Geneva
Convention non-justiciable, but rather because of the way the Court interprets
Article 64 of the Geneva Convention.242 The late Professor Julius Stone
offered the most thorough defense of the Israeli understanding of Article 64.
Stone asserted that international law requires the maintenance of
pre-occupation laws and that it permits, but does not oblige, the occupying
power to repeal a local law that is inconsistent with the Convention.243
The positions of the Court and Professor Stone are misconceived. A close
examination of the relevant provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions,
the opinions of the official commentators to the Conventions, the provisions'
underlying purposes and context, and the Conventions' negotiating histories
lead to the conclusion that local law should be applied only to the extent that
it is consistent with substantive belligerent occupation law.
Local law cannot confer powers that violate substantive provisions of
belligerent occupation law. The official commentary to the Geneva Convention
clearly states this principle: "This means that when the penal legislation of the
occupied territory conflicts with the provisions of the Convention, the
Convention must prevail." 2' Justice Barak reached the same conclusion in
Cooperative Society v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Re-
gion,' a case that did not deal with home demolitions. Justice Barak
explained that the fact that an executive power is permitted by local law is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the exercise of that power.
He stated that the application of local law is contingent on its conformity with
substantive international law: "It is not enough that the exercise [of an
executive power] be in accordance with the local law; it must comport with
the principles of Israeli administrative law and with the rules of the interna-
241. See supra text accompanying notes 94 to 96.
242. The Court's conclusion resonates with the position advanced by Shamgar on behalf of the Israeli
Government in 1971:
[I]t has been asserted that if there is another rule of international law according to which the
local law is regarded as inhumane or contrary to a basic norm of international law, this rule
of international law supervenes the rule of the local law. The wording of Articles 64 and 68
of the [Geneva] Convention does not support this thesis ....
Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at 276. The same argument would apply equally to Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations. See Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 43.
243. Stone argued:
[.r]he demolitions in question have taken place under provisions of local penal law in force
when Israel entered into occupation. Article 64 thus seems even to require continuance of this
law. Moreover, the same paragraph permits repeal of such a law in force which is a threat to
the Occupant's security. It would thus be very strange indeed to hold that the Occupant was
forbidden to maintain the existing law when this was necessary for his security. The paragraph
also authorizes him to repeal a law which obstructs the application of the Convention; but it
does not oblige him to do so.
SToNE, No PEACE, supra note 96, at 15.
244. THE COMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 336.
245. 37(4) P.D. 785 (1983) (English excerpt in 14 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 301 (1984)) (dealing with
expropriation of private land to construct highway in West Bank).
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tional law of belligerent occupation."2' In the same vein, the U.S. Army
Field Manual states that measures imposed by an occupying power for
enforcement of obedience must be "[s]ubject to the restrictions imposed by
international law."247
This approach is consistent with the rationale of the local law doctrine.
The principle of maintaining the local peacetime law is based on the premise
that it is most congenial to the local population and best suited for the
prevailing conditions in the region. This was the American understanding of
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations:
The existing laws of a country had been created by its people and were presumably the
legislation best suited to them. The inhabitants and their officials were familiar with them
and any changes made by the occupying authorities would impose additional hard-
ships... 24
International law aims at anything but enhancement of the powers of the
occupant. Rolin, the French Delegate to the 1899 Hague Conference,
explained the intent of Article 43: "It is not a question here of stipulating what
the victor is authorized to do, but what he ought to be prohibited from
doing."249 Similarly, the U.S. delegate to the Geneva Conference pro-
nounced that "the Occupying Power should in no circumstances use the
criminal law of the Occupied Power as an instrument of oppression. "'0
The stated objectives of the Geneva and Hague instruments support the
view that local law should not be used to the detriment of the local population,
but rather for humane purposes. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties instructs that whenever the ordinary meaning of a treaty's terms are
inconclusive, they should be interpreted in light of the treaty's context, object,
and purpose. The interpretation should also be guided by the instrument's
preamble and annexes."s The humanitarian nature of the belligerent
occupation treaties is unmistakable. The Preamble to the Hague Convention
states, in part:
Animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interests of humanity and
the ever progressive needs of civilization; .... Thinking it important, with this object, to
revise the general laws and customs of war, either with a view to defining them with greater
246. Id. at 793.
247. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, F.M. No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE: U.S. FIELD
MANUAL, art. 432 (1956) [hereinafter U.S. FIELD MANUAL].
248. VON GLAN, supra note 92, at 95.
249. CONFERENCE OF 1899 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 89, at 515 (quoting Delegate M. Rolin,
explaining rationale underlying Articles 2 and 3 of 1874 Brussels Declaration, which gave rise to Article
43 of Hague Regulations). See generally GREENSPAN, supra note 41, at 227 (asserting that purpose of
doctrine is to safeguard the population "against attempts by the occupant to deprive them of the benefits
which they already enjoy, and which are in conformity with the principles of the convention");
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 191 (stating that object of doctrine is one of restricting powers of
belligerent occupant).
250. FINAL RECORD OF THE DiLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, § 2-a, at 670.
251. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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precision or to confining them within such limits as would mitigate their severity as far as
possible.... 2
Likewise, the Geneva Convention was described by its drafters as "inspired
solely by humanitarian aims."' Protection of the local population was also
the main theme of a draft preamble to the Geneva Convention proposed by the
International Red Cross Conference.l 4
Upholding substantive prohibitions protecting human rights over
incompatible provisions of local law is also consistent with the interpretive
mechanism specifically prescribed by the preamble to the Hague Convention.
Based on the understanding that the Convention could not cover all possible
circumstances, the Martens Clause states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting
Powers deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulation adopted
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."
The default rule, therefore, is to prefer humanitarian ideals over the
occupying power's interests.
The humanitarian nature of the local law provisions is also evident in
their .legislative history. Humanitarian considerations permeated the debate
concerning the drafting of Article 43.' Indeed, the French Delegate Rolin,
who introduced Article 43, explained that the provision was intended "to bring
together the different opinions as far as possible on this humane provi-
sion. "I Clearly, between the 1945 DERs and the substantive prohibitions
of international agreements, the latter are more consistent with notions of
civility, humanity, conscience, and moderation.
Stone also bases his argument on the second exception to Article 64 of the
Geneva Convention, which permits, but does not oblige, the occupying power,
to repeal local laws that "constitute... an obstacle" to the Convention.25
8
252. Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, pmbl.,
36 Stat. 2277, T.I.A.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
253. FiNAL RECoRD oF THE DIPLOMATIc CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 362.
254. Id. at 113 ("These rules, which constitute the basis of universal human law, shall be respected
without prejudice to the special stipulations provided for in the present Convention in favor of protected
persons."). Ultimately, the preamble was left out of the Convention.
255. Hague Convention, supra note 252, pmbl. Draper describes the relevance of the preamble: 'It
is difficult to do full justice to the importance of these clauses of the Preamble. They color and inform all
that comes later in the body of the Convention, and, more pertinently, in the Regulations annexed."
Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, Military Necessity and Humanitarian Imperatives, 12(2) REVUE DE DROiT
PENAL MILrrAIRE ET DE DRorr DE LA GUERRE 129, 133 (1973); see also Helmut Strebel, Martens'
Clause, in 3 ENcYCLoPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIoNAL LAW 252 (Rudolf Bernhart ed., 1982).
256. CONFERENcE OF 1899 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 89, at 513 (comment by Delegate Odier); see
also id. at 519 (comment by Delegate Beernaert).
257. Id. at 520; see also id. at 513 (comments by Delegate Bildt).
258. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 64; see SToNE, No PEACE, supra note 96, at 15. The
first exception does not apply. It states that the occupying power is not bound by those laws that hinder
its security or impair its control over the region, e.g., laws prescribing recruitment for enemy forces, or
awarding the right to bear arms.
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The official commentators, however, interpreted this exception differently:
"The second reservation is in the interests of the population and makes it
possible to abrogate any discriminatory measures incompatible with humane
requirements." 9 The commentators added that this exception "refers in
particular, to provisions which adversely affect racial or religious minorities,
such provisions being contrary to the spirit of the Convention (Article 27),
which forbids all adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or
political opinion. "'26 This exception, therefore, is not intended to regulate
the actions of the occupying power qua executive, but rather to enable the
occupying power qua legislature to enjoin the local courts from applying
"evil" laws. It was included for "exceptional cases," where local law
transgressed "elementary conceptions of justice and the rule of law.""261
This, for example, was the case with the Nazi laws in the post-World War II
legal system of Germany.262 Technically, these manifestations of racial
ideology were valid local law even after the Allied occupation. Without this
exception to Article 64, the local law doctrine might have led to the
unacceptable situation in which German courts could not be prevented from
continuing to apply Nazi laws.
The second paragraph of Article 64, which deals with the powers that the
occupying power may exercise vis-,.-vis the population,263 supports this
view. It states that in order to maintain an orderly government and to ensure
the safety of its forces, an occupying power may exercise essential police
powers, although these measures must be exercised in accordance with the
"obligations under the present Convention." The occupying power cannot,
therefore, infringe on the Convention's restrictive prohibitions.
The Israeli Supreme Court's formulation of the local law doctrine is
further undermined by its different approach to the doctrine in non-demolition
cases. In such contexts, the Court has chosen to address the conflict between
the 1945 DERs and substantive international law rather than shield its
decisions behind the local law doctrine. Abu Awad v. Military Commander of
Judea and Samaria Region,264 for example, concerned a deportation order
issued pursuant to Article 112 of the 1945 DERs.26 Abu Awad, a resident
259. THE COMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 335.
260. Id.
261. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 92, at 446; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 195.
262. These included laws for the protection of "German Blood," "German Honor," and the
"Hereditary Health of the German People," and laws prohibiting lease agreements with Jews. See Edmund
H. Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 YALE
L.J. 393, 407 (1945).
263. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 64(2) ("The Occupying Power may, however, subject
the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power
to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory,
and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces
or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.").
264. Abu Awad v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 33(3) P.D. 309 (1979)
(English excerpt in 9 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 343 (1979)).
265. See 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 4, at 1085.
1994]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
of Bit Zeit, was ordered deported to Lebanon for alleged hostile activity and
dissemination of propaganda. The petitioner claimed that deportations were
prohibited by Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, which prohibits
"[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers ... regardless of their motive." '266
Rather than circumventing this provision by applying the local law doctrine,
the Court examined the question under the Geneva Convention and found that
the deportation power comported with the Convention.267
Similarly, in Cooperative Society v. Military Commander of Judea and
Samaria Region,26 Justice Barak did not base his decision only on local
Jordanian law. Instead, he examined the expropriation order in question in
light of substantive provisions of international law and upheld it only after
finding that it conformed with them. The Court also resolved Law in the
Service of Man v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region,269
which dealt with an order based on Article 130 of the 1945 DER, 270 by
direct reference to substantive international law. The Court justified the order
on the basis of American and British military manuals and the writings of von
Glahn, without any reliance on the local law doctrine. The Court's inconsis-
tent employment of the local law doctrine casts further doubt on the soundness
of its application in the demolition context.
The proper construction of the "local law" doctrine restricts, rather than
empowers, the occupant. Indeed, this doctrine is instrumental to the larger
goal of establishing universal standards for protecting the rights of civilian
populations. These standards may be relaxed for reasons of military necessity
when international law explicitly permits exceptions, and only within the
reasonable limits of these exceptions. Neither the fiat of military commanders
nor local law or custom can supplant these standards. International law sets
universally applicable protections that maintain the "interest of humanity" and
the "dictates of public conscience,"271 not the varying customs of localities.
It certainly does not sanction rules imposed by local tyrants or repressive
colonial regimes. According to the Court's logic, however, there is nothing
266. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 49(1) ("Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well
as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or
to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.').
267. After struggling with the Convention, the Court established that the purpose of Article 49 was
to thwart military actions like those exercised by Nazi Germany. The Court then concluded that despite
the Convention's language, deportations of individuals were permitted. It explained: "Nothing [about the
government's need to maintain order and security] resembles the deportations for forced labor, torture,
and extermination that were performed in the Second World War." Abu Awad, 33(3) P.D. at 316. The
Court offered the same reason in El Affu v. Military Commander of the West Bank, 42(2) P.D. 4, 31
(1988), translated in 29 I.L.M. 139. For criticism of this decision, see MERON, supra note 23, at 48.49
n.131; Yoram Dinstein, Deportationsfrom the Occupied Territories, 13 TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 403 (1988)
(Hebrew).
268. 37(4) P.D. 785 (1983) (English excerpt in 14 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 301 (1984)).
269. 42(3) P.D. 260 (1988) (dealing with order restricting international telephone service available
to West Bank residents).
270. See 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 4, at 1092.
271. Hague Convention, supra note 252, pmbl.
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to prevent a military government from hanging people without trial, talking
hostages and executing them, or committing torture whenever the local law
so permits. This logic is plainly indefensible. By ignoring the substantive
protections of international law, the Court turns the "local law" doctrine on
its head. It exposes the Palestinian population to a measure that, as the
following discussion will show, is proscribed by international law. The Court
thus defies international law under the guise of respecting it.
B. Collective and Non-Individual Punishment
The criticism most frequently and intensely leveled against the home
demolition policy is that it inflicts harm on people other than the offenders -
namely, their relatives and landlords.272 Virtually all Palestinian homes
house more than one person; indeed, many house more than one nuclear
family, and often more than ten people. In Qarabsa v. Minister of De-
fense,27 for example, the demolition left twenty-seven people homeless.
Demolitions are also not contingent on the question of ownership: in the 145
cases that the Court reviewed, only seven homes were reported to be owned
by the offenders themselves.2 74 Over time, proponents of the practice have
developed a string of defenses and justifications to thwart criticism of the
measure's collective nature. This section presents and evaluates these
responses, and challenges the legality and morality of the collective nature of
the demolition practice.
1. Article 50 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Geneva
Convention
Two provisions of international law are relevant to the debate: Article 50
of the Hague Regulations, commonly referred to as the collective punishment
provision, and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, which deals with
non-individual punishment. Article 50 of the Hague Regulations states, "No
general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population
on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as
jointly and severally responsible."'275 The first part of Article 33 of the
Geneva Convention, entitled "Individual Responsibility," states in part, "No
protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally
committed. "276
272. For the sake of convenience, this discussion refers primarily to the offenders' relatives. The
perspective of the property owner is, essentially, identical.
273. HCJ 2665/90 (1990) (unpublished).
274. Most homes belonged to the offenders' parents. A few were owned by their siblings and various
relatives, and several were rented from third-party homeowners. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
275. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 50.
276. Article 33 continues, "Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of
terrorism are prohibited." Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 33.
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The principle of individual responsibility conveys a simple notion:
individual A cannot be punished for the actions of individual B. The official
commentary to the Geneva Convention explains, "Responsibility is personal
and it will no longer be possible to inflict penalties on persons who have
themselves not committed the acts complained of. "2  Insistence on individu-
al punishment permeates the entire Geneva Convention.278 The individual
responsibility underscored in Article 33 is unequivocal and conclusive: neither
individuals nor groups may be punished unless every member has been found
responsible in his or her personal capacity. Punishing groups of any sort,
including families, is plainly prohibited.
The prohibitory nature of Article 50 of the Hague Regulations is
apparently not conclusive,279 especially when compared to that of the
Geneva Convention. Article 50 curtails the imposition of collective punish-
ments, but it does not abolish outright the possibility of assigning criminal
responsibility to a collective as a whole. Relying on a strict reading of Article
50, one might infer that Israel is not bound by the principle of non-individual
punishment. Such an inference, however, rests on questionable grounds.
First, I maintain that the Geneva Convention does apply to this occupa-
tion, and that Israel, therefore, is bound by its provisions. 210 Furthermore,
Israel has undertaken to abide by the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva
Convention,281 and it is without doubt that refraining from punishing the
innocent falls into the category of humanitarian provisions.
Second, treating the prohibition on non-individual punishment as purely
conventional law would be incorrect. The drafters at Geneva did not simply
invent this component of Article 33; rather, they sought to build on, improve,
and solidify the principle of individual responsibility, which is, as Schwarzen-
berger points out, the ratio legis of Article 50.282 In his important analysis
of humanitarian law, Meron suggests that some of the provisions of the
Geneva Convention and their underlying principles embody customary
international law in their core meaning, if not in their specific language. In
this list he includes Article 33's prohibitions against collective punishment,
"which have their roots in Hague Regulation 46 and Hague Regulation 50 and
the principle of individual responsibility which Regulation 50 articulates."28
277. THE CoMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 225.
278. The commentary to Article 78 states, "That is why Article 78 speaks of imperative reasons of
security; there can be no question of taking collective measures: each case much be decided separately."
Id. at 367. The commentary to Article 67 states, "[T]he 'general principles of law,' which are not set out
individually here but are referred to as a whole, include the rule concerning the personal nature of
punishments, under which nobody may be punished for an offense committed by someone else. This rule
is also laid down in Article 33 mentioned above." Id. at 342.
279. For a narrow reading of Article 50, see VON GLHN, supra note 92, at 232-34.
280. See supra notes 94 to 96 and accompanying text.
281. See supra text accompanying note 97.
282. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 238; cf. VON GLAHN, supra note 92, at 234.
283. MERON, supra note 23, at 47; see also OPPENHEM, supra note 92, at 451 (characterizing
Geneva Convention as attempt to "supplement and to make more precise the provisions of the Hague
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Meron also refers to the possibility that many of the Geneva Convention's
norms have developed into customary law since their adoption in 1949. To
support this thesis, he notes that the entire international community has
accepted the Convention,2 and that states have an interest in universal
compliance with treaties that embody deeply felt community values.285
Third, the Court's extensive treatment of the Geneva Convention and its
frequent reliance on it have effectively incorporated it into Israeli law. At this
stage, it would be inappropriate for the Court to uphold a practice that violates
Geneva Article 33 based solely on the issue of the Convention's justicia-
bility.286 Moreover, the Court has acknowledged the relevance of Article
33's principle of individual responsibility." 7
Fourth, the punishment of relatives is inconsistent with a correct reading
of the Hague Regulations. It is fundamentally at odds with both the letter and
the spirit of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, which requires the respect
of "family honor and rights." '288 The demolition practice can shatter a
family's communal living arrangement, strain family relationships by fostering
suspicion, resentment, and rivalry, and uproot families from their homes.
Moreover, the punishment of relatives is inconsistent with a proper
reading of Article 50 of the Hague Regulations. Some scholars have found the
punishment of relatives permissible under certain circumstances. For example,
daily fines imposed by the Germans on relatives of men who escaped
conscription in the Franco-Prussian War have been understood to be
permissible.8 9 These practices are, however, clearly inconsistent with the
plain language of Article 50. Mere membership in a group does not support
imposition of joint responsibility. Article 50 specifically requires that each
member of the group be found "jointly and severally responsible. "290 Only
Regulations on this subject").
284. MERON, supra note 23, at 50. But see Yoram Dinstein, Expulsion of Mayors From Judea, 8
TEL Aviv U. L. REv. 158, 167-68 (1981) (Hebrew).
285. MERON, supra note 23, at 54.
286. See supra notes 100 to 102 and accompanying text.
287. See Taha v. Minister of Defense, 45(2) P.D. 45, 54 (1991) (Dov Levine, J.).
288. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 46; see Alwyn V. Freeman, War Crimes by Enemy
Nationals Administering Justice in Occupied Territory, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 608 (1947). The Hague
Convention's Preamble also supports a broad interpretation of Articles 46 and 50. Hague Convention,
supra note 252, pmbl. For the interpretive principles prescribed by the Hague Convention, see supra note
255 and accompanying text.
289. WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 507-08 n.2 (1917); see also
SPAIGHT, supra note 31, at 409. One should, however, discount the relevance of such opinions because
of their inadequate conception of the protection of human rights in time of warfare. Spaight, for example,
states, somewhat remarkably:
The gentle reader.., will doubtless have come to the conclusion that martial law is a very
drastic, tyrannous, and primitive law - a law which is a jumble of bad old laws - curfew
laws, sumptuary laws, conventicle acts, grandmotherly acts which interfere intolerably with
individual liberty, which regulate the life of the citizen out of all conscience. Indeed, it is so;
but there is a cogent reason for its being so. Martial law must be despotic because it deals with
a primitive condition of things, in which the rule of might prevails.
Id. at 353.
290. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 50 (emphasis added).
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convincing evidence of acts implicating each member of the group will be
sufficient to withstand the Article 50 prohibition: "Any inhabitant against
whom no such evidence exists is entitled to enjoy the protection of the rule
excluding group punishment." '91 As previously mentioned, the Military
Government makes no inquiries into the involvement of relatives prior to
ordering demolitions, nor does it claim that they are personally implicated.
Article 50 has been cited repeatedly in support of flagrant violations of
human rights, 2 which have been criticized by international legal scholars.
In criticizing Article 50, modern scholars emphasize the undesirability of
punishing innocent people;"9a the problems associated with leaving judgment
of the population's responsibility with military commanders; 2 4 the vague-
ness of the rule establishing responsibility; 95 and the incompatibility of
non-individual responsibility with the rule of law. They also lament the desire
of military commanders to intimidate the population.29
Finally, the principle of individual responsibility is deeply ingrained in
Israeli criminal and administrative law, which the Court has stated that it
would apply when reviewing the Military Government's actions.297 It is my
assessment that if the Court does formally embrace the principle of individual
responsibility, it will do so on grounds of Israeli, rather than international,
law.
Israeli domestic law challenges the collective character of the demolition
practice more consistently than any other aspect of the practice. This issue
received explicit attention in 1964, when the Knesset scrapped the 1936
291. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 237.
292. The concept of collective responsibility has been used to justify such actions as the burning of
a whole town in response to the sabotage of a railroad bridge during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71,
see Garner, supra note 64, at 514; the burning of firms and destruction of homes in response to damages
caused to railroads and telegraph wires in the Boer War, id.; and the imposition of heavy fines on an
entire city because of one person's conduct during the German occupation of Belgium during World War
I, id. at 515 (discussing fine of 5 million French francs on Brussels after Belgian policeman attacked
German officer and facilitated escape of prisoner). See also CoMMISSION OF REsPONSIBILrTIEs, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PAMPHLET No. 32, THE VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND
CUSTOM OF WAR 18-19 (1919); James W. Garner, Contributions, Requisitions and Compulsory Service
in Occupied Territory, 11 AM. J. INT'L. L. 74 (1917). The oppressive and, indeed, cynical use to which
the notion of collective responsibility lends itself is exemplified by the War Book of the German General
Staff (Kriegsbrauch irm Landkriege) from the 1870-71 war, which explained that collective pecuniary
penalties were found to be the "most effective means of insuring the obedience of the civil population."
See Garner, supra note 64, at 527.
293. Garner, supra note 64, at 535.
294. Id. at 528-29. Indeed, military commanders face a host of difficult questions. Is the notion of
group responsibility for acts of individuals conceptually sound? Does a community's refusal to cooperate
in the investigation of offenses give rise to collective responsibility? Does failure to prevent offenses
amount to responsibility? What about expression of moral support for an offender? Does colleclive
responsibility encompass all members of the community, including dissenters and the powerless7 Must
military commanders always presume a community's innocence, or may they presume guilt in certain
circumstances? The complexity of these issues increases the likelihood that military commanders will
decide against the interests of the population.
295. OPPENHEIM, supra note 92, at 443-44.
296. VON GLAHN, supra note 92, at 233.
297. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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Collective Punishment Ordinance from the state's law books.29 In abro-
gating the Ordinance, the Knesset explained, "The mere possibility of
imposing collective sanctions in a general manner on the residents of a certain
area, offends notions of justice as well as the fundamental postulates of
contemporary legal culture." 9
The denunciation of non-individual punishment - found in criminal law
as early as biblical times " - stands above dispute in all enlightened
societies. This notion has been asserted by, among others, Joel Feinberg,301
John Rawls," 2 and H.L.A. Hart." 3 For all of these reasons, preferring
an archaic interpretation of Article 50 over the principle of individual
responsibility is unacceptable.
2. Juggling with Justifications
From the early days of the occupation, policymakers generally repudiated
the use of collective punishment and acknowledged its counterproductive
effect. Moshe Dayan, for example, often stated that punishing members of the
"non-active" population frustrates them and ruins their motivation to acquiesce
to Israeli rule.3" He nonetheless supported home demolitions. At first he
298. 436 Sefer Ha'Khuldm 4 (Nov. 26, 1964). This law, which was never applied by Israel,
authorized administrative bodies under certain circumstances to impose collective fines on communities
or towns. 610 Hatsa'ot Khok 165 (May 18, 1964).
299. 610 Hatsa'ot Khok 165 (May 18, 1964). For the same reasons, the Knesset also abrogated the
1936 Collective Fines Ordinance. 436 Sefer Ha'Khukim 4. The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High
Court of Appeals, has applied similar reasoning. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Yarkoni, 18(4) P.D. 20,
46 (1964); Goldstein v. Attorney General, 10 P.D. 505, 540 (1956); see also J. BAZAK, PUNISHMENT
PRINCI'LES AND APPLICATION IN ISRAEL AND IN JEWISH LAW 68 (1979) (HEBREW) ("Punishing members
of the criminal's family, and punishing the innocent, even when it has a deterrent effect, is wrong because
it contradicts principles of justice and equity."); S.Z. FELLER, 1 Y'SODOT B'DINEI ONSHIN [ELEMENTS
Op CRIuMINAL LAW] 100 (1984) (Hebrew) ("Everything concerning an offense is personal - the act is
personal, guilt is personal, and their fusion occurs within the actor. Therefore, the punishment must be
personal.").
300. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 24:16 (King James) ("The fathers shall not be put to death for the
children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his
own sin."). Moshe Greenberg explains:
This principle of individual culpability in fact governs all of biblical law. Nowhere does the
criminal law of the Bible, in contrast to that of the rest of the Near East, punish secular
offenses collectively or vicariously. Murder, negligent homicide, seduction, and so forth, are
punished solely on the person of the actual culprit.
Moshe Greenberg, Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law, in 5 YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN JUBILEE 23
(Menachem Haran ed., 1960).
301. Feinberg states, "Collective-responsibility arrangements are most likely to offend our modem
sensibilities when the liabilities are to criminal punishment." JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 238
(1970).
302. Rawls advocates that "in a just society legal punishments will only fall upon those who display
these faults." JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 315 (1971).
303. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBIIY 11-12 (1968).
304. GAzrr, STICK AND CARROT, supra note 37, at 296. In August 1983, the Military Government
altered its policy by limiting demolitions only to the offenders' specific rooms, leaving the rest of the
buildings untouched, see Yosef Tsuriel, New "Sealing Policy": Only the Guilty Will be Punished,
MA'ARiv, Aug. 3, 1983, at 2 (Hebrew), but returned to the original policy within months, see Yosef
Tsuriel, Return to Policy: Terrorists'Houses in Territories Destroyed, Others Sealed, MA'AR¢, Dec. 13,
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chose simply to deny the measure's collective character. In talks with
Palestinians, he asserted that demolitions were merely personal measures. His
audience, however, remained unconvinced."e In a second and more notable
effort to bypass the measure's unpopularity, Dayan explained that the measure
did not constitute collective punishment but merely amounted to what he
called anisha svivatit - meaning, literally, "vicinity" or "surrounding"
punishment. This new description of old policies stirred heated debate within
the Knesset and beyond, 3" as critics charged that the phrase was merely a
euphemism for collective punishment. Dayan succumbed to the criticism. He
abandoned the phrase and summed up the issue in his typical style: "I am
Minister of Defense, not of phraseology."°"
It was next asserted that the relatives were personally involved and thus
directly responsible for the illicit actions. During the initial stages of the
occupation, proponents of the practice insisted that homes were demolished
only when entire families participated or conspired with the offender in the
commission of the offense.308 Professors Alan Dershowitz and Julius Stone
have defended the demolition practice on this basis. In examining the issue,
Dershowitz presumes that the homeowners are in some way involved in the
commission of the offense."° Dershowitz then posits that "in terms of
human values ... it is better to destroy [someone's] house than to detain
him," so that even if demolitions constitute "a technical violation of some
Convention," they are permissible whenever administrative detention would
be allowed by international law." Dershowitz thus introduces an innovative
twist into international law: allowing substitution of unauthorized "benign"
punishments for sanctioned measures of a "worse" character. This proposition
would pave the way for endless and unprincipled types of punishments devised
by military commanders and wreak havoc in humanitarian international law.
This approach conflicts directly with a basic goal of international law:
maintaining universal standards for protecting human rights. Moreover, even
if the motives of the Military Commanders were benign, this approach leaves
undetermined which "human values" should be applied to limit the army's
powers. Dershowitz' analysis also overlooks the reality that home demolitions
1983, at 3 (Hebrew).
305. TEv aH, supra note 73, at 211, 254-55, 263, 272, 279.
306. Shmuel Segev, Dayan: Nasser Defeated at Battle for Canal, MA'ARIV, Nov. 13, 1969, at
3 (Hebrew); Dayan: No Change in the Liberal Policy in the Territories," MA'ARIV, Nov. 28, 1969, at 2.
307. DIvREI HAKNESSET [KNESSET PROTOCOLS] 107 (Dec. 1, 1969); Yehoshua Bitzur, Dayan: I
Am Minister of Defense, Not of Phraseology, MA'ARIV, Dec. 2, 1969, at 2 (Hebrew).
308. See GAzrr, STICK AND CARRoT, supra note 37, at 299.
309. Indeed, Dershowitz examines the demolition practice as applied only to homes owned by the
offender, by a person who knows of the offense, or by a relative suspected of harboring the offender. He
concedes that his justification does not hold when the homeowners are not involved - unaware, like many
other commentators, that most cases fall into this category. See Symposium, supra note 39, at 377. As
previously mentioned, the majority of houses are demolished not because they have been used in the
commission of offenses, but merely because offenders lived in them. In such cases, there is no ground to
presume that relatives should have known of, or were involved in, the unlawful activities.
310. Id. at 376-77 (characterizing demolitions as "a mere pecuniary punishment").
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are not applied as an alternative to other sanctions, but rather as a supplement
to them. The proposed comparison of evils is therefore irrelevant.3 '
Julius Stone's defense of the demolition practice relies primarily on a
Jerusalem Post account of a statement made by Moshe Dayan in 1968 before
the Knesset, from which Stone understood that the Military Government
follows certain procedures in order to determine the guilt of the families
before demolitions. Stone concludes that the punishment of the relatives is
"individual, not collective." '312 A close look at Dayan's statement to the
Knesset reveals, however, that the procedure is less than reassuring. Dayan
admitted, "The security authorities do not undertake the initiative to prove that
the family did not know anything. It is on the family to prove that they knew
nothing." '313 In other words, Palestinian families were required to submit
negative proof in order to save their homes. They were, in fact, presumed to
be guilty. 314
In practice, the Military Government did not follow even this procedure.
Prior to the ACRI case, it executed demolitions without contacting rela-
tives. 315 Shifting the burden of proof onto relatives, and then demolishing
their homes before giving them a chance to make their case, is clearly unfair.
The policy's proponents have apparently recognized the flimsiness of the
argument that relatives are directly responsible for an offender's acts. Neither
they nor the Court now uses this justification.
An alternative justification, based on the concept of vicarious responsi-
bility, makes families and landlords a priori bearers of responsibility for the
actions of their relatives and tenants. Gazit explains, "In principle, the line we
took was not to over-scrutinize these matters. Every homeowner was
considered responsible for the acts committed by those who rented his home,
and for all acts committed in his property."316 To the extent that vicarious
responsibility is generally tolerated, it requires that the person being held
responsible have authority over an offender. Even within such relationships,
311. Dershowitz also seems to have overlooked that Article 78 of the Geneva Convention, on which
he builds his argument, explicitly prohibits all non-judicial security measures except for administrative
detention and home arrest. See Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 78.
312. See STONE, No PEACE, supra note 96, at 15.
313. DrREI HAKNEssET [KNEssET PROTOCOLS] 100 (Oct. 29, 1968).
314. Gazit explains, "[O]nly when there was unmistakable proof that the guerrilla's actions were
committed without the knowledge or against the will of the homeowner, the home would be 'absolved.'"
GAziT, STICK AND CARROT, supra note 37, at 300.
315. The demolition of the AI-Khirbawi family's house in 1980 underscores this point. Six
Palestinian guerrillas climbed onto the roof of the AI-Khirbawi house across the street from BeitHadassah,
and shot six Israelis to death. The Khirbawi house was immediately destroyed. The peculiarity of this
demolition stems from the fact that the Al-Khirbawi family is famous for having saved some 100 Jews
from fellow Arabs in the 1929 riots, and for its continued cooperation with the Israeli Military
Government. The identity of the AI-Khirbawi family was overlooked because the Military Government
carried out the demolition, as always, without questioning the tenants about their involvement. The
punishment of this "loyal" family drew much criticism in the Knesset. See DIvRHI HAKNSFSET [KNESSET
PROTOCOLS] 3034 (May 28, 1980).
316. GAzrr, STICK AND CARROT, supra note 37, at 300.
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one cannot justify the punishment of superiors for actions performed by their
subordinates without the superiors' involvement, inducement, or control." 7
The Military Government has never claimed that these conditions exist in
demolition cases. Indeed, it would be difficult to claim that Palestinian parents
possess real control over their adult sons, that babies have authority over their
fathers, or that grandparents can effectively restrain their adolescent
grandchildren. Requiring landlords to monitor and control the actions of their
tenants would also be unreasonable. The demolition proponents, having
realized the precariousness of the vicarious responsibility argument, no longer
resort to this defense.
3. Home Demolitions as Non-Individual Punishments
I now turn to examine the justifications offered by the Supreme Court,
namely that the harm inflicted on others does not amount to punishment
because it is "unintended" and "unavoidable." First, we must reject the
argument that the measure may be justified on the ground that it was not
intended.318 Determining whether an act of government amounts to punish-
ment turns on whether it punishes people in fact, not on whether it is allegedly
intended to do so.319 Justifications based on the government's alleged
intentions can lead to disingenuous portrayals of government policies and
render judicial review meaningless. Such justifications can legitimize and
institutionalize indefensible punitive practices, as the case of the demolition
policy suggests.
Similarly unacceptable is the Court's implicit proposition that demolitions
are permissible because their underlying objective of deterring undesirable
behavior is justified. The government may not employ unlawful means to
further its interests, however legitimate. Belligerent occupation law, like most
areas of law, seeks precisely to subject the actions of occupying powers to
certain minimum standards of behavior. While deterrence may be the purpose
of the demolition policy, it cannot justify it. Schwarzenberger unequivocally
rules out this type of reasoning: "Irrespective of whether such a measure was
taken for purposes of prevention or deterrence, it would amount to the
punishment of individuals for acts for which they are not personally
responsible. ",320
The real question then remains: can the harm inflicted on relatives be
accepted as the incidental and unavoidable result of the offenders' punish-
ment? I understand the Court's proposition as relying on the "double effect"
argument, which is a common construct for justifying actions that are likely
317. Feinberg states that such punishment amounts to "barbarous regression." Feinberg, supra note
301, at 230-31; see also HART, supra note 303, at 211.
318. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
319. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-69 (1963).
320. SCHWARtZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 238 (arguing against taking of hostages).
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to lead to normally impermissible results. 21 The double effect doctrine
requires three principal conditions: that the direct effect intended by the act
be legitimate; that the purpose of the act be permissible and the impermissible
effect be unintended; and that the gravity of the intended permissible effect
outweigh the indirect impermissible result. To determine whether these
conditions are present in the demolition practice, I examine the deterrence
mechanism of the demolition policy."a
By imprisoning an offender, the government conveys to a potential
offender that he is likely to be sentenced to a similar prison term if he
commits a similar offense. The potential offender's calculus will depend,
among other things, on his aversion to serving such a jail sentence. By also
demolishing an offender's home, the government adds to this calculus the
harm brought about by a demolition. But the crucial point is that it is the
relatives, not the offender, who actually suffer from the loss of the home. It
is the relatives who are uprooted and ejected. Ironically, offenders suffer only
indirectly from the demolition measure, since most, with their long prison
sentences, are unlikely to live in their houses ever again. We see, then, that
the intended goal of deterrence is served by the infliction of harm on relatives.
It follows that the Court's proposition does not meet the second and third
conditions of the double effect doctrine. First, the impermissible effect - that
of punishing the relatives - is apparently an intended effect. Second, even if
harm to the relatives were not intended, it is doubtful that it could be
outweighed by the intended goals of the demolition practice. Demolitions thus
cannot be justified under the double effect doctrine; the relatives' predicament
cannot be discarded as being incidental or unavoidable.
Although the Court generally refrains from articulating how the
demolition practice creates deterrence, it did so, seemingly inadvertently, in
Daflis v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region:
The objective of Article 119 is to achieve the effect of deterrence, and such an effect, by
nature, should be applied not only to the terrorist himself but also to those who surround
him, certainly to the members of his family who reside with him. He should bear in mind
that his despicable actions will not only harm himself, but they may also cause grave
suffering to his family?'a
321. For a lucid explanation of the doctrine, see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UN-UsT WARS 153-
55 (1977).
322. In this argument I refer to "general deterrence," which is generally understood as aimed at
society at large. I am aware that my argument would apply differently if the purpose of the practice were
"individual deterrence" (deterrence of the offender himself). Given that both the Military Government and
the Court treat the issue as "general deterrence," and that most offenders are imprisoned for very long
periods and some are even dead, there is no need to discuss "individual deterrence."
323. 40(2) P.D. 42, 44 (1986) (English excerpt in 17 ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 315 (1987)). The Court
then went on to examine the collective punishment claim from another perspective:
It warrants no explanation that there is nothing between the concept of "collective punishment"
and home demolition; in the case before us it is clear that the guerrillas came out of specific
houses, and it is these - not other - houses that are to be destroyed. Clearly, the
"punishment" is not imposed on homes of people who are uninvolved, and it is difficult to see
from where the claim propagated that we are dealing here with collective punishment.
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Although this decision is not an analytical aberration, it is uniquely can-
did. 24 It simply articulates how the demolition policy is intended to
work."as To effect deterrence, the government conveys to potential offenders
that they and their relatives will be punished; it punishes them by imprisoning
the offender and demolishing his family's house. This is precisely what is
wrong with the measure: under international and Israeli law, as well as basic
precepts of morality, individuals - including relatives - may not be punished
for offenses that they did not commit.
326
Demolitions have a devastating impact on the lives of relatives. The
measure assaults the most intimate of personal properties. A home is not
merely a valuable asset, but an essential component of a person's sense of
belonging, a locus for realizing family interaction and personal fulfillment.
Overnight, demolitions force families out of their familiar shelters into tents,
pitched beside the pile of dirt that was once home. Demolitions abruptly
transform wealth into gravel. The sudden loss of property prevents families
from fulfilling their obligation to shelter and protect their spouses, parents,
and children. It also bars them from bestowing their property to their
children, thus disrupting the socioeconomic order of their community. The
measure takes on extra significance to Palestinians because of the special
importance of the home in their mostly rural culture. As Meron Benvenisti
describes:
In the eyes of the Arabs, the destruction of a house assumes almost cataclysmic proportions.
The Arab curse "Yahrbetaq" [sic] ("May your house be destroyed") is one of the strongest
Id.; see also Shoukeri v. Minister of Defense, HC 798/89 (1990) (unpublished) (Barak, J.) ("This harsh
result is intended to deter potential offenders, who must acknowledge that through their actions they cause
injury, with their own hands, not only to the safety and security of the public and not only to the lives of
innocent people, but also to the well-being of their own relatives.").
324. A similar explanation was given by Lord Roberts in South Africa. "I am not in favor of
lessening the punishment laid down for any damage done to our railway and telegraph lines. Unless the
people generally are made to suffer for misdeeds of those in arms against us, the war will never end."
Spins, supra note 29, at 112 (quoting Lord Roberts).
325. Similarly, Reicin argues that the demolition practice is "justified" because it succeeds. The
otherwise uncompromising offenders "might reconsider in light of the visual reality of destruction as well
as the awareness that financial disaster could befall their families and landlords." Cheryl V. Reicin,
Preventative Detention, CWews, Demolition of Houses, and Deportations: An Analysis of Measures
Employed by Israel in the Administered Territories, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 515, 547 (1984). Reicin
complements this reasoning with an ideal vision of Palestinian self-policing. Reicin's argument is based
on the premise that "other inhabitants of the house either abetted or knew of the violator's activities," Id.,
a factual premise that has been abandoned by all commentators for nearly two decades.
326. The non-individual character of the measure results in a certain irony. According to the regular
criminal law that was promulgated by the Military Government and is currently in effect in the Occupied
Territories, harboring a person who has committed a security offense is punishable by up to three years'
imprisonment. This law, however, exempts from criminal responsibility offenders' fathers, mothers, sons,
daughters, husbands, and wives. Article 17 of the Order Concerning Principles of Criminal Responsibility
(No. 225) 1968, reprinted in HAKHAIKAH B'YEHUDA V'sHoMRoN [LAWS IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA] 105
(Tzvi Freizler ed., 1984) [hereinafter LAws IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA]. Thus, the Military Government has
chosen not to impose criminal penalties upon family members for harboring an offender, but condemns
them to the loss of their homes for the very same act.
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they can use. They attach a great, almost mystical value to their homes and land. Their
house and garden are not a piece of real estate to be bought and sold. 1
7
Even in Western societies, a person's home is laden with emotional value.
The U.S. Supreme Court makes repeated reference to "the sanctity of the
home,"32 describing it as "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the
sick." 3 Indeed, anyone who has ever had his or her home burglarized has
most likely experienced just how sensitive we all are to our living space and
how abusive the intrusion feels. The pain is even more severe if it is inflicted
as a result of the actions of others. Home demolitions thus constitute an
affront to people's identity as autonomous human beings.
The demolition policy thus denies the victims their basic dignity as human
beings. The respect due to civilian populations is a central theme that
permeates the Hague and Geneva instruments. The Preamble to the Hague
Convention introduces standards of "civilized peoples" and the notions of
"laws of humanity. "330 Article 46 requires respect for people's "[f]amily
honor and rights ... as well as religious convictions." '331 Similarly, Article
27 of the Geneva Convention stipulates that the civilian population "shall at
all times be humanely treated." '332 It also states, "Protected persons are
entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honor, their
family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and
customs. ""'
The nature of the practice also triggers questions of morality. Any policy
that overemphasizes deterrence will naturally encourage exaggerated
governmental responses to offenses. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the
fact that demolitions serve as a means of exhibiting the government's
might.334 A spectacle of power intended for the population at large is carried
out against one person or one family. The Court all but admitted the
excessiveness of the practice in Sakhawil. The petitioner claimed that her
family had been discriminated against because, out of the eight people who
committed the offense with her son, only her family's house was ordered to
be sealed. The Court responded:
There is nothing wrong if the authorities decide to exercise their power vis-&-vis one person
and do not do so to others, if they believe that under the circumstances, it is sufficient to
apply this kind of deterring punishment in one case in order to achieve the desired
objective.335
327. MERON BENVENISTI, CoNFucTs AND CONTRADIcTIONs 7 (1986).
328. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
329. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969).
330. Hague Convention, supra note 252, pmbl.
331. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 46.
332. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 27.
333. Id.
334. See supra part lI.C.
335. Sakhawil v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 34(1) P.D. 464, 466 (1979)
(English excerpt in 10 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 345 (1980).
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In effect, the Court stated that there was no reason to seal eight homes when
the sealing of one was sufficient to create the required deterrent effect. This
statement contains two difficulties. It implies that one family is being made
to suffer disproportionate misery, and it does not explain how one of the eight
houses was singled out for sealing.336 In the absence of a mechanism for
determining which of the similarly guilty parties should be punished, the
policy inevitably incorporates some arbitrary method of administering criminal
justice.
The moral dubiousness of the demolition practice is most disturbing when
the Military Government demolishes homes of slain offenders.337 These
cases demonstrate the complete separation of punishment from responsibility.
When the house of a slain offender is demolished, can the Military Govern-
ment still claim that the relatives' predicament is merely incidental to the
punishment of the offender?
The Court's attitude towards non-individual punishment underwent a
significant change in Justice Heshin's dissents in Khizran and A1-Amrin and
Justice Barak's majority opinion in Turkeman.338 Justices Heshin and Barak
argued for the restriction of the practice at least as it applied to homes that
house more than one nuclear family.339
From a practical point of view, these decisions hinder implementation of
the demolition policy. Still, some doctrinal and analytical questions remain
unanswered. These decisions did not ban non-individual punishment outright.
While they spared the rooms of married siblings, they do sanction the
punishment of parents and unmarried siblings. It is difficult to analyze Barak's
opinion in Turkeman or to determine precisely what is the current doctrine,
because he did not explicate the jurisprudential guidelines or normative
principles on which he based the result. 34°
Heshin's dissent in Ihizran is commendable for its bold spirit, humani-
tarian undertones, and its call for normative adjudication. Its final conclusion,
however, is somewhat disappointing. Heshin's starting point is that "the basic
principle - and this is the crucial point - is that each petitioner, and he
336. The Court did not state whether the guilt of Sakhawil's son was more severe than that of his
accomplices.
337. See supra note 74.
338. See supra notes 175 to 186 and accompanying text.
339. The Turkeman Court upheld the sealing of the two bedrooms of the offender, his mother, and
seven unmarried siblings, but disallowed the sealing of the kitchen and the room where the offender's
brother lived with his wife and son. Turkeman v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 5510/92 (1993) (unpublished).
For the Khizran house, Heshin would have allowed the demolition of the room that the offender shared
with his mother and sister, but would have ruled against the demolition of the kitchen, hallway, bathroom,
and two rooms in which each of the offender's brothers lived with their wives and children. For the Abu
Mukhsein house, Heshin would have upheld the demolition of two rooms of the offender, his parents, his
brothers, and one sister, and ruled against the demolition of the offender's grandmother's room, the
bathroom, kitchen, and storage room. Khizran v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 46(2)
P.D. 150 (1992).
340. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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alone, shall bear his own punishment. ''341 He also criticizes, with compelling
rigor and at considerable length, the Court's traditional construct that
buildings that are deemed "inseparable units of residence" may be demolished
in toto.34
2
Nevertheless, Heshin was unwilling to take his argument to its logical
conclusion. Rather, he suggested, by way of example, that when an offender
shares a room with another person, the other person would be barred from
contesting the demolition on the grounds that it is "his house." Heshin also
stated that when a young person lives in his parents' house - in which he
roams freely - the whole house should be considered "his house," so that the
house could therefore be demolished because of the son's acts . 43 Heshin
explained that any other interpretation would strip Article 119 of any mean-
ing. 3" This explanation is inconsistent with his starting point. He first
argued that the principle of individual responsibility is fundamental, but he
later sacrificed it on the altar of Article 119. Ultimately, Heshin deemed
Article 119 an unassailable norm and thus failed to fulfill his own promise to
subject it to higher normative principles. In his conclusion, Heshin sadly fell
into the same conceptual trap that he so severely criticized. He allowed
demolitions of the offenders' "places of residence" and "unit of resi-
dence. "31 It is unclear why Heshin so adamantly condemns the traditional
criterion of "inseparable unit of residence," only to substitute it with equally
artificial and similarly arbitrary tests. We can direct Heshin's criticism of the
"normative significance" of such legal constructs at his own proposed
substitutes: in what way does sharing a bedroom or the zone offree roaming
constitute meaningful boundaries to delimit the scope of the punishment of an
individual?
Although these decisions have somewhat hampered the demolition
practice, the conclusions presented by Heshin and Barak ultimately authorize
punishing a group of people - albeit a smaller group - for the actions of one
person. No matter how carefully one constructs the guidelines of such
punishment, the endeavor will rest on conceptually flawed and morally
dubious grounds.
C. Three Shadow Doctrines
In addition to violating the prohibition on non-individual punishment, the
demolition practice violates international law in three other important ways.
341. Khizran, 46(2) P.D. at 159.
342. See id. at 168 ("Indeed, it is hard to avoid the notion that the concept 'separate unit of
residence' - originally devised as an ancillary and servant concept - has become, almost in of itself, a
quintessence and a master that commands us.").
343. Id. at 158.
344. Id. at 160.
345. Id. at 161.
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The Court has not addressed these areas - destruction of private property,
confiscation of private property, and absence of due process - because of its
adherence to the local law doctrine. An examination of the demolition practice
reveals that it violates international law in each of these areas.
1. Destruction of Private Property
The first doctrine, concerning destruction of property, consists primarily
of a general prohibitive rule and the exception to this rule. The exception
permits destruction only when it is required by absolute military necessity.
The issue to be examined therefore is whether the Israeli demolition policy
falls within this exception.
Private property is protected by Article 46 of the Hague Regulations;346
by Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, which prohibits the destruction of
property "unless such destruction... be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war";347 and by Article 53 of the Geneva Convention, which
declares the destruction of property "prohibited, except where such destruction
is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. 3 4' This tension
between the rights of property ownership and the exigencies of war,
commentators agree, is resolved in international law in favor of the for-
mer.149 The protection of property is also among the provisions most widely
346. Article 46 of the Hague Regulations states, "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot
be confiscated.' Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 46.
347. Article 23 of the Hague Regulations states, 'In addition to the prohibitions provided by special
conventions, it is especially forbidden: ... (g) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." Hague Regulations, supra note
9, art. 23(g); see also Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Aug. 27, 1874, art. 13(g)
(Brussels Declaration), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLIcT 25, 29 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 2d ed. 1981); A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGuE PEACE CONFERENCEs 258 (1909). Although
Article 23(g) is part of section II of the Hague Regulations (entitled "Hostilities'), it binds armies
throughout the duration of the occupation. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 23(g). This clarification
was emphasized by the official commentary to the Geneva Convention: "Since that rule [Article 23(g)] is
placed in the section entitled 'hostilities,' it covers all property in the territory involved in war; its scope
is therefore much wider than that of the provision under discussion [Article 53], which is only concerned
with property situated in occupied territory." THE COMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 301. This is a matter
of law as well as a matter of plain logic: what is prohibited under extreme conditions in time of actual
warfare is prohibited all the more so after hostilities have ceased. See also GREENSPAN, supra note 41,
at 214, 287; VON GLAHN, supra note 92, at 226-27; cf. Ayoub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113
(1979) (English excerpt in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979)).
348. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 53 ('Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real
or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other
public authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction
is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.').
349. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 244. Draper comments that the law "leans almost too
heavily in favor of humanitarian aspirations." Draper, supra note 255, at 141. Scott refers to 'the sanctity
of private property." See JAMEs BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907:
A SERIES OF LECTURES DELVERED BEFORE THE JoHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY IN THE YEAR 1908, at 539
(1909). This tension is as ancient as the history of warfare itself. For an early case, see the biblical
description of the destruction of Jericho. Joshua 4:24.
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incorporated in the military manuals of various countries.5 °
Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations and Article 53 of the Geneva
Convention are distinctly prohibitive rules. The protection of property is stated
in general, emphatically worded language. The permitted destructions are
formulated as exceptions; they are stated in categorical and restrictive
language. 351 The Hague Regulations require that the military necessity be
"imperative,n 352 and the Geneva Convention demands that it be "abso-
lute. "13
All commentators insist on a narrow reading of the exceptions 4.35 Loose
or expansive interpretations of military necessities vitiate the underpinnings
of warfare law. Consequently, international law has rejected Kriegsraison
("argument of war") as a justification for overriding humanitarian concerns:
[Blecause to accept [the concept of Kriegsraison] would reduce "the entire body of the laws
of war to a code of military convenience, having no further sanction than the sense of honor
of the individual military commander or chief of staff," Article 23(g) of the Hague
Regulations makes allowance for military necessity within the rule it lays down, but does
not permit military necessity to do away with the rule itself.
3 5
Thus, von Glahn advocates fair and honest application of the necessity
exception and warns that "an unrestricted interpretation of the meaning of
necessity... could serve as a virtually limitless reservoir of excuses for
almost any and all acts of an Occupying Power. 356
The Israeli home demolition practice has been criticized as an unac-
ceptable application of the military necessity exception by a number of
350. VoN GLAHN, supra note 92, at 9; see, e.g., U.S. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 247, art. 410.
It should also be noted that excessive destruction of property amounts to a "War Crime." Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(b), 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288. Such destruction is
considered a "grave breach" of the Geneva Convention as determined by Article 147. Geneva Convention,
supra note 10, art. 147. These stipulations, however, probably pertain only to large-scale devastation and
to "scorched earth" practices.
351. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 266; Draper, supra note 255, at 133.
352. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 23(g).
353. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 53. The rigidity of the absolute military necessity
standard is highlighted when compared to the less demanding standard of military advantage. See 1923
Hague Rules of Air Warfare, art. 24, drafted Dec. 1922-Feb. 1923, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CoNFUc'r, supra note 347, at 147, 150. The 1923 Regulations were never adopted in a legally binding
form, but they are widely accepted as being strongly persuasive authority. See GREENSPAN, supra note
41, at 305. Similar principles are set forth in Article 52(2) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), June 8, 1977, reprinted in TE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICr, supra note 347, at 551, 582.
354. See, e.g., Draper, supra note 255, at 263 (explaining that "exceptive clauses are not capable
of a wide interpretation'); VON GLAHN, supra note 92, at 226, 227 (urging that military necessity "be very
urgent and vital" and "make a decisive contribution to the end of the conflict"); OPPENHEim, supra note
92, at 414 (arguing that necessity must be of imperative nature); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at
244 (stressing that "alleged necessities of war [must be] kept within narrow confines").
355. GREENSPAN, supra note 41, at 279; see also TRiAlS OF WAR CRIMiNALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG M=lTARY TRIBUNALS 1347 (1950); Draper, supra note 255, at 134.
356. VON GLAHN, supra note 92, at 225-26.
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scholars. 57 It has been defended as appropriate on these grounds by
Shefl,s Reicin, " '9 and even Greenspan, who claims:
It is a tenet of counter guerilla action that the base from which the guerilla operates must
be destroyed, because only if he has a base can he operate.... All inhabitants are, of
course, removed before the houses are destroyed. The Israeli action is, therefore, justifiable
under Article 53.'
Similarly, Shamgar relies on a paragraph from the official commentary to the
Geneva Convention that states, "[l]t will be for the Occupying Power to judge
the importance of such military requirements." '' Shamgar interprets this
statement as an acknowledgment of the broad discretionary powers of the
army. The commentators, however, meant quite the opposite: because the
occupying power does, in fact, hold the power to judge its necessities, it must
not abuse its discretion. This interpretation flows from the text immediately
following the text Shamgar quotes:
It is therefore to be feared that bad faith in the application of the reservation may render the
proposed safeguard valueless; for unscrupulous recourse to the clause concerning military
necessity would allow the Occupying Power to circumvent the prohibition set forth in the
Convention. 2
The commentators' fears have been realized in the home demolition
policy. First, military necessity connotes exigencies that are concrete and
contextual, as well as compelling, definite, and immediate. The language,
rationale, and common understanding of the exceptions directly conflict with
the abstract nature and general application of the demolition policy. The
general aim of deterrence, the effectiveness of which is contested,363 does
not meet the standard of the exception.
357. Meron finds the practice to be in conflict with Article 53 as well as with Articles 23(g) and 46
of the Hague Regulations. See Meron, supra note 96, at 119. Dinstein, in passing, finds the practice to
be inconsistent with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention. See Dinstein, supra note 96, at 128; see also
Cohen, supra note 69, at 103; M.B. Carroll, The Israeli Demolition of Homes in the Occupied Territories:
An Analysis of its Legality in International Law, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1207-13 (1990); cf. T.
Kuttner, Israel and the West Bank - Aspects of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 7 IsR. Y.B. HUM.
RTs. 166, 218-19 (1977).
358. Shefi, supra note 37, at 300-04.
359. Cheryl Reicin is open to the proposition that the standard of "imperative military necessity" is
met by the mere possibility that "destruction of homes may deter those persons actually contemplating
terrorists acts as well as those who might otherwise harbor terrorists or encourage such acts." She
emphasizes that "destroying houses serves as a dramatic warning to those contemplating similar actions."
Reicin, supra note 325, at 547.
360. Morris Greenspan, Human Rights in the Territories Occupied by Israel, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW.
377, 391 (1972). It should be noted that Greenspan's conclusion refers only to buildings that were actually
used in the commission of an offense, and offers no justification for the demolition of offenders'
residences.
Julius Stone, while generally supportive of the demolition policy, takes an ambiguous stand regarding
the requirement of military necessity. See STONE, No PEACE, supra note 96, at 14-15. Similarly, Alan
Dershowitz, who generally justifies the practice, appears to concede that demolitions may not withstand
the standard of military necessity. Symposium, supra note 39, at 376.
361. Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at 276 (citing THE COMMENTARYsupra note 66, at 302).
362. THE COMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 302.
363. For divergent opinions among Israeli military commentators, see supra part II.C.
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Second, the claim of military necessity should apply only to situations
where hostilities are still in progress. 364 Draper's response to Greenspan's
supportive statement is compelling: "The appeal to the humanitarian element
by stating, which is true, that the inhabitants are first removed before blowing
up the house, destroys the very basis of his argument for the application of
Article 53 under its exceptive clause."36 Similarly, the ICRC argues that
the exception is limited to instances of "movements, manoeuvres and other
action taken by the armed forces with a view to fighting .... This exception
to the prohibition cannot justify destruction as a punishment or deterrent, since
to preclude this type of destruction is an essential aim of the article. "366
Thus, military necessity can not reasonably be argued except during a
phase of ongoing combat or the initial stages of belligerent occupation.
Scholars suggest a dichotomy between two phases of belligerent occupation:
the initial "combat or wake-of-battle phase" and the subsequent "occupational
phase." During the latter phase, the army's primary responsibility shifts from
fighting to administration. 367 The territory should then be administered by
standards "which, for practical purposes, are those of peace."3 68 Claims of
military necessity long after the conclusion of combat ignore this distinction
and violate the proper standards of conduct it implies. This observation is
especially true for occupations that last as long as the Israeli occupation has.
Third, military necessity cannot be said to apply to civilian properties and
to military targets alike. Conflation of the two amounts to a denial of
protection of private property. A bedroom is simply not a "bunker" or a
"military base" because a grenade was thrown from it,369 and even less so
merely because a person who committed an offense sleeps in it. It is plainly
unconvincing to claim that destroying a family's residence, especially when
the offender is in prison, is militarily "urgent, 370 "vital, "371 or "impera-
364. This situation may be different when a particular strategically located property continuously
constitutes a severe danger.
365. Draper, supra note 255, at 141.
366. ICRC Interpretation, supra note 11. In the opinion of the ICRC, "Destruction of property as
mentioned in article 53 cannot be justified under the terms of that article unless such destruction is
absolutely necessary - i.e. materially indispensable - for the armed forces to engage in action, such as
making way for them." Id.
367. See GREENsPAN, supra note 41, at 214.
368. Id. at 225. Von Glaha emphasizes that
necessity proper will be almost impossible to prove, except in a few minor situations during
the initial combat phases of the invasion of the enemy territory .... It must be remembered
that practically all measures of real importance undertaken by an occupant in a hostile territory
fall in a period of time when the military phase of active hostilities has passed from the
occupied territory and when the occupant attempts to establish an orderly administration.
Hence, there is an absence of nationally vital necessity and a lack of real necessity which
would enable a successful employment of the defense in question.
VON GLAHN, supra note 20, at 226-27.
369. See Shamgar, Observance, supra note 38, at 276.
370. See VON GLAHN, supra note 92, at 226-27.
371. Id.
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tive."" Finally, even assuming that demolitions have reduced the rate of
security offenses, it is doubtful that the incremental deterrent effect of the
routine measure meets the standard of absoluteness prescribed by international
law.
2. Confiscation of Private Property
Article 119 vests two distinct powers in the hands of the Military
Commander: confiscation, which is stipulated in the provision as "forfeiture,"
and destruction. Every exercise of power in accordance with Article 119
begins with an indefinite confiscation of the property. After confiscation, the
Military Commander can choose whether to destroy the property, seal it, or
use it for the army's own purposes.3" The Military Commander preempts
all rights in the confiscated property. The owners are prohibited from using
the land, entering the sealed home, or rebuilding the ruined house.374
Article 46 of the Hague Regulations states, "Private property cannot be
confiscated. ' '3' Belligerent occupation law makes four exceptions to this
rule. The legality of home demolitions hinges, therefore, on their compatibili-
ty with these exceptions. This section briefly examines each of the four
exceptions to show that the practice does not fit within any one of them.
The first exception, requisition, stems from the principle la guerrepayant
la guerre, under which the occupying army may demand goods from the local
population for its own consumption. The boundaries of permissible requisi-
tions are set out in Article 52 of the Hague Regulations.376 Five conditions
must be met for a requisition to be lawful, two of which are incompatible with
the demolition practice.3" First, requisitioned goods must be utilized solely
for the maintenance and subsistence of the occupying forces during their
372. Id.
373. Paragraph (2) of Article 119 authorizes the army to take possession of confiscated buildings.
1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 4, at 1089. This provision, however, has rarely been utilized by the
IDF.
374. Order Concerning Prohibition on Building (No. 465) (1972), reprinted in HAxHAxwKAH LAWS
IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA, supra note 326, at 248. Nonetheless, Article 119 authorizes the government to
remit confiscated properties to their original owners. 1947 Defense (Emergency) Regulations (Amendment
No. 15), in 1624 The Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, at 1566 (Oct. 23, 1947). The Military Commanders
occasionally do remit properties - mostly sealed homes - to their owners. They usually do so some years
after the forfeiture, and condition the remittance on the family's subsequent "record" with the authorities.
375. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 46.
376. Article 52 of the Hague Regulations reads, in part:
Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants
except for the needs of the army of occupation .... Contributions in kind shall as far as
possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due
shall be made as soon as possible.
Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 52.
377. The remaining three conditions are that requisitions be proportionate to the resources of the
occupied territory; that the inhabitants not be required to take part in military operations against their
country; and that the demand for requisitions come from the local military commander. Hague
Regulations, supra note 9, art. 52. These conditions are of little importance to the present analysis.
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administration of the occupied territory.37 The IDF does not make use of
the demolished properties.379 The second condition is that the owners must
be compensated for the requisitioned goods.3' The Military Government
does not compensate Palestinians for their demolished homes, nor does it
intend to restore the homes. Such compensation would defy the policy's
purpose and undermine its deterrent effect.
The second type of permitted confiscation is seizure. Article 53(2) of the
Hague Regulations allows the occupant to seize various objects that can be
directly utilized in warfare."' Seizable items typically include firearms,
ammunition, communication installations, and means of transportation. The
Israeli practice does not fall within the seizure exception for three reasons.
First, Article 53(2) instructs the occupying power to take measures to ensure
that seized items are "restored and compensation fixed when peace is
made. "3" As mentioned above, the IDF does not offer compensation for
demolished homes. Second, seizure is generally understood to apply only to
movable property.3" Third, the provision dictates that only items that can
be directly utilized in warfare may be seized.3" Most private homes do not
fall within this category.
The third type of permitted confiscation is expropriation for public use.
The authority to expropriate private property is not explicitly stipulated in the
Hague Regulations, but is implied in Article 43 as a permitted application of
the peacetime laws of the occupied territory.8 5 Where expropriation powers
were available to the ousted government, the occupant, too, may exercise
them in its effort to maintain the "vie publique." This power is typically used
when land is required, for example, for constructing schools or hospitals,
378. See VON GLAIIN, supra note 92, at 166; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 270.
Requisitioned goods typically include food, clothes, cattle, etc. The Hague Convention's drafters made a
point to clarify the phrase "the needs of the army of occupation." They explained, "This is the rule of
necessity; but this necessity is that of maintaining the army of occupation. It is no longer the rather vague
criterion of 'necessities of war' mentioned in Article 40 of the Brussels project under which, strictly, the
country might be systematically exhausted." THE REPORTS TO TBE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND
1907, at 150 (James B. Scott ed., 1917).
379. Dayan insisted that the demolitions would not provide "a shadow of benefit to the Military
Government." TEVETH, supra note 73, at 212.
380. Compensation for requisitioned property is fundamental to the legal exercise of requisition; it
is considered "one of the pillars of the rule of law in occupied territories." SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note
92, at 271-72; see also OPPENHI-M, supra note 92, at 410.
381. Article 53(2) of the Hague Regulations states:
All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news,
or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of
arms, and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to
private individuals, but they must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.
Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 53(2).
382. Id.
383. SCHW'ARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 269. The U.S. Field Manual states that immovable
private enemy property may not, under any circumstances, be seized. U.S. FIELD MANUAL, supra note
247, art. 407.
384. Hague Regulations, supra note 9, art. 53(2).
385. Id. art. 43.
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paving roads, or developing agricultural projects. Expropriation is legally
permitted only when it complies with two conditions. It must be performed
solely for the benefit of the local population,"' and the dispossessed owners
must be compensated for the loss of their property.387 Both conditions
render the concept of expropriation inapplicable to the home demolition
policy.
The fourth exception to the prohibition on confiscation is quartering
(temporary use of private property for military purpose). This power is not
stipulated in the international documents, but is nevertheless accepted by most
scholars as permissible authority. Typically, quartered properties are used for
troop dormitories, provisional hospitals, and surveillance posts.3 8 Confisca-
tion pursuant to Article 119 cannot be justified under the exception of
quartering, since the IDF does not use the confiscated homes. In addition, the
demolition practice violates the fundamental condition of temporariness.3 9
3. Absence of Due Process
With few exceptions, the Court has consistently characterized home
demolitions as "punishment." 390 Strangely, the Court has not examined the
386. VON GLAHN, supra note 92, at 186; see also U.S. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 247, art. 431
("[Ain occupant is authorized to expropriate either public or private property solely for the benefit of the
local population."); Cooperative Society v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 37(4) P.D.
785, 808 (1983) (Barak, J.).
387. GREENSPAN, supra note 41, at 296; see also SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 92, at 245;
Cooperative Society v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 37(4) P.D. 785, 808 (1983)
(Barak, J.).
388. The IDF makes frequent use of this authority, periodically taking possession of houses,
rooftops, and yards. This practice has been upheld by the Court. In Abu Rian v. Military Commander of
Judea and Samaria Region, 42(2) P.D. 767 (1988), the Court upheld the order by which the Military
Commander took possession of the petitioner's apartment in the town of Khalhoul, on the main road from
Jerusalem to Hebron. The order was issued because the army needed to station a unit of soldiers at that
location, where stone throwing and other incidents had previously taken place. The order was limited to
a period of three months and included notification of the petitioner's entitlement to compensation in the
way of alternative accommodation or money. In Juha v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria
Region, 43(2) P.D. 116 (1989), a privately owned grove adjacent to the Bethlehem police station was
made available for the army's use for the housing of army units. The Court recognized the authority of
quartering and accepted the Military Government's alleged need in that particular case, although it
stipulated that the order be limited to a predetermined period of time, and that the petitioner be
compensated for the use of the property and for the loss of the trees in case it was found that the trees
needed to be uprooted. Cf. U.S. CoNsT. amend. III ('No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.").
389. VON GLAHN, supra note 92, at 186.
390. See, e.g., ACRI v. Commander of the Central Command, 43(2) P.D. 529, 540 (1989)
('undoubtedly a severe and harsh punitive measure"); Sakhawil v. Military Commander of Judea and
Samaria Region, 34(l) P.D. 464, 466 (1979) ("exceptional punitive measure"); Symposium, supra note
39, at 380 ('personal punitive measure ... part and parcel of the penal law'); Shamgar, Observance,
supra note 38, at 275; 1442 Palestine Gazette, supra note 4, at 1089 (labeling part XII of 1945 DERs,
which contains Article 119, as "Miscellaneous Penal Provisions").
The Court has occasionally suggested that the practice is not punitive; that demolitions are imposed
"not to punish, but to deter." Al Raqeb v. Military Commander of Gaza Region, HCJ 878/89 (1990)
(unpublished); see also Rajabi v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region, 43(3) P.D. 177, 179
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procedural corollary of this conclusion: whether punitive power may be
exercised without judicial process. As previously mentioned, in practice the
Military Commanders issue and execute demolition orders as exercises of
administrative rather than criminal power, without any judicial involvement.
The Military Commanders are not bound to observe any substantial rules of
evidence, procedure, or reasoning before issuing demolition orders. 91 This
section examines this practice in light of international belligerent occupation
law, which guarantees due process, and the Israeli government's "respect for
law" policy, which stresses "the introduction of proper supervisory proce-
dures. o1392
On no other issue is the Geneva Convention as explicit as in its require-
ments for criminal justice. The Convention confines to the judiciary the
authority to mete out criminal punishments.393 Criminal justice should be
"impartial, prompt, and efficient," and the rules "should be strictly ob-
served. 1 3 11 The official commentary states, "The object of the provision is
to limit the possibility of arbitrary action by the Occupying Power by ensuring
that penal jurisdiction is exercised on a sound basis of universally recognized
legal principles." '  These provisions are binding on Israel, not only in
accordance with its proclaimed policy and its treaty obligations, but also as
(1989). The denial of the measure's punitive character is unconvincing. True, not every exercise of power
that causes people harm necessarily constitutes a "punishment." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614
(1960); see also U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.). In the United States, an
executive action will generally not be deemed "punitive" as long as it is rationally related to a regulatory,
non-punitive government purpose, and provided that its impact is not excessive in relation to that purpose.
See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); Nixon v. Administrator General, 433 U.S. 425,
475-76 (1977);'Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The demolition practice,
however, does not meet this exception, because it has no regulatory, non-punitive purpose. The measure's
sole purpose is deterrence, and deterrence, in and of itself, is part of punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court
has stated plainly: "Retribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979); see also Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. For a similar Israeli
case, see Mintser v. Tel Aviv Local Planning Board, 4 P.D. 492, 494 (1950). See also Kretzmer, supra
note 192, at 320-24.
Demolitions are analytically distinguishable from administrative detentions. The latter is a
paradigmatic example of a government action viewed as an "administrative" power that appears at first
to be punitive. See Kahane v. Minister of Defense, 35(2) P.D. 253 (1980). Administrative detentions are
based on the expectation that a person is likely to commit a crime; he or she is incarcerated not for actions
already committed, but to prevent actions that he or she may commit in the future. Demolitions, by their
nature and by the very terms of Article 119, are an ex post response to an offense that has already
occurred. Demolitions, therefore, are nothing but "punishment."
391. The Supreme Court's review of the Military Commanders' decisions does not amount to a
criminal appeal. The Court does not purport to canvass evidence or determine guilt; it merely decides
whether a decision of the Military Commander met the relatively lenient requirements of administrative
law. See supra text accompanying notes 70 to 72.
392. See supra text accompanying note 105.
393. See Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 71 ("No sentence shall be pronounced by the
competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a regular trial."); see also Universal Declaration,
supra note 22, art. 10 ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charges
against him.").
394. GREENSPAN, supra note 41, at 241.
395. THE COMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 341 (discussing Article 67).
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general principles of law.39 The Convention does not leave particular
safeguards of justice to the discretion of the occupying power, but elaborates
upon them.397 It obliges the government to maintain a proportionate relation-
ship between punishments and offenses,9 ' to deduct periods of arrest from
the sentence,399 and to publish the criminal laws that it enacts.4° The
Convention also prohibits applying retroactive legislation, 4°' as well as
prosecuting offenses committed prior to the occupation.' Furthermore, the
Convention entitles accused persons to be promptly informed of charges
against them, in writing and in a language they understand;' to produce
evidence and call witnesses; 4°4 to select their own counsel, who should be
allowed to visit them to prepare the defense;4°5 to be aided by an inter-
preter;406 and to appeal the sentence.'
The Military Government apparently perceives these fundamental precepts
as overly cumbersome. Indeed, circumventing them is precisely "one of the
great advantages" of the demolition practice. Gazit explains:
We operate two penal systems: punishment by administrative regulations and punishment
by standard legal proceedings. The great advantage of administrative punishment is the
swiftness of execution. When combating terror, a government cannot afford to wait three,
six or nine months for the completion of investigations, preparation of charges and litigation
in the various courts. To achieve deterrence punishment must be immediately visible.
Demolition of guerrillas' homes is aimed at achieving that precise goal. If we want to deter
young men in Hebron from following the way of Ezz Al-Din Reis, who threw the grenade
into the cave of Mahpela - we will not achieve it by a life imprisonment sentence,
announced nine months after the affair (Israeli due process requirements prevent us from
curtailing the proceedings and resorting to a brief and swift procedure). On the other hand,
the demolition of his house the day after his capture and admission - is a "pillar of
smoke," which everyone sees, hears and understands.4"
Gazit's premise - that swift punishment increases the disutility of crime
and thus increases the deterrent impact - is probably correct,4°9 but
expedience is hardly a criterion for legality. We should be concerned with
whether the measure complies with legal principles.410 Indeed, even Julius
396. See MERON, supra note 23, at 49-50.
397. Cf. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 22, arts. 14, 15.
398. Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 67.
399. Id. art. 69.
400. Id. art. 65.
401. Id. art. 67.
402. Id. art. 70.
403. Id. art. 71.
404. Id. art. 72.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. art. 73.
408. Gazit, Administered Territories, supra note 40, at 37. For a similar view held by the British
in Palestine, see MARLOWE, supra note 45.
409. See generally, JAMEs Q.WSON & RIcHARD J.HERRENsThIN, CRIME & HUMAN NATURE 397
(1985) (arguing that increase in speed, certainty, or severity of punishment increases disutility of crime).
410. Even if we had accepted the view that demolitions do not constitute "punishment," the practice
would nevertheless be prohibited by Article 78 of the Geneva Convention, which limits the scope of
"safety measures" that may be applied in the absence of judicial conviction. Geneva Convention, supra
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Stone, writing in defense of the demolition practice, concedes that demolitions
must comply with the criminal-justice provisions of the Geneva Convention.
He candidly states, "The practice would still, on this view, be required to
observe the provisions of Articles 71-74 concerning regular trial and
conviction after due notice to the accused and other requirements. 411
VI. CONCLUSION
The first objective of this Article was to demonstrate that the demolition
practice is unlawful. I argued that demolitions inflict non-individual punish-
ments on innocent people, namely the families and landlords of offenders. The
demolition practice is therefore inconsistent with international and Israeli law
and with universally accepted principles of justice. I showed that the
punishment of families and landlords is neither "unintended" nor merely
"incidental" to the punishment of the offenders, but is rather the very
mechanism by which the policy attempts to generate deterrence. I emphasized
that the measure strikes at the sanctity of people's privacy, wealth, tradition,
and well-being and denies to the civilian population the respect owed them
under provisions of the Hague and Geneva instruments. I suggested that the
measure is not as effective as it is claimed to be and proposed that it has
likely exacerbated antagonisms between Israelis and Palestinians.
In addition, I argued that the demolition practice violates three doctrines
of international law that have, by and large, been absent from the debate.
First, the practice exceeds any reasonable interpretation of absolute military
necessity and therefore does not meet the requirements for permissible
destruction of private property. Second, the practice does not fall within any
of the exceptions to the prohibition on confiscation of private property. Third,
demolishing homes without affording the alleged offenders a fair trial denies
them procedural justice, guaranteed by both international and Israeli law.
I also challenged the principal legal justification that the Israeli Supreme
Court has used to circumvent the substantive protections of international law:
that local law prevails over international law. Giving priority to local law in
this particular case contravenes the language, purpose, and spirit of the Hague
and Geneva instruments.
note 10, art. 78; see also GREENSPAN, supra note 41, at 253. Rooted in the desire to limit the scope and
severity of measures exercised against the civilian population, Article 78 states, in part, "If the Occupying
Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning
protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment." Geneva
Convention, supra note 10, art. 78. Indeed, the Military Government resorts to the power of administrative
detention in a routine fashion. More than 14,000 Palestinians have been incarcerated by administrative
orders since the beginning of the Intfada. See B'TsELEM, DETAINED WrrHouT TRIAL: ADMINIRTrvE
DETENTION IN THE OCcUPID TERRITORIES SINCE THE BEG INING OF THE INTIFADA (1992). The
demolition sanction clearly exceeds the "safety measures" provided for in Article 78.
411. STONE, No PEACE, supra note 96, at 15.
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On a broader level, the case of demolitions teaches us something about
belligerent occupations in general. It provides an illustration of the weakness
of belligerent occupation as a political arrangement: in practice, occupations
tend to escalate into bitter conflicts in which the occupying power is
eventually unable or unwilling to respect occupation law. Consequently, this
field of law is rendered ineffective and the interests of the indigenous
population are left unprotected.
Even when the occupying power concedes that it is governing the region
as a belligerent occupant, the law is sufficiently ambiguous to be easily
interpreted to the occupant's advantage. The physical and legal powers are
concentrated in the occupying power's hands; the indigenous population is
prevented from participating in the government or rallying against it. Further
complicating matters, the conflict between the occupying power's security
interests and the population's interests pervades all aspects of life. This is so
even when the occupant makes an attempt to be fair and considerate, and
when the parties do not have diametrically opposed claims or aspirations
regarding the region's final status. As soon as the slightest security concern
arises, the occupying power may have valid reasons to impose curfews, search
homes, restrict travel, and silence speech. Normal activities, such as
schooling, trade, and healthcare, may be restricted. Stifled by the occupying
power's measures and stripped of any political say, the population has little
recourse other than violence. The violence tends to escalate, until someone
gives up or a political settlement is reached.
Underlying this unsteady arrangement is an internal conflict that the
occupying power experiences in its dual role of adversary and guardian. The
occupying power's impulse is to employ its superior force against the defiant
population - to vindicate its rule and exhibit its might. But it also has a
responsibility to maintain the population's well-being. This latter obligation
requires the occupying power to contain its impulses. In a sense, the
occupying power must protect the population from the very power it uses to
control the population: its restrictive regulations, its security measures, and
its wrath. 412 Balancing this conflict becomes all the more burdensome as
hostilities intensify and casualties grow. I suggest that it is the unmanage-
ability of this dual role that hinders the protection of civilian populations from
the hardships of occupation.
A second question that arises from this study concerns the ability of
courts to mend the imperfections of an occupation arrangement. This question
is part of a broader inquiry into the role that courts can play in defending
412. The difficulty to control such an impulse was articulated by Shakespeare's Duke of Cornwall:
Though well we may not pass upon his life
Without the form of justice, yet our power
Shall do a court'sy to our wrath, which men
May blame, but not control.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR act 3, sc. 7, 25-28.
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human rights against claims of national security. The demolition study proves
once again that wars, as Alexander Bickel said, are "very hard on judg-
es. 11413 Indeed, this study may be viewed as support for those who propose
that, because of their repeated failure to protect human rights during crises,
courts should be removed from this kind of adjudication.414 Such proposals
have even come from the bench. Justice Jackson, for example, deemed
judicial protection in such circumstances to be "wholly delusive." He would
have left review of the actions of military commanders to the public's political
judgment and to the moral judgment of history. 45 The task of protecting
human rights in time of war, he admitted with discontent, is too demanding
of judges. 416 Because it is so difficult to resolve these matters, courts are
likely to uphold virtually any measure advocated by security authorities. The
fear, then, is that courts will legitimize governmental acts that are in fact
extreme, and, in doing so, they will bend the law and threaten their own
legitimacy.4 17 The net result could do more harm than good to the social
order.
The most obvious consequence of barring this type of adjudication is that
aggrieved plaintiffs will have no immediate recourse to counter government
actions taken in the name of national security. This may encourage govern-
ments to cloak actions in claims of crisis. But the opposite result is also
possible. Without the shield of judicial approval, security authorities may be
forced to face other kinds of criticism. Even security personnel are ultimately
accountable to the polity through the political system; and, like all human
beings, they bear moral responsibility for their actions. Self-restraint may,
then, serve to protect human rights.
A solution to this dilemma, however, is not offered here. Instead, the
demolition study demonstrates the complexity and indeterminacy of the matter,
and directs us to questions that must be addressed before we can draw any
conclusion. First, how did judicial approval affect the policy in question? At
first glance, the Israeli Supreme Court's treatment of the demolition practice
appears to provide strong support for barring the involvement of courts. We
observed how the demolition practice flourished with the Court's approval.
The Military Government began by defending the practice in its narrowest
form, and gradually expanded it as the Court broadened the doctrine. For a
long period, the Military Commanders had no reason to fear that the Court
413. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 45 (1962).
414. See, e.g., George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts
During Periods of Emergency, 5 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1984).
415. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
416. Id. at 245.
417. The decisions concerning Japanese-American internment and their subsequent reversal by
Congress and in the courts provide a good example of this phenomenon. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS (1982), excerpted in JUSTICE DELAYED (Peter
Irons ed., 1989); Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United States,
584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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might disapprove of their actions. It is also quite probable that the Court's
attitude soothed moral doubts the Military Commanders might otherwise have
entertained. But we also saw how a minority of justices ultimately managed
to stifle the demolition practice. The Military Government eventually yielded
to three unfavorable decisions and two dissents. Just as the judiciary once
fostered the demolition practice, it later undermined and delegitimized it.
While I believe that the Court's decisions did more harm than good, the
precise net result remains difficult to assess.
Second, is there good reason to believe that the government's conduct
would have been better without judicial review? This is equally difficult to
determine. An answer to this question requires an assessment of whether the
Military Government would have applied self-restraint were it not for the
Court's oversight. We can formulate a partial response by examining how the
Military Government implemented the demolition practice before it was first
upheld by the Court. We saw that at first the Military Government demolished
homes without allowing any legal recourse. If petitions managed to get to the
Court in time, however, the Military Government relaxed the particular
orders. From the Military Government's apparent attempts to preempt judicial
review, we can infer that the prospects for self-restraint were poor - that
removing the demolition question from the Court's purview would not have
curbed the practice. This assessment, however, is based on the Military
Government's conduct during a limited period of time. As previously
mentioned, it is possible that without the benefit of the Court's legitimation,
the Military Commanders might not have been able to sustain the criticism
and antagonism engendered by the practice, and might have begun to limit the
policy, as the Court ultimately did.
Ultimately, the appropriate role of courts in defending human rights in
times of national security must be determined on the basis of their overall
performance. Although, as I have argued throughout this Article, the Court's
decisions on the demolition issue have marred Israeli law and tarnished the
Court's own image, the Court's performance in reviewing the actions of the
Military Government has not been homogenous. While the Court has endorsed
some unsavory practices, it has also restricted others. Eliminating judicial
oversight would, naturally, prevent courts from extending their protection of
human rights, as they occasionally do.
Take for example, Morcous v. Minister of Defense,41 which concerned
a request to distribute gas masks to Palestinians in the West Bank under the
threat of an Iraqi chemical gas barrage. The case was decided some forty-
eight hours prior to the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War, at a time when the
Iraqi pledge to obliterate Tel Aviv was generally commended on the
Palestinian streets. Justice Barak, speaking for the Court, affirmed the
Military Government's obligation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
418. 45(1) P.D. 467 (1991).
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to attend to the safety of the civilian population - a duty that he interpreted
to include supplying the equipment necessary for their physical. protection
from hostile assaults. The Court also admonished the Military Government for
discriminating between the Jewish and Palestinian populations and stressed
that the commitment to equality must prevail even in the face of such security
tensions.
In sum, weighing the harm caused by judicial legitimization of practices
like the home demolition practice against the benefit of decisions such as
Morcous yields indeterminate conclusions. And within this realm of uncer-
tainty, it would be imprudent to surrender vital rights to unfettered govern-
mental discretion. Rather than suspending judicial oversight on the assumption
that courts will always fall short, we should aspire to have good courts. It is
our duty to hail them for upholding the law and protecting human rights and
to criticize them when they fail to do so.

